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THE ✓ PRINCETON SEMINARY BULLETIN

Militant Christianity—Defense and Offense

Eugene Carson Blake

Openness—The New Missionary Calling

of the Church

Charles W. Forman

Sermons:

The Inescapable God

Christian Discipline

A New Age of Inwardness?

The Apathy of Christ

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Religious Pluralism and World Community

Edward J. Jurji

Troubled People in a Troubled World

I. People in the Suburbs

II. People in Cities

III. People at Work and Play

Seward Hiltner

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THE PRINCETON SEMINARY BULLETIN

DONALD MACLEOD, *Editor*

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The Princeton Seminary Bulletin

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New York

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Titus Street Professor

of Ecclesiastical History, Emeritus

Yale University Divinity School

THE ANNIE KINKEAD WARFIELD LECTURESHIP

March 27-31, 1967

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Professor of Religion

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IN THIS ISSUE

THE initial article in this number of THE BULLETIN, entitled "Militant Christianity—Defense and Offense," was the first James J. Reeb Memorial Address, delivered by Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, the Stated Clerk of the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church, on March 4, 1966. The Board of Trustees of Princeton Theological Seminary established a special annual lectureship to be continued for five years in memory of James J. Reeb, of the Class of 1953, who died in the struggle for freedom at Selma, Alabama, on March 11, 1965.

The Students' Lectureship on Missions, 1965-1966, was held by Dr. Charles W. Forman, Professor of Missions, Yale University Divinity School. We are pleased to make available to our alumni the first lecture in the series, "Openness—The New Missionary Calling of the Church."

The sermons in this issue were given at the regular Chapel services during this school year: "The Inescapable God," by Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen, president emeritus of Union Theological Seminary, New York; "Christian Discipline," by Dr. Frederick M. Meek, minister of the Old South Church, Boston, Mass.; "A New Age of Inwardness?" by Dr. James N. Lapsley, assistant professor of Pastoral Care; and "The Apathy of Christ," by the Rev. Gilbert E. Doan, Northeastern Secretary, Division of College and University Work of the National Lutheran Council. Mr. Doan is also a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Theology in Homiletics and Liturgics in the Department of Practical Theology.

During the week of May 4-11, the second Edward F. Gallahue Conference on World Religions was held under the auspices of Princeton Theological Seminary. The substance and trends of the conference are summed up in an article, "Religious Pluralism and World Community," by Edward J. Jurji, Princeton's Professor of the History of Religions, who served along with the Chairman, Dr. James I. McCord, as Conference Director.

The 1966 Alden-Tuthill Lectures at The Chicago Theological Seminary were given (January 25-26) by Dr. Seward Hiltner, professor of Theology and Personality at Princeton. These three Lectures, under the general title "Troubled People in A Troubled World," are published through the courtesy and generosity of Dr. Hiltner and are commended to the interest of our alumni.

—Donald Macleod

MILITANT CHRISTIANITY— DEFENSE AND OFFENSE

EUGENE CARSON BLAKE

When I was a small boy in a Presbyterian Sunday School, with what great gusto we used to sing:

Onward! Christian soldiers,
Marching *as to* war,
With the Cross of Jesus
Going on before.

For a good many years now it has not been fashionable in many church circles to sing this hymn. The reason for this is the bad conscience of many Christians as to their churches' failures in wartime to make sufficient distinction between the nation's war effort and the battle in which the churches themselves should be directly engaged. Actually there is nothing wrong and a good deal right with the sentiment expressed in "Onward Christian Soldiers," if you think about what the words really say. Note that the war supported in the opening verse is the battle of the Church—Christian soldiers are marching *as to war*—moreover there is the "Cross of Jesus going on before," which symbolizes both the purpose of this Christian war and even hints at its unique method of victory—not by the infliction of suffering on an enemy, but rather by the voluntary acceptance of suffering by the *Christian* soldiers.

In this vein I have chosen to speak to you tonight on the subject "Militant Christianity—Defense and offense." I would make it clear at the

outset that I use this military metaphor not in any connection whatever with the nation's present military effort in Vietnam, but rather to set the tone of what I want to say about the present state of the Christian Church in our nation and in the world as it is engaged in its battles both to survive and to be relevant to the life of men and women everywhere.

"The Church Militant" is a traditional way to describe the Christian Church theologically in "salvation history," between the coming of Christ almost two thousand years ago, and his *parousia*, or second coming in power to establish his Kingdom on earth. I do not want, however, to use our time together to discuss the theology of dispensationalism, but rather to remind you that to think of Christians and the Church as an army of soldiers is on the whole right and useful.

By using the military metaphor, one can be reminded of a number of spiritual truths that are always in danger of being forgotten. For example, there is a leader and commander, even Jesus Christ. Again there are powerful enemies who will be defeated only if in addition to loyalty, there is strategy in our Christian efforts. Furthermore we need to remember that the Church is not essentially an institution, but rather a movement. It has a mission in the military sense of that word, that is to say, an objec-

tive to be achieved, and there are adversaries who stand in the way of reaching it. One can go on and be reminded of the discipline and organization required as much in an effective church as in an effective army. Further there is variety and diversity in any army. Some fight on the front lines, and others are engaged in bringing up supplies and support from the rear. There are skirmishers, cavalry, artillery, and even spies, as well as quartermasters, foot soldiers, cooks, physicians, and Generals. One could go on in this way and remember too that unity is as important to the Church as it is to an army. Surely variety and diversity are important too, but no more than coordination, discipline, and unified command.

My topic indicates, however, that I want to speak to you tonight on just two aspects of the Christian effort in our time that are suggested by it: Militant Christianity—Defense and Offense.

I do not know how many of you may be chess players. In this age of television, it is my guess that few of us play chess very often. And let me make it clear at the outset, that I do not speak about chess as an expert, but rather as a rank amateur. This much I have learned about this military game. After the formal opening, one soon finds himself both under attack and attacking. The King, and the other pieces too, must be constantly defended; but no victory can be won in chess unless you attack as well. The fun of the game is in the combination of the two purposes. Nothing is quite so pleasant as to find a defensive move forced upon you by your opponent, which is at the same time offensive,

that is, it puts pressure upon a piece of your opponent in the very process of defending your own.

Or perhaps some of you are more familiar with football. A successful football team must be able both to score itself and to keep down the score of the other team. One of the best ways to defend is what coaches call "ball control"—which is to keep on the attack for as many minutes of each quarter as possible. The best defense is often a good offense.

So much for illustrations. I want to talk to you tonight about what the Church must defend and also what it must attack.

To do this, first of all, I must remind you of the obvious fact that our world is a changing world. This has been said so often and in so many ways that it is hard to talk about it without boring you by repeating what you have heard too often already. So I shall merely use the common words to remind you of the extent and depth of the changes we face in our world. For it is, I believe, the number of changes that we face, plus their interplay on each other, that causes most of the fear and frustration that characterize our times.

Population explosion—all over the world. What do we do to feed, house, and organize the life of men whose numbers are growing by geometric progression? *Urbanization*. How do we keep human life human and humane, when men are more and more packed into high-rise apartments in bigger and bigger cities? *Technological unemployment*. How do we find jobs for everybody when programmed machines do so many things better? And how do we use the leisure that

machines make possible? *Depersonalization*. How do we avoid becoming merely numbers in a machine? *Cybernetics*. Who is to program the machines and on what values? *Nuclear War*. How do we prevent it and how to find ways to promote peaceful change? *The Shrinking World*. What does it mean that on radio we can hear and on television soon we will see anything of importance immediately wherever it happens? *Interdependence*. What does it mean to be dependent for life itself on electricity, or rapid transit, or good labor relations? *Pluralism*. How can you reconcile necessary tolerance with vital convictions?

I have said enough, I hope, to make it clear to all of us that our world is rapidly becoming a very different place from that into which most of us were born. Change is rapid and even revolutionary. And most of us do not like it. Our securities are threatened. We fear the future. We want to withdraw, but find ourselves increasingly involved. What do Christians do in such a changing world? Is our faith relevant to any of this? My topic suggests that Militant Faith is relevant—that a battle is going on in this world of change and that the Church must join in the battle. And this battle is both defensive and offensive, as is every battle. I ask you now to consider with me two questions: I. What must we defend? and II. What do we attack?

I.

What does militant Christian faith defend?

I. First of all we defend the faith itself. One of the reasons that conserva-

tive-minded Christians are so much upset with the world and with their own churches today is that they fear that the churches are listening so much to the secular world that they are giving up the essential reason for their existence, namely, God and the gospel—the good news of Jesus Christ. And this fear has some grounds. In every age there is the possibility that the essential values and goods of the past will be lost, or partly lost in trying to adjust to the present and the future.

What are conservatives among us properly worried about? They are afraid that their ministers and leaders do not believe in God anymore. They are afraid that they do not believe in morality—in right and wrong. They are afraid that we do not believe the Bible, that there is no longer any authority. They are afraid that denominational leaders do not believe in their denominations, that they have given up on their congregations and that the lay people are not heeded in their concerns.

Remember my point here is that militant faith will defend the truth and the values of the past. And my sincere answer to the conservatives of the Church is that it is important that we lose none of these things. It is, however, interesting to me that despite all, these fears (which I have already said are legitimate) had more ground when I was a boy fifty years ago than in my judgment they have today. Fifty years ago the Christian understanding of God as revealed in Jesus Christ in the Bible was more under attack than it is today, either in the world, or in the Church itself. Darwin and evolution, technology (primitive

though it was by our standards), materialism, historical criticism of the Bible, and the whole idea of revelation were shaking the very foundations of the Christian faith in 1916 in a way that none of these "new ideas," or their successors are doing today. The climax of that battle of defense came about 1926, forty years ago, and ever since the Church has been stronger in a defensible faith than it had been since Darwin and the industrial revolution.

In another connection I have recently outlined what appears to me to be ecumenical consensus theology that has made the Church stronger in the past thirty years than it had been before. I repeat the four points here.

The theology that now undergirds the churches—Protestant, Orthodox and Roman Catholic—may be summed up in these four major convictions:

a. There is a transcendent God, who has revealed himself in Jesus Christ.

b. Knowledge of this God is found in reading the Bible and understanding what it says in historical context.

c. The heart of Christian faith remains what it has always been: God, who created the universe, is Redeemer through Jesus Christ and he is fulfilling his purpose in history.

d. "Time makes ancient good uncouth," which fact requires us radically to revise our understanding of what should be expected of followers of Jesus Christ today as contrasted to what was required fifty years ago.

This is not an easy faith, or a minimum faith. This is the traditional faith restated for our times. It is under attack from many quarters. It needs to be defended, not merely as a theo-

retical theology, but rather as the convictions by which Christians must live in order to be Christian soldiers. I would, therefore, remind those conservatives in the Church, who are fearful that the faith is being betrayed by the Church itself, that they often are attacking the wrong enemy when they are fundamentally critical of the ecumenical consensus that is guiding most of the churches in America today. As in a confused battle in a fog, it is not always easy to determine which is friend and which is foe, so today many fearful conservatives do not realize that the restatement of the ancient Biblical faith and its defense is in fact the number one duty of the Church in our time.

2. In the second place, militant Christian faith in our times is called upon to defend the best of the heritage of our nation. I will mention just four aspects of our American heritage that I believe all Christians ought to join in defending.

a. *Equality*—especially equality of opportunity. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States were written upon the conviction that all men by their creation had rights. "Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" is the classic formula. Totalitarian governments of both the left and right ignore and trample these basic rights of men. It is true that we have not as a nation always lived up to this initial faith and conviction. It took almost one hundred years for the nation to understand that the slavery of Africans was a contradiction to our basic national position. As we approach the end of the second hundred years, we confess these rights are still unsecured for all

our people. We must as Christians defend the basic equality of all men as the pledge of allegiance expresses it, "with liberty and justice for all."

b. We must defend responsible individual freedom. I have travelled a good deal in the past ten years in communist countries. The one thing we have that those totalitarian states do not have is individual freedom. If and when the power of any state is used to coerce men either to think alike, or to regiment their acts, the freedom which we must, as Christians, defend is lost. But our nation is lost if, generally speaking, this freedom is irresponsibly used. We must as Christians uphold responsible freedom.

c. We must defend individual enterprise. The strength of our nation is still in its *voluntarism* in business, in social concern, and in government. This is the importance of the Church, the trade union movement, the Chamber of Commerce, the women's clubs, and the whole galaxy of voluntary enterprises of our nation. The encouragement of "free enterprise" in this sense is one part of our heritage we must be in the business of defending.

d. Finally, we must, as Christians, defend government of by and for the people. We are a proud people and all pride is not evil. We should be proud of our great experiment of government—its stability, its resiliency, and its justice. By no means have we been perfect. During most of our history, municipal government has been excessively corrupt. But we have institutions of freedom which we must defend. If we successfully defend our faith and our heritage in the terms I have stated them, we will have made the relevant contribution of faith to

life that our times demand of us. I am pleading with you to be conservatives in this sense.

But to conserve the good of the past and to defend it requires us equally to attack—to lead in the offense that militant Christian faith requires of us.

II.

What then must we attack? I mention three enemies that we must defeat.

1. The too prevalent conservative idea and attitude that the new, that innovation is wrong, *per se*, and *ipso facto*. Some of you will still remember the earlier section of this address when I merely listed the new facts that we face in a changing and revolutionary world. To try to be conservative by ignoring the new conditions in which all men find themselves today and to resist for this reason the efforts to change anything is the new way to lose the battle. It is because we are conservative in the right sense that there must be innovations and risks undertaken.

The most exciting and rewarding things that have been happening in the life of the Church, and its connected movements, are precisely the new stances and activities that have been so controversial. Nuns demonstrating in the streets for civil rights. Ministers of comfortable churches with their young people actually risking their lives out of militant faith. Ecclesiastical officials willing to risk the institution's unity and strength for the purpose of saving its soul.

These are the reasons it is good to be alive in the Christian movement today and I feel sorry for all those who, through fear or misunderstanding,

have not become a part of it. It is new patterns of life conserving the values of the past that are the hope of the future.

2. Again we must attack hypocrisy which is today, as it was two thousand years ago, the chief sin of religious people. I do not believe we ought to be easily charging hypocrisy against all who disagree with us. But I do suggest that we must attack root and branch those who profess Americanism and Christianity to cover up their major concern of holding on to special privilege. We will never successfully resist atheistic communism unless we stop using God to defend pocketbooks and privilege.

The marxist charge is that all our institutions (including the Church) are but thinly disguised attempts to keep the masses of the people down in order that the privileged people may stay in control and protect their privileges. They charge that our laws do not aim at justice, but rather at control. They say that our whole way of life is a gigantic hoax on the common people in the name of God.

I shall not take time this evening to demolish this argument of the marxist. It can be demolished. But, it cannot ever be successfully countered in the world of today unless we who believe in freedom repent of our greed and turn from our personal fears and give up our hypocrisies.

Most of you know that in these past few years I have been giving a great deal of my time to the concerns of race and poverty. I mention these two areas of present concern, because they are the best illustrations of the hypocrisy of the Church and nation

which must be attacked in order to save the Church and nation.

Despite the clear teachings of the Christian gospel and the basic framework of the Constitution of the United States that racial prejudice and racial discrimination are utterly wrong, there are millions of Christian Americans who have not yet been brave enough to take their stand unequivocally for racial and economic justice. I do not charge any individual with conscious hypocrisy. That is not the issue. I do charge the groups of Americans who have not yet joined in the critical battle to establish equal justice, freedom and opportunity for all in our land and in the world with the ultimate betrayal of the Church and nation out of fear and selfishness.

The slum housing in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland, Boston, Baltimore and St. Louis, is a disgrace to the nation and will be the cause of its collapse unless we tear the tenements down and build decent housing for the poor. The educational system, which gives poor education to the poor, must be supported by more dollars than any legislation has yet dreamed of so that we can safely retain government of and by the people. The health of the poor in this rich land is a disgrace to any people. The racial discrimination in jobs, the level of wages in the worst jobs, (I refer to migrants, tenant farmers, service employees, domestics, etc.) gives ground for the marxist charges against our whole way of life.

You will note that I have not used the words capitalism or socialism so far in this address. I suggest that they are mostly used to confuse the social

and economic issues that the nation and the world are facing and to prevent answers being found. What I am saying, and I hope very clearly, indeed, is that we must attack hypocrisy which uses any kind of words to cover up hate and fear and greed.

3. Finally, I suggest that we must attack that blighting cynicism which takes the heart out of the troops. This is where the Church has a very specific contribution to make in the course of this battle. To believe in God is to have courage in the face of defeat. To follow Jesus Christ is not to be a romantic idealist, but to believe despite the sin of man, realistically observed, that men may be converted by the power of God. To be a Christian is to believe that with God the battle may be won in this world now and in eternity.

The blight of cynicism which leads to distrust of one another and saps the courage of us all is an enemy that must be defeated.

So I have tried to encourage you to a militant Christian faith to defend what is good and cherish it, to attack what is evil and destroy it. Such faith gives meaning to human life and hope to a revolutionary and changing world.

I remind you as I close that in this war, as in any war, there are casualties and there are heroes too. The old-fashioned word for Christian heroes who lose their lives in Christian warfare is "martyr." In English a martyr is one who is killed as he (or because he) is witnessing to his faith.

As the history of the Church in the 1960's is later written, I hope those who describe our days will note clearly

that the Church militant in the United States has begun to have her martyrs again in the authentic sense of that word. No normal man chooses to be a martyr. But men and women who did not even know they were being brave have found themselves answering a call from God that put their lives in jeopardy. The martyrs of our time, as of any time, do not always agree theologically—some do not even know they are Christian martyrs. They heard a call. Freely they answered it by putting themselves, their souls and bodies in the front line of the conflict.

James J. Reeb was a martyr of the Church of Jesus Christ. He studied theology in this institution. He became a Presbyterian minister. He left the Presbyterian ministry, doubtless because our Church seemed to him too slow to move to where the action was. He entered the ministry of a Church that at a crucial point of Christian theology is at sharp variance from the system of theology taught here.

Yet this seminary, James Reeb's seminary, honors one of her sons by establishing this lectureship in his memory. Some would say that this is an embarrassment both to the seminary and to the Presbyterian Church.

And so it is. But the embarrassment I feel tonight is not that of a trustee of a seminary or an officer of a Church that cannot boast of James Reeb's belonging to us theologically. My embarrassment is rather that we are a Church and we are an institution which for too long has been content that its ministers and graduates should be safe and professional in their Christian calling. And I do not believe it is the weight of orthodox or con-

servative theology that makes heroes and martyrs move from us to the front line of battle. It is rather that we have not moved forward as our faith demands; we have been careful and self-protective. We have forgotten the cross practically, of which we have made so much theologically. We have been, God forgive us, more concerned with intellectual dogma than with courageous faith.

May the martyr death of James J. Reeb keep on reminding us that right teaching is fruitless without courage and devotion. Let us all listen for the call that summons *us* from the safe and static camp into the marching column. For the Church is again on the march, and as always when the Church is in the right battle, there is ever the Cross of Jesus going on before.

OPENNESS—THE NEW MISSIONARY CALLING OF THE CHURCH

CHARLES W. FORMAN

For some time there has been spreading among Christians of all varieties a fresh realization of the fact that the Church does not live for itself. We are reminded that the Church must turn from preoccupation with itself to a concern for the world around it. It must see its life in terms of mission. This concern has recently been carried a step further. The Church is now being called not only to a life of mission in the world but also to openness to the world. The difference might be clarified by saying that to live in terms of mission means to be concerned for others, while to live in terms of openness means to go beyond that concern and to open one's own life to the others, to participate in their life and to be at their mercy, to allow mission to take its shape from the situation in which they exist. This is the kind of openness to which the Church's mission is being challenged today.

The force of history is pressing all groups and institutions toward a greater openness in our time. Segregated societies, minority groups, restricted clubs—all of them feel a pressure to open up, to relax their exclusiveness and to lower their walls. The greater ease of communication and speed of travel which characterize our world exercise a ferment for openness. The easier possibility of reading what other groups are writing and of hearing what others are saying

makes it harder to keep away from their ideas. Formerly isolated ethnic groups in our society, as for example the Jews, find that they cannot keep themselves closed off even if they want to do so. Their younger generations are rejecting the attempts of their elders to keep associations within the group and marriages inside the community. And groups which resent isolation like the Negroes are finding it somewhat easier to move out into society at large.

All these changes have their effect upon the Church which is discovering in its own heritage a demand for openness it has heretofore neglected. Karl Barth in his *Church Dogmatics* works out at length the belief that the Church is the place where men practice their solidarity with the world, and he presents an extensive critique of past Protestant thought because it has neglected to open the Church, but has rather turned it in upon itself.¹ Masao Takenaka in the Mott Lectures for the EACC has described the new man in Christ as the open man, open to Christ and to secular engagement. Hans Hoekendijk has maintained that the Church is a function of the apostolate, that the Church must allow itself to be taken up in God's action in the world and must reconstitute itself over and over in accordance with

¹ Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, IV, 3 (Second half), pp. 762-773.

the various forms of society.² Colin Williams and others like him have suggested that the Church must take new shapes according to the needs of the world around it, and the shape that is taken may not be that with which we are familiar.³

The archetype for this new approach is provided by Jesus himself as he was delivered to the Gentiles. The phrase which is used about Jesus in Luke's gospel (18:32)—"that he will be delivered to the Gentiles"—carries a double meaning for us. It means that he was to be turned over to the Gentiles, to be put at their mercy, to suffer under them even as the Church is now to be turned over to and put at the mercy of men. The phrase also suggests in a more oblique way that Christ was to be delivered to them in the sense of being a gift to the Gentiles, belonging to them and being the Christ of the Gentiles. Likewise the Church is to be a gift to all men, to belong to them. These meanings of being at the mercy of men and being a gift to them depend on each other and imply each other. It was only in being given as a gift to the Gentiles that Christ could be fully at the mercy of men even to the point of death, for it was not lawful for the Jews to put any man to death. On the other hand, it was only in being delivered to their mercy that Christ could be a gift to the Gentiles. If he had been the Messiah who won an earthly victory, such as the Jews ex-

pected, he would have had to represent one nation over against the other nations and so he could not have been a gift delivered to all. It was only as the suffering one that he could be given to all nations and all could appropriate him as their own, as one who belonged to them rather than as the champion of their opponents.

In accordance with this pattern the Church is called to be delivered to the nations. The realization grows that Christ is to be taken by the Church out into the world and put at the mercy of the nations, not kept within his own community where he is honored. He can belong to all the nations as their Messiah only as he ceases to be the champion of certain so called Christian nations and implicitly thereby the opponent of other nations, and becomes instead one who is at the mercy of and open to all nations. This is true not only in the movement between nations but also within one country. In our own country the Church can belong to all people only by suffering for them and giving itself to them, not by standing for the Christian group and consequently against the others. Some of the loss of position and rejection which the Church has suffered in our time seems to be an appropriate concomitant to its openness and readiness to give itself up to and take form in the life of the men among whom it is set.

We can hardly conceive how great is the change which this attitude represents as compared with that of one or two generations ago. In earlier generations the stress was on the fact that the world was open to the Church, not the Church to the world. Great surveys were made of the whole world, for

² *Concept*. Papers from the Department on Studies in Evangelism, World Council of Churches, VII (May 1964), pp. 3-7.

³ Colin Williams, *Where in the World*, National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1963.

the Edinburgh Conference for example, to show how the world was opening up for Christian advance. Land after land which had been closed was now open. Edinburgh represented only one of the clearest examples of the Church looking out upon a world that lay at its feet, open to its penetration—rather than presenting a challenge to its own openness. For 1500 years, from the time of Constantine, the Church has approached the world from a position of cultural or political superiority. Especially when the Church has been engaged in missions has it operated from a self-consciously superior position, expecting the world to be open to it rather than for it to be open to the world.

In the post-Constantinian Empire Christians carried the weight of government favor and influence and the heathen were gradually relegated to the heath, the back waters and fringes of society. When Rome sent its first missionary embassy to Britain under Augustine the missionaries represented an admittedly superior culture. The same was true when missionaries from Byzantium moved into central Europe and Russia. The Central European Slavs, when confronted by the German advance, had to face a Christianity with not only cultural superiority but also military superiority.

When the modern age opened and a Christian mission was launched into the New World the same situation prevailed. Christianity was associated with a technically more advanced culture, a literary as against a largely pre-literate culture, with military superiority which expressed itself in conquest, and with political rule. This was true of the Spanish occupation

in the South with which went the greatest and most rapid missionary expansion ever achieved by the Church, and it was also true of the English and French in the North. The missionaries to Asia in that same period made constant use of the prestige of the Portuguese power to which they were related, at least whenever they were in areas where that prestige was effective. It must be said that in the 16th and 17th century missions to some parts of Asia, such as the Malabar, China and Japan missions of the Jesuits, there was a closer approximation to equality of status and consequent openness to influence on the part of Christian missions than at any other time between Constantine and the Second World War.

The missionary movement of the 19th and early 20th century was entirely a movement from a position of superiority. Military and political dominance belonged to the peoples from whom the missionary came. Cultural dominance accompanied the other forms. Missions were a movement reaching downward, not a movement reaching outward on a level. Even in cases where there was no military or political conquest such as in Japan, there was a sense of superiority since the Japanese people had decided to westernize themselves in order to keep up with the rest of the world.

This characteristic fact of the missionary situation over the past millennium and a half cannot be taken as a criticism of the missionaries or the missions in that period. This was the fact of the situation within which they worked and nothing they could have done would have altered the fact. The

unfortunate thing was that the facts of the situation tended to produce in the mission a closed attitude toward those among whom it was sent. A description of the early missionaries to Malaya has this to say of them: "Such was their contempt for the non-Christian faiths and a seeming unawareness of the relationship of religion to the cultural life of the people that no attempt seems to have been made to understand the people whom they wished to reach."⁴ An early issue of the *Missionary Register* published in Britain asked the question: "Shall sixty million heathen subjects of the British Crown be abandoned to a cruel and debasing superstition, when prudent measures and holy men will with the blessing of God be the means of enlightening their minds, elevating their characters, attaching them to British interests and everlastingly saving their souls?"⁵ In this outlook there was little room for openness or humility in the mission. Though there were certainly missionaries who felt that Christians had much to learn from and appreciate in the people among whom they served the general attitude was not one which expressed such openness and appreciation.

The sense of superiority with its consequent closed attitudes was, understandably enough, appropriated by the converts won through the work of the missions. Gandhi criticized the Indian Christians for being "ashamed

of their birth, certainly of their ancestral religion, and of their ancestral dress." The Ambonese Christians who represent the oldest Protestant Church of Asia, have been described as lazy, careless and poor. The reason given for this is that they have had a strong conviction of their superiority as Christians along with the belief which is common to their society that a superior man does not work but lives from the labor of others.

Only in the 20th century has there been a change from the situation of superiority within which the mission has been carried on for 1500 years. The people who were subjected to the dominance of "Christian" powers have rebelled and asserted their equality. The change from that situation has brought a gradual development toward openness in the mission. This development began to be noticeable in the very early years of this century. It is perhaps significant that an open Church movement began in the 1890's in America, and an Open Church League was formed in 1894. This was, to be sure, only a movement to keep Church buildings open every day, but even that action had significance; the building was open so it could be used by the community; the Church was opening itself up to the community around it. It was at one of the conferences of the Open Church League that the call was first sounded for the creation of a federation of churches to more adequately serve the people of this country and from that developed the Federal Council of Churches and our present National Council of Churches.

In Asia and Africa with the dawn of the 20th century prophetic voices

⁴ J. Harry Haines, "History of Protestant Missions in Malaya" (unpublished Doctoral dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary), p. 228.

⁵ Quoted in Max Warren, *The Missionary Movement from Britain in Modern History* (London: SCM Press, 1965), p. 55.

began to be raised and new lines of relationship began to be explored. From the Catholic and Protestant sides two men stand out as widely recognized representatives of the new approach. It is interesting to see how these two men between them embodied in those early years almost all of the expressions of openness to which the church is now feeling called. The Catholic was Charles de Foucauld and the Protestant, Charles Freer Andrews. Foucauld was a French nobleman and army officer who became a priest and a missionary among the Tuaregs of North Africa. He was killed in an uprising in 1916. Foucauld had many and varied ideas of how the mission should be carried out and there was a considerable development of his thought through the years. Therefore, it is difficult to derive one emphasis in the missionary calling from Foucauld's life. Some of his emphases have persisted and others have not. Certainly his close relation to the French army and his interest in French imperial expansion in the Sahara have not been of continuing significance. But he did express and put into action certain convictions about being open and approachable which have proven very influential. "It is a good thing to live alone," he said, . . . "because one comes to belong and can make oneself so little and so easy to approach." He renounced organized charities in favor of simple participation with men: "Take the life of Nazareth in its simplicity and broadness as your objective," he wrote, "no special costume or habit-like Jesus at Nazareth, no enclosure-like Jesus at Naz-

areth."⁶ He himself lived alone among the tribal people whom he had adopted as his own, bearing life with them and carrying on his religious services till the time of his death. His influence began to be felt in the 1930's when an order was organized on the lines of his proposals and he has been increasingly influential ever since, especially among European Catholics.

Contemporaneously with Foucauld the Protestant missionary, Charles F. Andrews, was discovering other aspects of the call to openness. Andrews came to the point of severing his connection with the organized mission in order to be in more intimate touch with Indians of all creeds. He threw himself into the midst of every crucial struggle of his time in India—the struggle for Indian freedom, the struggle against indentured service, the struggle for Indian equality in South Africa, the struggle for reconciliation between Hindu and Muslim communities. Everywhere he went he called men to justice and humanity and reconciliation, and he seemed to have the gift of leading men to search their hearts and to repentance.

Andrews and Foucauld marked much of the course ahead for Protestants and Catholics in Asia and Africa. Gradually the change of outlook became more general. In Africa after the First World War there came what Bengt Sundkler has described as "a definite change of heart" regarding African life and culture. Missionary scholars and leaders emphasized "the value of the African's past" and tried to develop an appreciation for it

⁶ R. Voillaume, *Seeds of the Desert: The Legacy of Charles de Foucauld*, pp. 18 and 22.

among their colleagues. Edwin W. Smith, Dietrich Westermann and Placide Tempels are the best known among this group. Missionaries even became more appreciative of African life than were the leading Africans. Chief Awolowo, the dominant politician of Western Nigeria, in his autobiography of 1960 writes: "The principal of the college [Wesley College Ibadan] in my time, the Reverend E. H. Nightingale, B.D., suffered a good deal of unjustified criticism. Essentially his view was that we should be proud of anything that was indigenous to us: our language, our culture and our style of dress. It was believed that Mr. Nightingale fostered these policies in order to slow down our progress in the western sense. I shared this view then, but now I think that he was a great pioneer. Practically all of his critics are today doing precisely what he preached many years ago."⁷

In Asia during the same period Hendrik Kraemer was trying to develop more respect and openness among the missionaries in Sumatra toward the Batak people among whom they worked. In a report on the Batak missions written in 1930 he urged missionaries to stop impressing on Bataks the bad conditions of their past before they became Christians. He said the older Bataks were ashamed of that past and resented being reminded of it. They regarded this European talk as a way of shaming them. The younger Bataks did not even know that past and were espe-

cially resentful of the missionaries for bringing it up. "We Europeans," he wrote, "are always considered representatives of the superior and ruling race. These people will not readily believe that we are sincerely and truly glad when a person of colored race becomes equal to us." "The Batak," he maintained, "rightly sense that they are valued as objects of missionary work, not as people in themselves."⁸ Here we can see both the old superior and closed attitude and the new attempt to adopt a more humble and open approach.

Kraemer returned to this theme in his most recent writing. In an article on "Islamic Culture and Missionary Inadequacy"⁹ he reminds missionaries that the world has changed from the time when the West could regard and did regard all other peoples as moribund and backward. Missions in the colonial world, he says, could be carried on in entire disregard of the opinion of the Muslim population. This was unnatural and made for resentment of missions. But now a change is coming. The time of age old antagonism, unilateral closed mindedness, and communication by monologue, he says, must now give way to mutual interdependence, genuine human encounter and open dialogue. Then the Muslim world will be able to see the Church as she is according to her true nature.

Kraemer's words set forth clearly the change which is in process in the Church at the present time. The call

⁷ The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 69.

⁸ *From Missionfield to Independent Church*, pp. 69-70.

⁹ *The Muslim World*, X (Oct. 1960), p. 247.

to openness, to being at the disposal of men, to participating in their life and letting the mission take form in terms of their situation is heard more and more. The recent post-war years have seen a great variety of new forms of openness in the mission. The worker-priests in France provided an example of solidarity with the world and of taking shape in terms of the world. The Evangelical Academies in Germany have appeared as places where the Church may discuss the problems of the world with the men most deeply involved in them. The Kerk en Wereld Center in Holland has provided "worldly" forms of theological training for future social workers and industrial personnel officers. The Taizé Community in France has explored what may be done by men working for evangelism and Church unity while living fully as a part of the world.

In America the inner-city churches have led the way in a new openness as they have tried to develop living congregations involved in the issues of city life, centering on the kind of worship which is related to the environment and on Bible study which leads to social action. Specialized ministries which take form in terms of the situations in which men live, work and play have proliferated in this country. There are now coffee houses by the dozen, recreation ministries, ministries to night people, shopping center ministries, and so forth. All this activity and experimentation has been brought to a head in the ecumenical study sponsored by the World Council of Churches on the missionary structure of the congregation. The

attempt is to find that structure which will be open to the world and will therefore enhance rather than hinder the proclamation of the gospel. Gradually some of the shapes and qualities of that type of missionary congregation or missionary Church are becoming apparent to us. It is to be a Church which does not try to dominate society, but to serve it, a church which is in touch with the sore points of the society in which it is located, a Church which is active to heal the wounds of society, a Church which centers in the life of the layman rather than the clergy using the clergy as equippers of the layman in bringing their Christian life and witness into the world, a Church which may be a group of business men in the business world, a company of students in the university, a gathering of laborers in the factory, or a residential parish alive to the full context in which the residential community is set. These are some of the dimensions of the openness to which we are called in our mission.

These dimensions are all well known to you but there is a further quality of the open Church which is usually neglected and which, because it is neglected, I would like to set before you at the present time.

I have in mind the internal cohesion and inner strength which are especially needed in an open Church. The change from a closed, introverted Church to an open, missionary Church marks what we may regard as the change from the molluscan stage to the vertebrate stage in the life of a Church. The Church which lives in a ghetto, which is out of touch

with the life of the world around it and is surrounded by walls of isolation, does not have to worry about the strength of its inner life. Strength is provided by its surrounding walls. It is like a mollusc whose inner structure can be flabby and weak. The protective shell which it has built around itself provides its strength and enables it to continue to exist in a weak and a shapeless state. But if the shell is taken away then the flabby inner life cannot continue.

The Church which is emerging from its shell must absorb the strength formerly provided by that protective covering into its inner life. It must assume a vertebrate structure and internal cohesion must replace external protection. So the Church which lives in solidarity with the world, which is at the mercy of men and open toward them must pay great attention to its inner life and nurture. Each step toward openness calls for a concurrent step toward inner strengthening.

If we look at the experience of the Church where it has begun to open up to the world, I believe we will find that at least three reasons appear why openness must be accompanied by greater efforts for nurture and inner cohesion. One is that opening up and involvement in the world inevitably put a strain on the fellowship of the Church. When the Church moves out and enters into the life and problems of the world it can be expected that Church members will differ in their judgments on how those problems are to be dealt with. Only as they are strongly conscious of their unity in the faith will they be able to hold together through the time of their involvement in the world.

It is instructive, in this connection, to compare the reaction of the Roman Catholics and Protestants to the Communist regime in China when it was first established. The Catholics drew together and presented a solid front with a minimum of concessions and a minimum of openness toward the Communist power. The Protestants, on the contrary, tried to develop the channels of communication and mutual understanding with the Communists. They were far more open than the Catholics. One result was that the Protestants were subjected far more quickly and strongly to inner strains in their fellowship. The Christian Manifesto which was drawn up by certain Protestant leaders became a source of great inner questioning, mutual suspicion, doubts and hostilities within the Protestant fold at a time when the Catholics were still largely holding the line against the Manifesto and drawing their flock more closely together in the process. The early development of the accusation movement among Protestants suggests that their inner strength was not in general adequate to support the openness which they adopted.

The participation of the American churches in the struggle over racial justice has already shown some of the inner strains this involvement can bring to the Church. A century ago American Christianity presented a tragic example of the inability of the inner life of the Church to bear the strains of a similar involvement in the effort for racial justice. What was needed then and will be needed in the days ahead is a great sense of the forgiveness and love of God and the

Lordship of Christ which hold Christians together despite their differences.

A second reason for greater attention to inner life and nurture is that openness and involvement in the issues of the world will bring other people into contact with the Church, and even into the Church, who are only vaguely aware of the nature of this body they are joining. When people see the Church effectively involved on the frontiers of the struggle for a human existence they are drawn to join forces with it though they have little sense of its inner identity in terms of the Lordship of Christ. The missionary work in the non-Western world provides us many examples of this tendency simply because those missions, though far from open to the life of the people, did represent involvement in a struggle for fuller human life for men. The outcaste groups in India often saw the move to Christianity as a way of asserting their dignity and their freedom from onerous caste burdens. In some countries the missions represented above all the new kind of education and the new horizons which it opened up. A young Musoga teacher in 1923 said, "If religion were not connected with education and getting on in the world, how many people should we ever see in this church?"¹⁰ Christianity became so closely connected with education in Africa that elderly people were known to say regretfully "We cannot become Christians, we are no longer able to memorize."

The third and perhaps more immediately evident reason for stressing

inner strength and nurture along with openness is to be found in the diluting effect which openness is likely to have upon the convictions of those who are already Christians. Openness and involvement lead to a scattering of the membership of the Church in the world and the subjection of the membership to constant challenges with regard to their faith. The readiness for this subjection is of the very essence of openness, but it would be foolhardy indeed to assume that such thinning out of the membership will not also produce a thinning out of their Christian convictions unless they are given far more inner cohesion and nurture than the congregation usually provides.

I think for example of the Christians who followed Charles F. Andrews in the Gandhian Movement for independence. It is remarkable how one after another they modified their Christian creed to fit the Hindu emphases of Gandhi and the overriding concerns of national unity. Some adopted a position which looked upon all religions as equally true and useful. Others wrote books describing Jesus as an early advocate of Gandhian ethics and economics. Often they were found preaching to Christian congregations against any Christian preaching. A few of them renounced their Christian heritage; for the rest it remained more a heritage than a motivating faith. In our own country we have had some similar experiences with young Christians who have joined in the civil rights struggle. Though they may have joined in the struggle from Christian conviction, they did not maintain the conviction after a period of involvement in the struggle.

¹⁰ F. B. Welbourn, *East African Rebels*, p. 62.

It is sometimes suggested that if the Church as a whole were more involved in issues such as civil rights in this country or independence in India these dilutions or defections from faith would not take place. I expect, however, that this would be true only if the involvement of the Church as a whole carried with it a stronger common life and deeper Christian commitment than we are presently accustomed to. Bengt Sundkler describes for us what happened when the Church as a whole in Africa identified itself, as we have noted, with the demand for education of the people. The result was a dilution of the faith and something of a defection of purpose on the part of the whole Church rather than on the part of a few individuals as in the Gandhian and civil rights movements. He reports that the whole Church program became geared to the educational planning to such an extent that the essential functions of the church were jeopardized. He describes a Church impoverished in money and spirit by the magnitude of the effort diverted to its schools, so that boys and girls leaving the schools were in danger of finding no vital Church ready to receive them. He speaks of a ministry in bondage to its schools, so used to thinking in terms of schools that even the most overburdened could plead, "Without my schools I cannot be a Methodist minister." He tells of a large West African city where "the Church was only concerned with education, not with evangelism. . . . The leading African minister of a dominant Protestant Church in that city was mainly a big educational administrator. The Church took collections three times on Sunday for their

schools but there was nothing over for the repair of the dilapidated church building." As a Methodist leader put it, "In striving for universal Christian education we must beware lest we wake up in thirty years time to the fact that there is no longer a Christian Church to provide it."¹¹

This type of experience should provide abundant evidence that openness to the world outside needs to be accompanied with deepening nurture and commitment inside.

We are frequently told that the existence of the Church in the coming years will have to be a diaspora type of existence with Christians scattered through the various groupings of society, no longer being a solid phalanx shut off from the world. But if this is true then we must also confess that we have by no means learned how to live as a Christian body in a diaspora form. In general it has happened that where solid phalanxes of Christians have existed, there strong churches have developed, and where Christians have been scattered the churches have languished or died. Recent reports from the Church in India which is trying to establish itself on its own financial foundation after generations of support from the Presbyterians of this country, indicate that where the Church is concentrated in numbers there a good hope exists for self support and continuing congregational life. But where the Church is scattered in small pockets of one or two families in a village there seems to be very little chance of continuation unless money and workers are provided from outside.

¹¹ *The Christian Ministry in Africa*, p. 96.

All this suggests that the call to openness must also be taken as a call to inwardness. The Church must learn how to *train* its members for an open life in the world and for a scattered existence in society. It will require not less but more of that nurture in the faith and worship of God and mutual pastoral care which give inner strength

to replace the lost strength of confining walls. Openness and nurture are not two competing or divergent emphases, but rather they are two rails of the one track along which the Church must move forward. There is no advance along one without an equal advance along the other.

THE INESCAPABLE GOD

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

Psalm 139

THIS Psalm is probably the loftiest declaration of religious faith outside the New Testament. *The Inescapable God*.

When these words are uttered, our spontaneous response is likely to be of one of three kinds :

(i)

To some these words speak with a strange, and indeed alien accent. There is nothing—*nothing*—in our experience which recognised them. Under no possible circumstances could we imagine ourselves repeating them as our own. All of us have been present at discussions in which we felt as complete outsiders. It may be that the talk focused on technical, scientific matters which were altogether beyond our ken, or in the realms of art or literature of which we knew nothing. The universe of speech is familiar enough—each of the words, we understand. But the universe of meanings is wholly foreign. "It's all Greek to me," we complain. Annoyance, irritation, resentment may stir within us. So, with these statements of the 139th Psalm. They sound like exaggerated, poetic imaginings of a far-off and by-gone world. Perhaps we rather distrust them. Certainly we are not comfortable in their presence; we do not like to hear them.

(ii)

With others of us the spontaneous response is somewhat different. We

also listen with ears which do not fully comprehend, but we admit we like to listen. Our experience is somewhat like that of the musically untutored at a first hearing of Wagner's "Parsifal" or Beethoven's "Fifth Symphony." We cannot say that we understand it, but in a vague way we recognize its beauty and its majesty and its reality. If we are unable to affirm it ourselves, we recognize its meaning in the faces and voices of others—those who sing or play, and some who listen. Our appreciation is vicarious, but we are glad to be within that vicarious influence. We may envy just a little those who do understand, for whom it is real. Still, we confess ourselves outsiders; but we know it to be great and true, though we could not so declare it from our own inner certainty. Yes, and perhaps there have been moments, dim flashes, even flickers, when we have caught a fleeting glimpse of its reality for ourselves. We know it to be a great and true, not solely because of its meaning for others, but because of the faintest promise of its meaning for us. So likewise, with the affirmations of the 139th Psalm.

(iii)

But there are some of us who, as these words are spoken, feel their spirits at once at home, and at ease, and at peace. They rest back in quiet satisfaction, as do music-lovers at the first bars of the Grail Motif in the

"Parsifal Overture" or at the dum-dum-dum-DUM (so familiar because of its war-time use) of the "Fifth Symphony." Not infrequently life takes us into other types of companies where likewise we feel painfully out of place. The atmosphere is artificial, unreal, insincere; the talk self-consciously clever, strident, crudely self-important. Courtesy demands that we play a part in it all, but we dislike it intensely. At the first opportunity we withdraw—inwardly strained, distorted, exhausted. We make our way wearily to a place or a presence which is home. In a moment we are restored to ourselves. So, our spirits find these words. However far we wander, however little the hurly-burly of our daily preoccupations might suggest it, here is our home. These words say precisely what our spirits would declare, but in words of beauty and power which we could never command. We may repeat them over phrase by phrase. "O Lord, Thou hast searched me, and known me. . . . There is not a word in my tongue, but, lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether. Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid thine hand upon me" (vs. 1, 4 and 5). We know it to be literally true—each phrase.

Yes, but some of us may query: Can we believe these tremendous affirmations of faith? And how can our spirits appropriate what our minds find incredible?

I

Here we may well have recourse to a suggestion from the thought of Jesus. We may call it *the logic of common sense*. There is a feature of Jesus' teaching which is too seldom

noted. It is his assumption that in the crucial issues of truth men already know the answers to their questions. His task is not to convince them of what they do not already know or to persuade them to what they cannot believe, but to remind them of what they already know well enough, to make vivid by a figure or bit of keen insight the truth which they already possess. They brought him their questions—political, ethical, theological: What attitude should men take up toward an overbearing ruler—Rome? What should be done with a grossly immoral woman? Who is to blame for inherited blindness? What will be the conditions of marriage in the future life? Sometimes he gives a direct answer. More often, a story, an illustration, or a biting rebuke. Frequently he turns their inquiry back upon them with a question in reply, hinting that their query was gratuitous. Almost always he seems to be saying to them: "Why do you ask me? You already know the answer. Allow your minds to become quiet, your insight poised. There is your answer." Once he put it so bluntly that they could not evade it: "You know well enough how to read the signs of the weather when it is going to rain. Why is it that you cannot read the signs of these times?"

And the sources of this knowledge? Mainly two: acute observation—sheer common sense. And analogy from men's relations to one another to men's relations to God: "If you being evil know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father in heaven."

Let us apply this logic of common sense to our thought of God. It was

perhaps the most learned scholar of the English-speaking world in our day, one of that select company of twelve¹ who were recognized as having understood Dr. Einstein, who suggested: If you were to ask the ordinary Man on the Street—or, better, the Man on the Farm, since he lives closer to Nature and, therefore, to Reality—what it is of which he feels most certain, after a moment's reflection, he would be likely to answer: "Well, of three things, at least—Behind this Universe there is a super-human Power, God; there is a difference between right and wrong; the right deserves the allegiance of my life." It is the first of these assumptions of the Plain Man with which we are immediately concerned: "Whatever else and more may be true, behind this inconceivably vast and incredibly mysterious universe, there must be an ultimate power, God."

II

Yes, but the most serious difficulty for our thought of God is not to believe that he is, but to be certain that he knows and cares. Here especially the logic of common sense may guide our minds to true insight. It has never been easy to believe that one in whose Power the cosmos revolves can possibly give personal attention to the private interests and hopes, the perplexities and needs, of Tom, Dick, and Harry. It has never been easy to form the thought of One whose mighty sway holds the stars in their courses and yet who marks the comings and goings, the fears and frustrations of each creature. For men and women in

our day, the difficulty is slightly, if at all, exaggerated.

But a moment's quiet thought recognizes that it is incredible that a Power so vast, an Intelligence so profound, should not be intimately aware of, and solicitous for, each of the sons of men. If there be a God at all, it must be true that he is, quite literally, closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet, one from whose solicitous concern there need be no parting, one from whose enveloping care there can be no escape. That is the only sensible belief. The Sustainer of the cosmos must be one who also numbers the hairs of each head. That is the profounder insight. "Not a sparrow falls to the ground but your Father notes it," declares Jesus. Note the realism. He does not deny that the sparrow falls, whether through the accident of nature or men's cruelty. But God notes its fall, and cares.

If we think of a human friend who understands me far better than I understand myself, so intimate that he senses my thoughts before I voice them; if we expand a human friend's insight to the wisdom and foresight of an Infinite Intelligence; and if we recall that this Friend's sympathies are so inclusive as to embrace every other person with the same measure of interest and concern, and that his imagination is so flexible as to change from second to second with each moment's advance in each life's course, and that solicitude is at play toward every man and toward each at every moment; if we can so stretch our tethered and faithless imaginations—we may make a beginning at realizing the intention of God for each one

¹ Professor A. E. Taylor of Edinburgh.

of us. Augustine's word is still the truest: "He loves us all as though we were but one, but he loves each one as though he loved him alone."

III

Lastly, how shall these truths which our minds acknowledge become real in our inner certitude, of the warp and woof of our inmost experience? What, as a matter of fact, is the normal route of our painful and stumbling pilgrimage into the inmost sanctuary of every great meaning? Not merely religious faith, but no less, learning, beauty, friendship, love. In each is it not usually by three stages?

First, we hear of it by the hearing of the ears. But it remains to us external, strange, unknown. Its enthusiasts speak in a foreign tongue. Perhaps they seem to us to speak with tongues. We have instanced music—"Parsifal," "The Fifth Symphony." Has that not been the experience of many of us there; but also with others of life's deepest realities—love, intellectual delight, parenthood?

And if we advance to the second stage, is it not usually because we have sensed reality in the response of others? If you will, through them we have faith that for us also there might be meaning—deep, rich meaning—here. Or perhaps because there has been just the dimmest reaction akin to theirs within ourselves. The note without, which has stirred them to singing response, has awakened a faint, almost imperceptible echo within ourselves. It is faint, but it is enough to quicken hope and to give a vague confirmation to their enthusiasm—hope that perhaps for us too that meaning might ring clear.

But if we penetrate within, it is because we have permitted ourselves to be exposed repeatedly to the voice of that message—first, meaningless; then, vaguely, exasperatingly suggestive; finally rich with power—until it can slowly make its reality clear and take us captive.

Speaking upon perhaps the greatest passage in the New Testament, the thirteenth chapter of Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians, Henry Drummond used to challenge his audience to read that passage once a day for a month. Then speaking autobiographically he would add, "I know a man once who really did that and it changed his life." So one might challenge you to read the 139th Psalm each day for a month.

Let us be clear—it wins its way into our souls not by overpowering or overpersuading us, by forcing us, by superimposing itself upon us. There is no forcing reality upon man's soul. No, but by repetition the reality without may stir the slumbering response in the dumb spirit within until these first, faint echoes within awake and increase and ring strong and sure. No longer do we hear with the hearing of the ears. We know. It is true—every word of it. "O Lord, thou hast searched me, and known me. . . . Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid thine hand upon me." This is the inmost sanctuary which stands as the goal of our pilgrimage. Here is our home.

Then we are ready with the true response. We cry: "Search me, O God, and know my heart; try me, and know my thoughts; and see if there be any wicked way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting."

CHRISTIAN DISCIPLINE

FREDERICK M. MEEK

Be strictly careful, then, about the life you lead.

Ephesians 5:16
(Moffatt).

I SPEAK about one specific area of experience in the Christian life that is frequently neglected, at times scorned, in this generation of controversy of idea, of fluidity of form, and of deep social passion—our individual acceptance of Christian discipline. Its acceptance has importance for any of us who follow the Christian vocation, because that vocation does not backhandedly absolve *us* from the demands of Christian discipline. Meanwhile, the attitude of over-many laity and clergy is that a concern for such Christian discipline is the mark of an outmoded orthodoxy, and bespeaks a retreat from fulfilling responsibility for Christian social passion.

The immediate answer to any such assumptions is: "Read the New Testament record." The record says, "If your hand gets in the way of this best life, cut it off." Here is a harsh demand for disciplined commitment. The record tells how Jesus turned away from the clamoring multitude and their evident needs, to spend time fulfilling the discipline demanded by that relationship with God which was the core of his existence.

The Christian experience within which most of us have been nourished has come within the framework of the free Protestant Church, so that at first hand we know comparatively little about external disciplines commonly imposed by an authoritarian Church.

But the less we know of imposed external discipline, the more essential becomes the discipline that is accepted and fulfilled from within, because of the definiteness of the New Testament record, because of the spirit of the Gospel, because of our own concerned commitment.

As Paul lived, freed from the external disciplines of Jewish law which he had known, he came to understand the place of accepted, self-imposed Christian discipline. See how incisive and revealing are his words as he described the centrality of discipline. And their explicit demands drive us to self-examination.

Paul asked, "Are you behaving like ordinary men?" This question searches the pattern of living of all of us, and particularly of men and women in Christian vocations.

Paul admonished Timothy, "Take time and trouble to keep yourself spiritually fit." Interpreters of Paul who would evade this admonition in any one of many ways, imperil themselves, their students, and their congregations.

Paul shared with his Christian friends a bit of candid autobiography. While it is only a fleeting glimpse, it is clear that the disciplined struggle in which he shared was strenuous in the extreme. He said, "I am my body's sternest master, for fear that when I have preached to others, I should myself be disqualified"—be a castaway.

Here Paul etched in the possible tragedy that can come to those who handle the word of God, but who become "castaways" themselves because they fail to fulfill the demands which the Christian life makes.

This discipline which Paul evidently followed, is at times a subject for contemporary derision. If Paul were among us now, some theologians and denominational officials and clergy would say, "Paul, you'd better get rid of that middle-class morality. Discipline? Subduing the body? This may have been all right in Ephesus and Corinth. But this doesn't fit with circumstances like ours in Boston and New York and Princeton. This is out. We have more significant concerns."

Paul's pungent response, interlarded with some of his distinctive expletives, would picture vividly the destructive potential of the undisciplined life, of the undisciplined body, anywhere, at any time, for any Christian, and particularly for Christians with a Christian vocation.

In writing to the Ephesians, Paul summed up the whole matter when he urged: "Be strictly careful, then, about the life you lead."

I

You and I *profess* that that life which the Christian life in Christ is and promises, is ours; and we profess a further commitment to the Christian vocation, a commitment which involves us in that unique relation with our God, with the faith, and with other people. Therefore we are not *first*, students, teachers, administrators, ministers, or counselors. Standing before each one of these descriptive

occupational words is the directing, definitive word "Christian." And we cannot fulfill the obligations and demands inherent in our Christian vocation unless we be disciplined by this fact—in body and mind and spirit.

In our Christian vocation we are committed to placing God in Christ before men. We do this in many different ways. But whatever the method used, the most persuasive telling, the most persuasive communication, come through what we ourselves know and do at first hand. But this first hand knowledge and experience are not ours automatically, simply because we follow a Christian vocation. They are our experience and our possession only in and through a disciplined Christian life.

There is then a paradox about the Christian life and its experience. To be "Christian" is both the easiest and the most difficult of experiences; and the ease and the difficulty cannot be separated. It is easy, because as, in response to God's outreach to us, we commit ourselves unreservedly to him through Christ, we begin to depend upon him, unreservedly—a wonder-filled experience of assurance and power.

But we soon discover that here is a most difficult experience, because everything and everyone (including ourselves) seem to conspire to make this relationship difficult to know and to fulfill within the common life. And beyond this, the Christian life is never wholly found, never wholly known, never wholly experienced, never wholly fulfilled. Because of this we can come easily into despair and doubt. This paradox of the ease and

the difficulty of the way fills any spiritually sensitive man with apprehension and fear, and even dread. And the fear (it is a wholesome fear) is that, as we share in the common life and are seemingly hemmed in by its pressures, we shall become separated from God in Christ.

Unless in institutions like this, deepening Christian experience is correlated with the necessary intensive study, the man or the woman of Christian vocation is defrauded, and can almost imperceptibly become that cast-away. Unless the seminary makes clear that because of what a seminary is, and that because of who the students and faculty are by commitment, it expects and fosters disciplined, purposeful Christian living for each of those who are within the seminary community, the academic disciplines by themselves can move student and teacher further and further from the central Christian experience. Until our Protestant seminaries acknowledge a basic obligation for the Christian life and experience, and guidance in discipline of the vocational neophyte, the neophyte, having become the minister or the teacher or the counselor, will be ill-equipped to lead individuals or the people of a local church, or the students of a class, into a fullness of Christian experience through the Gospel.

For a moment, and simply by way of example, look at the surrounding secular life, in which significant achievements come through discipline and its sacrifices.

Recently a parishioner of mine did not return home for six days on end. He slept fitfully in a laboratory chair, existing on coffee and occasional

snacks, until he had finished a persuasive presentation of a scientific fact which had importance in his field of electronics.

After an opera, the greatest Wagnerian singer of our generation always went back to her hotel room alone, there to sing her entire role in the opera through silently, seeking for imperfections in what she had done that evening. And only after that could she ever go to sleep. (I shrink from admitting what this says to any man who dares to handle the Word!)

A little time ago, the leader of a subversive group in Europe was speaking about the young men and women who with him are devoted to their cause. He said, "There is nothing that we will not surrender for its sake; there are no disciplines to which we will not submit in order that it may have its fulfillment through us. . ."

If we who are of the Christian vocation are to witness to the Christian Gospel persuasively and with power, it will only be because we know a comparable dedication for the sake of God in Christ. Can it be said of us that we parallel the subversives' sense of commitment: "There are no [Christian] disciplines to which we will not submit in order that [the faith] may have its fulfillment through us"?

II

Look at all this, then, in simple, practical terms.

How many of us in an academic community of Christian vocation have as the primary day-by-day concern around which all else is arranged, taken time to reach out toward him to

whom we have committed ourselves? How can we know him, how can we understand what his purpose is, how can we come upon the experience of forgiveness, if we do not resolutely take time to share life and concern with him, and if we do not listen for what he would say to us?

How can the living Word speak to us who are of the Christian vocation, if we do not persistently, inquiringly, ponder the Testaments, not as dissectors of Palestinian religious cadavers, but as those who would listen to what the living Word says to us individually and to a change-filled generation.

How can we expect to handle the word of God faithfully and perceptively, if we know it only as a handy expedient for published articles or for homiletic excursions? How can we expect to witness compellingly about God in Christ if he is only a casual acquaintance, and if our casual acquaintanceship with him is used simply to provide us with a living?

Finding time, forcing ourselves to take time, and refusing to succumb to the pressures of the mood of the moment which always persuasively suggest postponement; facing resolutely the doubt that always appears to suggest other uses of time—all this, and much, much more are part of the demanded Christian discipline. And yet how easily we evade it and commonly pass it by!

We have time for weather reports and news, newspapers, hi-fi, television, for going to the movies and the theatre, for entertaining friends, even for exercise—perhaps for study. But do we face the Christian purpose for living as those who actually are of the

Christian vocation? Do we seek first to know him and his way, keeping our commitment to Christ with disciplined, primary urgency?

Someone told me of a well-known church leader who said, "When I began to tithe, I found that for several years I had to give up the purchase of an automobile." (And you know today's gibe, that an underprivileged seminary student is one who has to drive a second-hand car.) "When I began starting my day with prayer, I found that it meant giving up reading my morning newspaper. When I began to reach after Christian love, I found that I had to give up a multitude of prejudices against a multitude of people."

Even the hour at which we get up, and the hour at which we go to bed, are matters of discipline—to be arranged around one consideration: Under which circumstances do we do our best work in the Christian vocation?

See the disciplined struggle demanded of us to prevent ourselves from being enmeshed in secular habits and practices and values that are questionable in the light of Christian morality. Even if we feel that no harm will come to us, there is the discipline of restraint expressed by Paul: "If eating meat cause my brother to stumble, I will not eat meat."

There are always those of the Christian vocation who imagine that they can share in many of the habits and practices and customs of the secularist, and of the nominal Christian, without any decrease in spiritual sensitivity. But they lose spiritual sensitivity because they have not been will-

ing to say "No" to themselves and to desire, for the sake of the commitment and its fulfillment, for the sake of the vocation.

In the years of my ministry I have never before known as many clergy, in the pastorate and allied callings, to be involved in personal departures from New Testament norms of conduct—with the result of divided congregations, vocational repudiations, institutional failures, hospitalizations, clergy-fed cornucopias for psychiatrists, and suicides. And so much of it roots in a failure to accept and fulfill Christian discipline in specific areas of the common life.

A few months ago an acquaintance of mine, unnoticed and unrecognized, sat down in the area where, in one of our well-known seminaries, the men and women students gather for a cup of coffee. He could not help overhearing the conversations at the adjoining tables. This man is a very practical person, a world traveler, experienced in business. He was genuinely concerned because of the earthy, amoral character of the overheard casual conversation about a variety of subjects and about matters of conduct. His later direct question to me was: "Out of the values and the kind of life implied in what I heard, do you expect that there will come Christian leadership which has the persuasive sensitivity of the mind of Christ?"

III

You and I in the Christian vocation are charged with handling the things of God. But it is so easy to give

hospitality to attitudes and deeds that gradually make us insensitive to the Christian meaning and purpose of these things of God. And then in our vocation, the currently approved speech of the theological jargon of the month is a façade, hiding our inadequate Christian experience. Delivering lectures and preaching sermons and counseling *can* become a substitute for personal Christian devotion. Political and social concern *can* become a substitute for discipline in individual Christian living. The Gospels speak with sharp violence: "If thy right hand offend thee, cut it off. If thine eye offend thee, pluck it out." If an ambition or a friendship or a deed or a way of life or a habit or an experiment impedes the Christian vocation's fulfillment for ourselves or for someone else, then root it out; and as you tug, God pulls also.

The disciplined seeker turns aside from all other things, so that he shall come to know this most profound of all experiences—a life, a vocation, lived for and in companionship with God in Christ.

There can be no redeeming, enriching, personal relations and affections without discipline—the warm-hearted discipline of resisting the "taken-for-grantedness" of people and life and affection; the love-lit discipline of saying and meaning words of trust and affection; the devoted discipline of an abiding faithfulness that at times willingly sacrifices self and desire. Such disciplines as these are central in any abiding human affection. And such disciplines are paralleled and

deepened in that primary personal experience of God and his affection and his purpose.

Horace Bushnell has a word for our later generation. Once he said to a group of men in his native city, "I

know Jesus Christ better than I know any man in Hartford." Behind these words was a lifetime of disciplined, persistent Christian seeking and experience. "Be strictly careful, then, about the life you lead."

A NEW AGE OF INWARDNESS?

JAMES N. LAPSLEY

In the world you have tribulation; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world. John 16:33.

As for us, we do not have much tribulation in the world. Rather we have become accustomed to being on friendly terms with it. Some of us, like Harvey Cox, have celebrated the *seculum*—if not in verse—in prose, and others of us have joined in the celebration. Certainly we in the Church have learned to use the technical know-how of the world to enhance our ministries.

I am told by an expert in the television field that the TV spot announcement being shown in the Midwest—the one that goes, “Keep in circulation the rumor that God is alive”—is technically nearly perfect. I leave to your judgment whether it is perfect in other respects. The communications specialists are not the only ones of us who have learned from the *seculum*. In my field of pastoral care we borrow whatever modes of healing we deem worthwhile. The administrators are not content with today’s managerial techniques. They want tomorrow’s even before the business community can try them out.

Now, I am very far from disparaging all this traffic with the *seculum*. I am as much at home in it as any, if not, indeed, more than most. But I think you will agree that in the light of all this, the Johannine opposition between Word and world, which is embodied in the scripture passage I read a little while ago, sounds rather strange, if not actually stuffy. The

climax which speaks of tribulation in the world only serves to remind us that we don’t have much—or most of us do not. We have a few Jim Reebbs among us who have felt tribulation aplenty. But most of us are at home in the *seculum*.

I want you to consider seriously with me the possibility that this situation is going to end soon—that we may be passing out of an age of secularization into an age of *inwardness*, to borrow a term from Kierkegaard. By *inwardness* Kierkegaard meant something desirable; I mean something descriptive of a new emphasis on subjectivity in our culture, which may be a good thing, or may not be . . . A turning away from the empirical world of facts “out there” to a new awareness of the world within the person. There is a sense in which this may be termed secular, in that it is not a supernaturalism, but it represents a different kind of attitude, a valuing of experience rather than facts, of process rather than conclusions and solutions, an emphasis upon the self, rather than upon the city.

This is not in itself a new theme. It can be found far back in our history, and in world history. The nineteenth century was in some respects an age of subjectivity, and there is truth in what some have said in contending that we are just now about to have our nineteenth century in American theology. Yet in our day it is a new

kind of subjectivity in which integrity and identity are the core concepts. It is a search for authenticity and not merely for heightened subjective awareness.

The signs of the coming of the post-secular age of inwardness are to be found on the campuses throughout our country. They are to be found on our own campus, and even among us present here. We, too, search for a viable personal and professional identity. The LSD craze offers further testimony of the interest in the inner life, though it is not a very promising modality in my estimation. The affluence of our society has enabled many persons to have the experiences which our culture has valued, and after which their parents strove all their lives, by the time they are twenty. They have been around the world three times—done Paris and London—what more is there? For them the inner search begins in boredom with the *seculum*, but it may take on meaning as it proceeds.

More negatively still, the Vietnam situation, and all the "Vietnams" which will probably follow this one—on which the official time table is six to seven years—is wearing us down, sapping our energy. It is a drain on our resources, our attention, and our man power. The drive of our culture is ebbed away by far off conflict; the glitter of its city fades.

It may well be that we shall soon again experience anew tribulation in the world, both inside and outside the Church.

How will it make sense to say in an age of inwardness that Jesus Christ has overcome the world? First, we

must be clear that there can be no going back to a pre-secular age and its images of overcoming. We cannot return to an "old time religion," that many of us knew, and still know. The new age will be post-secular. We have become secularized men and women and we cannot get behind that and undo the past. Instead we must face forward to discover for ourselves what it can mean for the world to be overcome.

The works of C. G. Jung, and of Kierkegaard, and other guides to the inner world can be of service to us. But primarily we must learn to be honest with ourselves as we seek to know ourselves—a thing so easy to say and so difficult to accomplish. Often we must acknowledge that we cannot be honest with ourselves without the help of another. We need each other for acceptance, for support, for insight, and for confrontation. But we cannot give one another courage—the courage to know the truth that often what we take to be our integrity is only a defense against what seems to be a painful path to a genuine integrity. We must somehow find courage ourselves.

The route to a new understanding and experiencing of how Christ overcomes the world begins in inwardness, but it does not end there, as Kierkegaard himself has told us. We begin in inwardness, but only to move toward transcendence—being alone before God as he put it. We may not want to buy his symbolism, but the route he pointed has validity for the coming age. The way to a new sense of transcendence is through a radical immanence. The inner search does not

lead only to the self but beyond the self to a new form of Christ who overcomes the world.

We must discover this new form for ourselves. No one can show us what it will be for us. But I believe he who has the courage to seek for himself in honesty and inwardness,

and who stands in that tradition empowered by those events of which the scripture spoke, will come to find that new form for himself. And in so finding we will find that the new form is in some integral way also the old form, and that the world and its alienation have been overcome already.

THE APATHY OF CHRIST

GILBERT E. DOAN

When Jesus therefore had heard that Lazarus was sick, he abode two days still in the place where he was. John 11:6.

NOW just what do you do with a verse like that? It's almost shocking. A dearly-beloved friend is gasping his last,—and Jesus "abode two days still in the place where he was." Wouldn't you expect rather to see him pack himself off post-haste, in a last ditch errand of mercy? But no; he seems simply to dawdle. You think maybe if you were to close your eyes, the verse will go away. But it doesn't. And to make matters worse, John throws in a "therefore," which he usually saves for important things.

Why does Jesus just sort of stand there? You can imagine some of the reasons people give—and you can see just as clearly the people behind each of the reasons: "It just goes to show he was one of those insensitive religious types." He was "testing the faith of the sisters." He was "awaiting the prompting of the father." He was "waiting for enough witnesses to gather." He "wanted to make sure Lazarus was really dead, so that he could get the greatest possible mileage out of his intended miracle." He was "waiting till Lazarus was dead four days, because in Hebrew numerology four is the perfect number." Enough said?

Now, there are a few bits of evidence on which you could build an educated guess as to why Jesus did not rush to help Lazarus. There's some evidence that Jesus had heard from sources other than the sisters

that Lazarus was dead already. And more important, there is evidence that Jesus knew that if he ever again set foot near Jerusalem, even as close as Bethany, it would be for the last time. Small wonder that he paused! Would it be like him to rush headlong into some ill-considered martyrdom—even though it might be much less difficult and painful than the cross? Perhaps he needed time to fight off this temptation; time to work up that thirst that would enable him to drink to the bottom of the cup that was being poured for him—the very dregs of which were the price of our restoration to the Father. Perhaps, then, he spent the two days in prayer, in a Gethsemane whose story is never to be told.

But you see, now, how easily we assume that his life's logic is of a piece with the calculating, prudential rationalizing that is our life's logic. Indeed, don't we treat each other's unexplained behavior just that way in our own hearts?

Perhaps, then, a Gethsemane whose secret is locked forever in the stones beyond the Jordan. Perhaps. Perhaps many things. You do not know and neither do I.

But tell me, now, speculation aside: Isn't it really like Jesus Christ, at such a time, to wait? How like him, not to get frantic! How exasperatingly like him! Doesn't it ring true? Think of all the other times we hard-headed

practical people would have screamed "apathy"! Five thousand famished people and the disciples frantic because nobody remembered to order box lunches. Wine gives out at the wedding: crisis!—and he shrugs it off. The sick of the palsy: "Be of good cheer; thy sins be forgiven thee!" The disciples in the boat, and a storm threatens to swamp the lot of them—and Jesus of all things asleep in the stern. The woman taken in adultery—in the very act—and it doesn't seem to upset him really. Captured in Gethsemane. Panic! Yet he chides Peter for taking a swordswipe at the posse. On trial for his life, and he doesn't even bother to make answer!

And needless to say, in every case, in his own sweet time and way, he transforms the desperate situation, and brings it to a consummation far beyond our paltry expectation and even understanding. Such, it seems, is the story of his life: Ye shall hear of war and rumors of wars, famines, plagues, earthquakes, signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars, the waves roaring, men's hearts failing them for fear and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth, the powers of heaven shaken . . . and when these things begin to come to pass, then look up, and, lift up your heads, for your redemption draweth nigh!

He knows what he will do. His life is rooted in realities far deeper than our delicate, puny space and time. Why should he get frantic, knowing that the father has delivered all things into his hands? And why should we scurry about digging up excuses and rationalizations to protect him from the "devastating" assaults of those

who are no more able than we to read his mind? I mean really!

Despite the common charge of apathy, our time is also, and perhaps just as much, a day of frenzied activism. Whether it is campus revolt, or the bomb, or fair housing, or the ethics of management, our imperative is to get involved! Do something! And surely this is true of the Church. We are on all sides being needled and prodded into doing. Crisis! Decide! Commit! Act! Protestants are good at this. Ever since the Reformation we have come off well in a time of crisis. We thrive on it. And we have gotten a kind of Pavlovian "thing" about it, so that if there isn't a suitable crisis handy we'll even go to and fabricate one and trot it out and view it with consummate alarm. Now there is, of course, great merit in readiness for crisis—of which merit most of us have been amply apprised. . . .

But readiness for crisis is not the whole story. Frantic desperate involvement in crisis can be the very hallmark of faithlessness. For Paul to say, "Let that mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus"—can that not also mean that we are to permit ourselves to accept some of the serenity, the confidence, the cool competence of Christ? A world, like Lazarus sick unto death, may well need this part of his ministry too. For all things are delivered into his hands, and it just may be of some help to a sick and trembling world if we give some faint sign of believing it! Has he not made us partakers in both his cross and his resurrection? Does it show? Maybe as what you might even

call a "Holy cool"? Maybe that, too, is part of what they call the Christian Presence.

When Jesus therefore had heard that Lazarus was sick, he abode two days still in the place where he was. And when he was good and ready, he set out for Bethany—indeed, he set his face to go up to Jerusalem. And in his own confident time he brought those

affairs to his own consummation—a consummation not only for Lazarus but for us and our crazy lost world—which passeth all understanding. In his own sweet time, for the Father had delivered all things into his hands. Let *that* mind be in you, which was in Christ Jesus, "for his right hand and holy arm hath gotten him the victory."

RELIGIOUS PLURALISM AND WORLD COMMUNITY

EDWARD J. JURJI

IN launching a Second Gallahue Conference, May 4-11, 1966, under the above theme, Princeton Seminary took a resolute step in its historic role of service to American scholarship. It joined hands in an enterprise with leading American and other institutions as some fifty or more eminent scholars from diverse culture areas of the globe concerted their efforts on a crucial frontier.

This program of interfaith and intercultural association was heralded by an initial experiment in 1964 when the First Gallahue Conference was convoked under the theme, "The Phenomenon of Convergence and the Course of Prejudice"—incidentally the title of a forthcoming proceedings volume scheduled for publication by the University of Texas Press.

The Second Gallahue Conference was designed to implement sophisticated dialogue among intellectuals of great religious communities of the world in the context of the history of religious and under vigorous research standards. Advice was sought from colleagues in such related disciplines as those of theology and the humanities, as well as the social sciences, with particular regard for anthropology and psychology.

The primary aim of the undertaking was to establish—for the benefit of all concerned—a center of world scholarship, research, and interchange within the general framework of re-

ligious pluralism and world community of spiritual and academic values. Advanced study, dialogue, and authentic conversation were considered to be a necessary prelude to deeper consciousness and sensitive confrontation within the order of inclusive polarity.

To that end the integrity of academic thought was pledged and guarded. The Conference was avowedly hospitable to every shade of religious and philosophical persuasion. Yet the free exercise of personal faith under dictates of conscience and reason was equally respected and fostered. The general outlook on pluralist issues followed the guidelines of a phenomenology requiring that each religious entity be manifest through its own exponents and interpreters as it appears on the world stage.

Muslim conferees thus stated the case for Islam's involvement in the process of history and modern culture. Hindu scholars reflected likewise on the problem of religion and the population explosion. They also unveiled the nature of Hindu understanding of religious consciousness and freedom. Two distinguished Buddhist scholars, the one a dean of the University of Tokyo, the other a foremost philosopher of the University of Ceylon, defined the Indian and Buddhist concept of law and scrutinized Buddhist views of relativity *vis-à-vis* the one world idea.

In the same spirit of openness and objectivity, responsible scholars of Judaism and Christianity offered findings in the respective faiths on the issues of human brotherhood, the situation of theology, and the awareness of time and history.

A Dartmouth expert on Chinese culture presented a paper on the historic Chinese contribution to religious pluralism and world community. The basic theme of the Conference was presented to a public audience (all other sessions were closed) by Professor Huston Smith of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A concluding summation was given by Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Director, Harvard's Center for the Study of World Religions.

I

Problem Identified

Inevitably, many an issue was touched upon that was vital to present day political and existential thinking. In the keynote address, Huston Smith urged the faiths to develop what he described as their "irenic potential" by building mankind's confidence in them, by strengthening their mutual ties, and by giving careful attention to the way whereby they relate themselves to political conflicts. He noted that religious differences historically have exacerbated political divisions more than they have tempered them. To document this, Professor Smith added, we do not have to go back to the Crusades or other wars of religion: in our own lifespans there is evidence to spare.

In order to identify the problem more precisely, Huston Smith posed

a number of pertinent questions. Would Pakistan be partitioned from India today if Hinduism and Islam were not disparate? Would there be 600,000 refugees in Jordan—1,300,000 in Arab states as a whole—if Judaism were not a historic community distinct from Islam? Recalling Cardinal Newman's words, "O how we hate one another for the love of God," he formulated the problem this way: How can we keep our religious differences from exacerbating political conflicts? He had a dynamic concept of the task before the conference: Can our religions despite their differences, actually help to resolve political conflicts that endanger us? Can religion in our time be a force for the taming of the nations? Does it have an irenic potential?

The odds are that Wilfred Cantwell Smith was incredibly sound in his "summation" when he hurled at the conference the challenge that it had failed. Its failure was the outcome, he said, of reluctance to tackle deep-seated differences. But he did understand that the conference had not sought "clear conclusions," "agreed-upon solutions," or "nicely defined questions." Its main achievement, he said, was that it had "educated its participants to a truer, more intimate, and more personal awareness of what the problems are; of where we differ; of what directions our thinking and striving must take if we are to aspire to world community across religious frontiers."

No one could say, however, that the central issue of our time, Marxism, was a subject quietly forgotten. Huston Smith reproduced an extraordinary stance on Marxism suggested by

an Oxford scholar and conference participant, Professor R. C. Zaehner (*Matter and Spirit: the Convergent Spirit*, pp. 17-18). Instead of focusing on its irreligious features, Zaehner saw Marxism as an eruption in our day of an age-old essentially religious dream of human solidarity. From the beginning, he wrote, there have been, within religions, two tendencies in dialectical tension with each other—the one drawing the individual ever deeper into himself, down into the “kingdom of God” that is “within you,” and the other integrating him ever more closely with religious community.

In modern times, according to Zaehner, the latter tendency has re-emerged in the Marxian hope of an infinitely perfectible world which is to come into being once the last of the social contradictions has been surmounted and man is no longer exploited by man. He regarded Marxists and Christians at one in affirming “a power that is greater than man, greater than nations, and greater than individual religions, the power that Marx identified with matter itself, and which (a Christian) would identify with the “spirit of God,” that moved upon the face of the waters before the world began, the spirit which is ever busy kneading mankind into a coherent mass, however much individual men may kick against the pricks.

Further light on the problem was shed by the nature of religious pluralism.

II

Profiles of Religious Pluralism

Etched on broad canvas, the com-

plex of religious pluralism projected profiles of philosophy, relativism, “choseness,” and dogmatism. These were dealt with in that order by Murty of India, Jayatilke of Ceylon, Finkelstein of the U.S.A., and Abdel Kader of the U.A.R.

1. In Professor K. S. Murty of Andhra University, India, the conference discovered at the final scheduled session a perceptive philosopher. He illumined the theme of the conference and sought to tackle the central problem posed. His paper on “History, Historical Consciousness, and Freedom” constituted a singular profile of religious pluralism as it is envisaged by a top-flight Indian thinker. Historical reality is the past with a living message. He declared it is like Indus civilization which did not exist for the contemporary world till excavations begun in 1922 at Mohenjodaro and Marappa brought it to light. The ultimate aim of history is to understand human existence.

The proper key for the interpretation of human history, Murty went on to say, is man as he was, is, and shall be. Such a historical consciousness liberates us. In fleeting moments, man can grasp that history is grounded in the Absolute, that is, glory is fragmentarily manifested in history. Now and then man falls an easy prey to the illusion that the Transcendent has been or is found in a particular historical person or event or thing. Others are not quite thrilled to relate themselves to the Transcendent. They desire to become it, or reduce it to an historical existence. A cat, however, can never become a tiger. It is not wise to try to become

sugar instead of remaining content with tasting it.

Murty's reflections yielded a contribution to the problem in terms of a favored withdrawal to a philosophy that was disposed to find the light of history in man—a polymorphic being with infinite potentialities for experience. World community and social responsibility could then fall by the wayside. This could easily be the deduction to be drawn from Murty's insight that human history is the exhibition of man's failure to convert the world into heaven and himself into Deity.

Murty could draw upon his knowledge of Hindu wisdom and philosophical formulations. He portrayed human history as a record of ideas and passions. One's own historical judgment liberates him from the irony of history. It is historical consciousness itself that provides freedom from history. An awareness of one's historicity leads to communion with the trans-historical, and harmonious living together of free men becomes a worthy rational ideal. Since men are not wholly rational, however, nor can become wholly free, this freedom is never fully realized. Nevertheless, such an ideal does serve as a beacon light to humanity and should inspire perhaps some to strive for it.

2. From Hindu philosophy we pass on to Buddhist relativity as a second profile in the complex of religious pluralism. Professor K. N. Jayatilleke, chairman of the Department of Philosophy, University of Ceylon, suggested that the Buddhist concept of relativity with its emphasis on oneness and spirituality constituted a formidable contribution to world community.

Its permissive interpretative technique is an object lesson, he said, to other religions which tend to stress their exclusivity to the point where they fail to see what they have in common with one another.

Jayatilleke further maintained that Buddhism is up-to-date. It is compatible, in his judgment with contemporary scientific cosmology. Earlier Buddhist texts spoke of the "thousands of suns, moons, and inhabited worlds, thousands of heavenly worlds of varying grades." He did not indicate, however, whether or not Buddhism thus equated with scientific rationalism ought to abandon its traditional spirituality.

He further observed that Buddhist scholars had anticipated Marxist philosophy. They taught that the maldistribution of goods was responsible for the loss of values and ultimately a cause of war. They advocated welfare systems to curtail poverty and unemployment. Indicative of a distinct preference for self-government, moreover, was Buddhism's emphasis on equality and respect for the individual. In his exposition of Buddhist relativity, Jayatilleke adverted to the class of Buddhist doctrines and practices which he described as attractive to people of diverse conditions across many centuries. Those were tenets and acts, in his opinion, which made no exclusivist claim whatever.

Jayatilleke went on to profess that early Buddhism was by no means atheistic in the materialist and Marxist sense. He dismissed as utterly commonplace the contrast often drawn between an original atheistic Buddhism and a developed theistic variety of the so-called Mahayana school where al-

legedly the concept of a cosmic Buddha emerged. His contention was that both the primitive and Mahayana types were atheistic in that they knew nothing of a personal God. Parenthetically he noted that a universe created in time by an omniscient and omnipotent deity could not but figure as a rigged cosmos. If at all construed, the will of any such deity, he said, should tend to denigrate manhood, reducing man's status to that of a puppet. Any effective attempt to resolve the problem of evil and free will should then prove futile.

The distinction was made, however, that ever since its first inception Buddhism was theistic in inculcating the validity of moral and spiritual experience. It also subscribed to an impersonal, transcendent, and ultimate reality beyond time, space, and causality. In this sense, it is perfectly in order for a Buddhist to embrace a conception of a God beyond theism.

Be that as it may—it was anything but self-explanatory that the central core of Buddhism as the speaker asserted, had not appreciably changed, nor was his argument less precarious that a hard core of theism beyond theism had accompanied this faith since its most pristine beginnings.

3. "Chosenness" was not exactly the title of the paper given by Chancellor Louis Finkelstein of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, but it might serve to describe his significant contribution. Rabbi Finkelstein dealt with his formal subject, "The Jewish Vision of Human Brotherhood" in an objective and impressive manner. In contemplation of Jewish source material and procedural documentation, the presentation was both learned and

lucid. Commendable restraint was exercised in stating the case for the Shammaitic and Hillelite wings of Pharisaism, with their chauvinistic and universalist norms, respectively.

In thus investigating Judaistic concern with the "in" and the "outside" groups, Dr. Finkelstein rendered a service to students of pluralism and its relation to world community. One wondered, however, whether the idea of progress and the concomitant concept of human perfectibility were to be taken integrally or not with the vision of Messianic brotherhood at the end of time.

Finkelstein won his audience by dint of personal charm. Departing not infrequently from the prepared text,—he succeeded in making the incredible credible. This he achieved by force of allusion and anecdote as well as a category of illustrative technique all his own. He did trace the concept of the Chosen People mainly to the Pentateuch. (Professor Charles T. Fritsch of Princeton raised the question whether wisdom and Prophetic literature, too, should not be regarded as source). But Chancellor Finkelstein had actually included Second Isaiah and the Jewish Prayer Book—"the most significant tract of Jewish theology."

In all these writings, the selection of Israel was translated into a command, said Finkelstein. Israel had been chosen for specific tasks and responsibilities. At the very beginning of literary prophecy, Amos informed Israel that it was no different before the Lord than the Ethiopians, Philistines, or Aramaeans. Man's hunger for primacy is given satisfaction. But

the primacy to be achieved is in service not in power.

4. Dogmatics would quite logically come up in any sampling of profiles having to do with the nature of the problem under study. Directly to the point was the paper on "The Islamic Involvement in the process of History," offered by an al-Azhar theologian, Dr. Ali Abdel Kader, presently Director of The Islamic Center, in Washington, D.C. Aware of the menace, reportedly described as "fissiparous" tendencies by the late Jawaharlal Nehru, Conference strategy had aimed at creation of a dialogue situation through certain oblique hints spelled out in themes and sub-themes.

The maneuver proved surprisingly successful. Dr. Abdel Kader minced few words in stating the case for Islamic dogmatics along lines of exegesis and hermeneutics, even of straight apologetics. His central assumption was on this order: Islam has a comprehensive nature, intrinsically capable of setting forth guidelines for society. It is equally well equipped to guide the individual Muslim toward God, his fellow believers, and human society generally.

Dr. Abdel Kader specified that Islamic involvement in the process of history cannot be adequately grasped apart from the Koran, its primary legislative source. His analysis confirmed the Koran as the "infallible word of God which gave rise to the first Muslim state within the confines of the Arabian Peninsula." Working through historical and juridical material, Dr. Abdel Kader arrived at five principal conclusions: (i) That Islam is both religion and state. (ii) That the division of the world into an abode

of Islam and an abode of war is the invention of later Muslim jurists, an invention uncritically swallowed by Orientalists. His own contention was that Islam is not a religion of war but peace. (iii) That the Koran is a formidable source of legislation imparting support and meaning to Islamic intellectual life. (iv) That Islamic jurisprudence derives from the Koran and meets 20th century requirements. (v) That secularism in the Muslim world is a sign of intellectual incompetence to project a new Muslim personality in the context of modern history.

An unanswered question was just what such a refurbished Islam proposed as a platform for communication-dialogue and improved understanding with other religions. Dr. Arend T. van Leeuwen of the Kerk en Wereld Institute, Driebergen, the Netherlands, in the course of a detailed commentary, inquired whether a post-Muslim phenomenon, on the order of the so-called post-Christian era, was anywhere predictable.

III

Involvement of the Religions in Modern Society

Whatever light the just discussed profiles might have shed on the problem, they did unveil a medley of religions and cultures wrapped up in the political, juridical, and social institutions of world civilization. Four such patterns of involvement in regional and global ethos were singled out for special examination. Each pattern was expertly analyzed by an authority in a non-Western field who

was simultaneously conversant with the Western cultural tradition.

In each instance, the topic had a worldwide significance transcending particularist relevance. There was, firstly, the case of Chinese pluralism. It was ably assessed by Professor Wing-tsit Chan of Dartmouth College. Secondly, there was an evaluation of the Asian concept of law by Professor Hajime Nakamura of Tokyo University. Thirdly, Professor Annemarie Schimmel of Bonn University cited a pattern of involvement consisting of the confluence of Western and Islamic cultural streams. A fourth and last category of involvement of religion in social and demographic affairs was introduced by Professor H. C. Ganguli of New Delhi University on the subject of population explosion.

I. Professor Chan expounded the involvement of religious pluralism in today's monolithic Chinese structure. He took cognizance of the same phenomenon in the over-all cultural heritage of China. He referred to the so-called "Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom and Let One Hundred Schools Contend" movement of 1957, adding: The one hundred flowers may not be blooming at present but the one hundred schools are still contending.

What has China contributed to religious pluralism? he inquired at the close of a seasoned veteran's paper. Simply the fact, he replied, that religion—Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, as well as the late comers, Christianity and Islam—can flourish together. One can profess all of the first three at the same time. What made this possible, he observed in passing, was emphasis on similarities

rather than differences. When China shall once more take her place in the world community, he continued, her pluralistic character will once more come to grips with Western religions. Past experience has taught us, he reasoned, that trouble can be avoided if religions do not serve political and economic interests. Such issues as whether God is personal, original sin, immortality, and the cycles of life and death, can perhaps be resolved through discussion.

Chan enlarged upon this theme of the involvement of religion in China's total record. "Coexistence or even synthesis" of religions was a "shining example of the amiable relationships" possible between religions. He noted furthermore, that China had been relatively free from religious persecution. Even where these arose they had lasted only for a short time. The reason was that such religious outbreaks were at bottom economic and political rather than spiritual or ethical.

Basic to China's experience of relative religious concord was the conviction that religion is not to be made a tool for conquest or conversion. Its primary purpose was to preach a good way of life, he stressed. He described the anti-Christian movement of the 20th century as having had "more of the nature of anti-imperialism than anything else," although an element of "anti-foreignism" also existed. He maintained that the Chinese attacked Christianity not as a particular religion but chiefly as "an instrument of Western imperialistic encroachment on Chinese sovereignty" and as a beneficiary of "unequal treaties that bound China in a semi-colonial status."

Returning to the more strictly re-

ligious dimension, the involvement of China's religions in society prompted Chan to observe that differences in doctrine are not easy to avoid. A basic source of conflict is the claim of a given religion to be all-inclusive and supreme, on the one hand, and, on the other, China's peculiar concept of religious pluralism. Logically, he declared, one cannot be two, and two cannot be one. Fortunately, he quipped, logic has seldom led to solutions of religious problems.

Perhaps the very desire to live together, he counseled, might show us the way. It was nowhere certain, however, that China's pattern of involvement—impressive and historic though it be—had ever been implemented on an international scale outside her territorial borders. Although Professor Chan's assumption left open the possibility of China's ultimate involvement in world community, the idea had a purely conjectural ring.

2. Involvement through impact of law was elaborately developed and documented by Professor Hajime Nakamura. Utilizing Sanskrit and Pali, as well as Chinese and Japanese sources, he traced the Indian-Buddhist concept of *dharma* (law). Nakamura exhibited all along more than casual acquaintance with the collateral Western apparatus. Despite outward similarity between the concept of *dharma* and that of *logos*, he drew a sharp line of demarcation between them. He argued that *dharma* tended to be subjective, controlling human behavior; whereas *logos* tended to be objective controlling the world of nature which forms the environment of mankind.

There was a conclusion to which Nakamura said his studies inescapably led: the societies of Eastern and Southern Asia evolved out of small, localized farming communities. Asians did away with nomadic life, he said, at an early stage. They settled on rice fields. He observed, furthermore, that people who thrive on rice tended to settle permanently in one spot. In such societies through long generations, genealogies and kinships acquired established norms and took on the spectacle of unified families. In such a setting, Nakamura saw individuals closely knit together in an exclusive human nexus. Asians thus were schooled to adjust themselves to such a type of familial organization, an expression of a way of life that met their needs.

Indo-Europeans, in contrast,—nomadic and engaged for the most part in hunting—found themselves at close quarters with alien peoples. Human relations accordingly were bound to be those of fierce rivalry and suspicion. Consistently, a rational plan or a stratagem of some sort had to be improvised. Such a trait, Nakamura interjected, survives in the present day Western world. It was extremely difficult, he had to concede, to draw a sharp juridical line between East and West. He made no secret of his own personal opinion that humanity essentially is one. He went on to explain that if he had detected certain differentials of Hindu and Buddhist cultures, his aim could only be to serve the cause of mutual understanding between East and West.

3. Further illumination emanated from the paper on "Islam in the Mod-

ern World" read by Professor Anne-marie Schimmel. The subject was altogether germane to the involvement of religion in 20th century ideas and political configurations. "Confluence" has been suggested as preferable to "impact" in depicting the influence of Western culture abroad.

Professor Schimmel drew upon firsthand knowledge of Islamic civilization in defining the nature of such confluence. Her purview encompassed crucial facets of the total Islamic *leitbild*. The treatment thus embodied an analytical critique of Islam: the concept of a personal God, prayer, preaching, alms-giving, pilgrimage, holy war, the Koran, the person of Muhammad. Other pivotal Islamic issues examined were those centered in the Hadith-tradition, emancipation of women, and Sufi-mysticism. Scientific evidence obviously contradicts Lord Cromer's celebrated dictum that "Islam reformed is Islam no more."

Almost every Muslim intellectual exults in the belief that a perfect unity of *din* and *dawla*, religion and the sociopolitical order, is prescribed in the Koran. Since the two form facets of an identical reality, the Muslim esteems the validity of a teaching true to human experience and progress. In a world disarrayed by the basic anomaly of division between the sacred and profane such an involvement carries essential weight. It is calculated to temper such alienation of religious sanctities as the primacy of our secular age breeds.

Confrontation with modern science did occasionally stir certain theologians to fix on Koran 55:33 as an allusion to Sputnik and on 81:6 as

a forecast of the A-bomb. Behind such claims was a frenzied yearning to exalt the integrity of God-given revelation in the face of formidable rivals. Yet as Professor Schimmel intimated, the Koran has an adequacy all its own, sufficient for it to outlive the keenest competition. This is probably quite accurate. Yet the spirit of the Koran is strictly anti-classical. It is incompatible with such Greek philosophical, rational and aesthetic motifs as made both Renaissance and Enlightenment real.

4. If any doubt lingered that taken singly or in aggregate the religions are profoundly involved in the destiny of mankind, Professor Ganguli's treatment of "Religion and the Population Explosion" shattered it. He urged that the religions "not only tolerate fertility control in the best interest of future generations but propagate it, and give it all the weight of their authority." The only way to do this, he held, was for the religions to adopt a Protestant ethic that considers marriage beneficial in itself and not primarily a means for procreation.

Ganguli reckoned that most religions, with the exception of the Roman Catholic Church, agree that a curb needs to be placed on present population trends. None of the other great religions has taken a negative attitude toward use of contraceptive devices. He regarded Roman Catholic approval of the "rhythm method" a "very good compromise attempt between total abstinence advocated by Mahatma Gandhi and the permissive Protestant disposition." But he maintained that the latter compromise has meant sacrifice of intellectual vigor and practicalness.

Strangely, however, Ganguli's own researches in the field did not jibe with his conclusion in holding the Roman Catholic Church reprehensible for delay in promotion of birth control. He did bolster his thesis with a statistical analysis of population trends. He was fully aware, moreover, that the rate of population growth tends to run on an average of seventy per cent higher in the less developed countries.

Professor Bernard J. Cooke, S.J., of Marquette University, emphasized that the Roman Catholic Church was in the throes of rapid change in her official attitude toward birth control. Under study by a Vatican Commission appointed by Pope Paul VI, the issue is not basically a problem of sex morality, Father Cooke advised the conference. It is rather an issue of the continuity and discontinuity of basic Catholic doctrine.

The irony of it all is that discussants at this session never got down to the present day problem of overpopulation. In their zeal and concern for the remote future of the race, participants ruled out by default any substantial interest in the demographic situation in some overpopulated regions where intolerable conditions prevail. There can be no serious consideration of world community, and the involvements of the world religions, apart from an awareness of the disease, hunger, and degradation which forestall social stability. Political, economic, as well as ethical involvements run neck and neck with the central theology of the problem. This might have been the vital intent of Professor Joseph M. Kitagawa's thoughtful commentary on the Ganguli statement which was made in

his absence by Professor Willard G. Oxtoby now of Yale.

IV

Desegregation of Religions and Cultures: Guidelines

The problem thus set forth and substantiated through the several profiles as well as in the involvements to which the conference addressed itself, the response of a qualified participant needs to be interposed. Dr. Fazlur Rahman, official representative of the Government of Pakistan, offered a written commentary which said in part:

"For the first time in the history of the world, the world has felt the need for and is striving to build a world community since World War II. The question of religious pluralism in a world community is a complementary counterpart of national pluralism in a world community. Interreligious and intercultural dialogue and understanding is a human need which as imperatively challenges man as does the need for political understanding. Without stretching the political and religious parallel too far, one may simply state that whereas man has been willing to found and belong to a United Nations, a United Religions organization has not yet come into existence.

"Yet a conference like the present one is to this writer, quite encouraging. Although the problems of religious pluralism have yet to be fully stated and faced, particularly in terms of ongoing religious tradition, the proceedings of the conference have made it clear that leaders of thought in these traditions are actually conscious of the need for a meaningful coexistence. General statements may have been

more or less individual in character rather than representing the tradition to which an individual belongs—and, again—some may have been rather apologetic than realistic. Nonetheless, the statements in themselves were significant.

"I think, however, that the coexistence potential of religious tradition still needs to be further explored in a scholarly and objective manner not merely to give us a true picture of the past of these traditions but in order to assess, on scientific basis, as to how this potential may be strengthened in each case. I basically support the formulation of the task of such a conference by Professor Huston Smith. This would involve a scientific examination of the major relevant factors in each tradition at different levels—doctrinal as well as concrete attitudes—and in different phases including the modern age which itself is continually developing and unfolding itself.

"Again, the traditions and systems are not to be restricted to what are called "religious" and "theistic" traditions but should include all the major cultural systems and ideologies existing in the world. Only thus can we do justice to this problem as a human problem. In this I support and welcome the thesis of Father Whitson."

Providing general background for such a "desegregation" of religions and cultures were the papers of Professor S.G.F. Brandon, the University of Manchester, "A New Awareness of Time and History"; of Professor C. J. Bleeker of the University of Amsterdam on "Methodology and the Science of Religion"; of Dr. Fazlur Rahman himself on "The Impact of Modernity on Islam"; as well as the

paper he alluded to, namely, "The Situation of Theology," delivered by Professor Robley E. Whitson of Fordham University.

I. Professor Brandon offered a definition of religion as the expression of man's instinctive quest for security resulting from the sense of insecurity triggered by a consciousness of Time. However, if religion originates from a Time-sense common to all mankind, this sought after security from insecurity has been conceived of in a multiplicity of forms. Both extinct and living religions show how varied, and often strange, have been the fashions in which such security parades.

The Pyramid Texts of Ancient Egypt, Iranian and Indian sacred writings, Gnosticism, and other relics of religious antiquity were masterfully tested by Dr. Brandon in the course of his investigation. He granted that technical examination of source material reveals a totally different conception of Time in the theologies of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Here a linear rather than cyclic conception of Time arises. Such a divergence in the concept of Time left an impress on the Weltanschauung of the Western world.

Out of this Judaeo-Christian conception of Time sprang a normative Western doctrine of man. According to this, the individual soul was especially created for a single incarnate life in this world. It was a life construed as a proving ground for eternity. Creation of the omnipotent God, the universe has a beginning and an end in divine purpose. During the eighteenth century Enlightenment, supernatural sanctions were rejected. Yet the secularized idea of progress

owed its inception to the Christian valuation of history.

Although such a valuation is no longer tenable, Professor Brandon was convinced that its ghost continues to haunt Western thought and culture. To this anomaly, he ascribed the malaise which afflicts contemporary Western thought. We are unable to discern any purpose or pattern in history, he conceded. He agreed, nonetheless, with Alfred North Whitehead "that that religion will conquer which can render clear to popular understanding some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of mortal fact."

2. Professor Bleeker's paper, "Methodology and the Science of Religion" projected another dimension for a world community of desegregated religions and cultures. Many of the blunders in national and international politics and economics could be averted he surmised, if statesmen took into account the religious emotions and ideas involved by their decisions. He was convinced that the principal insights of the science of religion—particularly phenomenology—serve to substantiate harmony for the still nebulous pursuits of interfaith and intercultural understanding.

Dr. Bleeker saw world community realized through rapid modern communication. He dispelled any assumption, however, that differences among world religions would soon fade out giving way to a world religion. He urged that all undertakings to study the problem of relations among world religions be conducted in line with the scientific methods and findings reflected in the phenomenology of religion. Necessary clarifications and implications, said Bleeker, are contingent

upon the phenomenological approach and procedure. His explications of the nature and purpose of phenomenology went straight to the core of his thesis.

The phenomenology of religion has successfully developed since its introduction in 1887 by the Leyden historian of religion, P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye. Professor Bleeker also reminded the conference of the twin principles of phenomenology: (a) *epoché*, the suspension of judgment till a given religious phenomenon has been fully sustained; (b) the eidetic vision, that is, an understanding of religious essentials displayed by the phenomenon under investigation. He further referred to another Leyden scholar, W. B. Kristensen, who once said: "Let us not forget that there is no other religious reality than the faith of believers. . . . Not only our religion, but every religion is according to the faith of the believers, an absolute unity and can only be understood under this aspect."

To the foregoing Bleeker added his own incisive judgment: "It must be remembered that the believer keeps a secret which he cannot and does not wish to reveal to non-believers and believers in another faith. Nevertheless, it is possible to attain by factual knowledge, and by religious intuition, insight into what is unique in the forms of the religion one is studying." It is the task of the phenomenology of religion, he concluded, to make religiously understandable what is humanly ununderstandable.

3. Professor Fazlur Rahman's paper, "The Impact of Modernity on Islam," raised certain issues of common reformation importance. Of his insights, a number might serve to elu-

cidate the general problem of the desegregation of religions and cultures in world community. With the possible exception of Turkey (even there secularism among the country folk is far from whole-heartedly understood or accepted) the Muslim world's citizenry and officialdom vie with one another in lauding Islam as a complete way of life. Yet what is deprecated as bifurcation of society into sacred and secular is the order of the day in most Islamic states.

Versatile Pakistani reformer that he is, Fazlur Rahman had serious misgivings about any such bifurcation. Vexing his task, as it were, was the fact that although dedicated to a Koran-based society, he at the same time found himself a modernist and an avid rationalist. He could scarcely steer a course removed from the strategy of demythologizing and isolated from philosophical reconception. As a wrestler with traditional Islam, the posture he chose to take could never be other than that of radical Islamic theology.

Such a vision of thorough-going reform was impeded and jeopardized in Pakistan by dearth of intellectual talent. In the teeth of a fundamentalist theology, only the state seemed redoubtable enough to institute effective measures in support of such reforms as those of women's education, coeducation, updating an archaic banking system, and the liberalization of religious law.

Ernst Troeltsch maintained that the Protestant Reformation did not effect a fresh start till it had successfully detached itself from medieval Christendom and taken the Enlightenment as a point of departure. In a

somewhat similar vein, Fazlur Rahman contended that Islamic reform could not get started till a return to Koran and Sunna carried convictions of a responsible reformation rooted in a dynamic and meaningful reinterpretation of the faith.

4. Professor Whitson's "The Situation of Theology" revealed the need for a comprehensive sensitivity in the field. He noted that participants in world religions gatherings talk *to* rather than *with* one another. The several religions are now being challenged, he said, to move into genuine dialogue seeking that universal convergence toward which "we now seem to be drawn."

Father Whitson went farther to speak of the values of new communities formed by new institutions. They could in fact enable scholars of different religions and cultural backgrounds to develop shared experience, for "knowledge occurs within community." But this process is not only the exchange of ideas, said Father Whitson. It is an experience in the shared formation of ideas. All this will involve a situation of unity as the convergence of major areas of knowledge must significantly produce.

Whether the Roman Catholic Church was prepared to engage in such an undertaking was a question posed during the animated discussion that followed. While speaking for himself, Father Whitson replied that the Roman Catholic Church regarded the ecumenical situation as "maximal." Now implicitly, and more and more explicitly, it regards the religious situation as universal. Concern with those of other faiths, he thought had led to the establishment of the

Vatican Secretariat for non-Believers. The destiny of the human race seems to be the move toward union.

Father Whitson's 47-page document peered into many a major phase of religious culture and thought. Embraced were Confucian and Taoist, Hindu and Buddhist, Zoroastrian and Jewish, Christian and Muslim components. Far from being an eclectic trial balloon, the treatment attempted a theological synthesis under a novel definition of theology: The systematization of man's experience of definitive relationships grounded in the theos—, and logos—, category. But in its assessments of other faiths the investigation went far beyond the imperatives of phenomenology.

Actually, as in the cases of Hinduism and Islam, the evaluation was surprisingly inattentive to history of religions findings. Some rather antiquated judgments in the field were perpetuated. Yet profound and refreshing were the radical and revolutionary tenets of Father Whitson's essay. Whereas his concept of knowledge shared in community apparently leaves us meager scope for maneuver in personal initiative—save on fringes of the problem—it does capitalize on an essential guideline. Such a guideline was conspicuously drawn out in a flair for the intellectual potential. Above all, it was embedded in Father Whitson's understanding of "involvement" in its humanist valuation.

Postscript

On the merits of its Second Galahue Conference, Princeton Seminary may or may not have won a world religions championship. Indubitably, it

came quite near to setting a record. That specific achievement was wrought in the area of interfaith and intercultural communication and dialogue. Next to January 18-19, 1963, and October 27-29, 1964, red letter dates in the history of the institution will now include May 4-11, 1966. The 1963 theme was "The Significance of Comparative Religion in Modern Culture." In 1964, it was "The Phenomenon of Convergence and the Course of Prejudice." In 1966, the theme "Religious Pluralism and World Community" indicated a broadening perspective.

All three gatherings were frontier operations conducted outside the pale of ecumenicity. Yet they would have been utterly inconceivable apart from the twentieth century ecumenical thrust. As for intentionality the conferences were geared to the goal of the education of man. Proceedings, researches, and scholarship were bound to elicit response in consciousness of congregation and parish, sangha, synagogue, and mosque, order and fraternity, or whatever the counterpart of a local "church" may happen to be.

Invariably the great religions constitute merger between classical and popular strains. A symbol of such a symbiosis was once advanced by John Clark Archer of Yale. It took the form of the letter X, on its side as the Romans wrote it to signify 1000. Thus one stroke stood for mythical folklore and sundry visible elements of mass religion as they appear in rite and cult. The other stroke represented classical conceptual, and scriptural norms of faith and order.

These two strokes of the symbol may be conceived in terms of two his-

torical streams flowing down from high antiquity. Intersecting at a given point in time, they form a traffic circle, so to say, affording both transit and interchange of future direction. Study of religion on both the classical, metaphysical and popular, ritualistic sides may be regarded, therefore, as a requisite. Both conference deliberations and repercussions confirmed the inevitability of intercourse between religion and society in both classical and popular dimensions.

If conferees were at times caught in a *cul-de-sac*, hemmed in from behind, as it were, the reason was not far to seek. Such an immovability seemed healthy in an encounter between so many shades of metaphysical doctrine, all the way from pre-modern to post-Christian. The cleavage dividing Europe from America, even Asia from the West, did not set off any damaging fireworks. Sharp disagreements cut instead across barriers of language and creed. Muslim disagreed

with Muslim, and occidental with occidental.

Professor Gustave E. von Grunebaum of the University of California had a pungent word for Eastern apologetic. It was, he said, the sort of *monologisch* required by the nature of new-old cultures aroused to the consciousness of an exceedingly competitive modern world. Be that as it may, no one has yet devised a technique to recapture moments of truth as they kick off in all their dramatic eloquence and psychological logic at a confrontation of brilliant minds with a fantastic repertoire of knowledge, sophistication, tradition, and vision.

The parable of the Tower of Babel—with its caution against illusory utopianism—seemed to have been mastered in essence if not form. If there were any longings to erect a citadel of concord they were more than matched by a sober trend toward prophetic expectation.

TROUBLED PEOPLE IN A TROUBLED WORLD

SEWARD HILTNER

I

PEOPLE IN THE SUBURBS

THE sub-titles of these three addresses—"People in the Suburbs," "People in Cities," and "People at Work and Play"—may well make my friends, as well as former colleagues and students, wonder if I have quit my own field and taken to competing with Arthur E. Holt, Samuel C. Kincheloe, Victor Obenhaus, Gibson Winter, and others in the field of Christian social ethics and sociology. Let me disclaim any such intent. I am no more expert on the sociology of cities, suburbs, work, and play in 1966 than I was when I left Chicago in 1961.

The focus of my concern remains where it has always been, with the *people* problem, and most especially with the problems of *troubled* people. Any expertness I have continues to come from my use of a theological perspective along with psychodynamic insights about people, how they got into their predicaments and what we, especially we of the Church and the ordained ministry, may do to help them.

But I have found it increasingly difficult, of recent years, to separate the "psychodynamics" from the "sociodynamics" of people's problems. My consultation services to the Menninger Foundation since 1957 have tended to reinforce this conviction. At

that great psychiatric center of service, education, and research, psychodynamic insights are penetrating, thorough, and always used with relevance to individual sufferers. The Menninger staff continues to teach me about such things: unresolved Oedipus complexes, hair-shirt Superegos, failures in impulse control, the effect of the stages of life upon individual psychodynamics, and much else of great significance.

But again and again, while sitting in case conferences attempting to appraise the potential strengths as well as the weaknesses of a sufferer, I have found myself stressing, even more than the staff, the significance of where the patient lives, what he does for a living, how he spends his off-time, and above all, what values he has come to take for granted as a result of his cultural context. Be assured that the Menninger staff is not inattentive to such matters. Yet to my own surprise, I have found that my background and concern in pastoral theology sometimes make available insights, from the social and cultural realm, that are not yet fully incorporated into even the best psychiatry.

I think, for instance, of a patient about whom I was consulted some time ago. In his fifties, married, and a competent and versatile artisan, he

had developed various symptoms that brought him to the mental hospital even though he was in no sense an ordinary psychotic sufferer. The psychodynamics of the situation were clear enough, even extending to the marital situation. He had a travelling rash which appeared unpredictably on various parts of his body; his wife was quite obese—a combination absolutely guaranteed to impede any marriage relationship. But the staff, and I also, felt that other factors than the man, and even the man and wife, had to be taken seriously into account. His record showed him to be an excellent and versatile workman; but he was now, presumably for security reasons, holding a salaried job in which he was making a good deal less money than he had made before. The security of the pay-check seemed to mean more to him, in dealing with his high internal tension, than the risks of greater financial reward of which his technical skills made him capable. In a metaphorical sense, he had moved from being a "city man" to a "suburban man," with some resultant gains in his ability to handle his inner tensions. But the fact was that he was then in the hospital; so there were some kinds of losses in addition to the gains. In short, even though the psychiatric appraisal properly focussed on what all these things meant to him, it could simply not have been competent without reference to the social and cultural factors that impinged upon him and which were, in some sense, as much inside him as his individual characterology.

It is in this spirit and with this intent that I attack, in these lectures, the suburbs, the city, work, and play.

The Meaning of "Suburb"

I have reluctantly concluded that we get no help from philology or etymology in understanding what a suburb really is. Perhaps my Latin is too literal, but I still think that "sub" means "under"; and whatever the suburb may be, "under" is a poor word for it. Perhaps all this is like our theological use of the Latin "trans," as in "transcendence." "Trans" does not mean up but across. The "transcendent" moves across, out, beyond, but at no point with the "uppy" implications we have come to associate with it. One can see why "exurb" would not do; for the "ex" suggests not only extension outward but also some kind of disassociation. Perhaps Latin simply failed, offering no choices but "sub" or "ex"; and, all things considered, the illogicality of "sub" retained the notion of connectedness, although getting its geography mixed up, whereas "ex" would have broken the connection while retaining the more correct horizontal movement. But it is still hard to think of Adam being flung out of Eden into a "sub-garden."

The modern suburb began as a coping device. As urban congestion and noise and closing-in increased, and as industrial dirt and smoke and sprawl became greater, the pressure increased to move away. The intentionality was to prevent the modes of rising technologies from entirely determining all actual living, perhaps especially family living. The physical move outward was made possible by the development of transportation. However we may now evaluate the result of this suburban movement, it is of great im-

portance to recognize, that without it, worse things would certainly have arisen.

The analogy between suburban development and the origin of many mental illnesses is close. According to the theory now set forth most clearly by Karl Menninger, for instance, the person who is now, in his adult life, mentally ill did not get that way by beginning his life in weakness. Somewhere, probably early, he was confronted with a threat, like a raging sea. Few as his resources then were, he managed somehow to cope with the threat. Perhaps, as the wave lunged upward, he grabbed a rock and hung on. It was his strength not his weakness that got him through. Had he not found the rock, he would have drowned. The beginning of his pattern was, therefore, not in itself illness but rather evidence of strength.

But the soon unconscious memory the person has of the storm that nearly engulfed him continues to motivate him, even though the sea becomes calm and no doubt recedes from beneath him. He still hangs on. If a common-sense outsider should come along, and see our man clutching the rock, he would ask, "What's the idea? There is lovely grass just a foot below you." Menninger argues that a good deal of mental illness should be explained in just this sense. A pattern, at the start, was adaptive in the face of actual threat. But, having found his rock, the person held on to it, even when the situation actually changed. The clinging became, in actual fact, non-adaptive. And as the demands of adult life appeared, it became harder and harder to perform a job and be a husband with one arm entirely pre-

occupied with the rock. There is an aspect of non-contemporaneity, therefore, in many mental illnesses. But the illness, let it be emphasized again, reveals not only weakness but also a residual strength the person does not know he possesses.

I do not believe that I am fanciful in seeing a similar process at work in relation to the suburbs. Suppose we had simply yielded and built all our dwellings under the smoke stacks? Surely the result would have been far worse than what we know today. The coping by way of suburbs did in fact bring many gains. It brought lawns and trees, and dogs and cats, a bit more elbow room and a bit less noise, less smoke and dirt, and also a kind of new chance for institutions like schools and churches and Scouts and many others. The initial coping, we might say, was relatively successful, granted the titanic character of the threat. There was even good for the urban area in the suburban movement; for otherwise the city would have had to stop some of its own progress. While recognizing the immense differences among suburbs, even from the beginning, I am contending that the direction of suburban movement was an evidence of relatively successful coping.

But the suburban movement, once under way, began to cling to its rock, each suburban area no doubt having a bit of a different rock and a bit of a different hold. But they have all hung on, reluctant to confess what got them started in the first place, and yet lacking the contemporary eye to look down and see the difference between the present situation and what first motivated them. That clinging

has been shown in many ways: in architecture, in the way zoning has or has not been carried out, in general refusal to pay the costs of suburban transportation, in attempts to create islands of single-class and single-color and single-mores living, and in many other ways. I see a great deal of these suburban clings as like the transference phenomena in psychoanalysis. The big threat, the original massive threat, is forgotten or repressed. But, cryptically, it still determines much of the outlook; and so its energy is transferred onto contemporary objects which may, in rational fact, be anything but threats. But the clinging goes on.

The generally clinging or defensive suburban stance is occasionally jolted by a new and contemporary threat, in these days probably a combination of teen-age drinking, driving, and drugs, as happened a year or so ago in Darien, Connecticut. The real message is very much like that which Jonah reluctantly brought to Nineveh. But the suburb reads it narrowly, for instance, we simply must do something about teen-agers. Thus the clinging stance may be maintained unchanged; neither the massive threat nor the considerable strength at the start are seen in their true light; and black and white judgments continue to be made, rightly or wrongly, about anything that threatens the clinging pattern.

My analogies have limitations, and I shall carry them no further. But within limits, I do believe they help us to see better what the actual attitudinal situation is in the suburbs.

Suffering in the Suburbs

People in the suburbs, like people in

cities and on farms and in university communities, have accidents, get cancer, become mentally ill, and otherwise experience all the forms of suffering, except starvation, that are also the lot of their fellow citizens. But I think there are some differences about suffering in the suburbs, and I shall try to designate these differences under three headings. Here also I am conscious of the great differences among suburban areas. But I believe these three points transcend the differences.

I.

No matter what the principle is, or whether it is exercised consciously or otherwise, all suburbs contain limited populations. And the kind of limitation affects the kind of suffering that is or is not experienced, directly or vicariously. Take a suburb, for example, that contains mostly young married couples. Morning sickness becomes well known in this community; but there may be only the most limited acquaintance with sudden death from heart disease or with the lingering deaths from cancer. Or take a wealthy suburb where the population is mostly middle aged or older. It becomes familiar with the degenerative diseases but may lose touch with childbirth, whooping cough, and football injuries. Thus, even the sense of physical ills may acquire marked biases in every suburban situation. The contrast may be even greater with forms of suffering not primarily physical in nature.

No matter where we live, a part of our own humanity lies in and emerges from capacity to experience vicariously and sympathetically the variety

of suffering in other people. Indeed, when it is we who suffer, it is just that sense of solidarity that can also help us get through. Suffering is not to be hugged or used as an object lesson. But the fact is that great varieties of human suffering do actually exist. If we have no sense of their existence, how can we feel either solidarity or sympathy? On this matter nearly every suburb is a poor educator today.

2.

The second kind of difference about the suburbs and suffering lies in the predisposition to regard all presented problems except physical illness as family problems. Every minister has abundant evidence of this fact in his counseling, whether he has drawn the proper inferences or not. Whether a husband and wife come to him together, or only one comes reporting the other's refusal, he finds them calling it a "family problem," even if its roots and causes have long antedated the marital situation. The point is that "family problem" carries less stigma in the suburbs than would "personal problem." This is a kind of backhanded tribute to the prevailingly romantic understanding of family life in this country, certainly at its peak in the suburbs.

One can never deny, of course, that some kind of "family problem" exists. If an alcoholic beats his wife or loses his job, family involvement in the problem is manifest. But that may be quite different from calling the trouble a "family problem." The latter reveals indirectly the cryptic domination and hostility that is deeply imbedded in our romantic pattern, that is so often

more attentive to jealousy than to affection, and that often contains more dependency than love. Unless there is physical illness or accident, suburban families tend to think of all other kinds of suffering involving them as family problems. Although the togetherness motif is not without admirable features, the insistence that this is a family problem may cloud or confuse the diagnosis of the trouble, and impede the movement out of it. At the same time, suburban families tend to push their children prematurely into social life with the other sex, and may tend to retard little Johnny's development of responsibility by taking his propensity for spitballs and chewing gum on seats as a "family problem."

I have certainly seen in the suburbs evil results in the children from bitter and hateful quarreling, or silent non-speaking, or even physical violence. But quite a lot of suburban parents fear falsely that the time Papa (or Mama) blew a stack has been irreparably traumatic to the children. Without advocating regular mutual target practice before breakfast, I believe that this kind of fear is unjustified, and is simply another mark of the form our family romanticism has been taking. A man who will feel insulted if you call him a "good man" will nevertheless, and blandly, accept and expound on your statement that he is a "good father." Mothers probably have fewer illusions, but they will rise to the bait also.

Let me put this family point still more sharply. The paradigmatic suburban family today regards it as its function to prevent and eliminate suffering if at all possible, and to con-

ceal or deny it when elimination is impossible. As Reuel Howe has shown convincingly, this kind of attitude makes no provision for forgiveness either given or received. Suffering is seen in the suburbs as "simple evil," like the badness of the villain in the western movie. It is not understood as Christian faith understands it, as complex evil, bad in itself, but having ambiguity in terms of our capacity to respond to it—as the reconciliation after a fight may contribute to deeper sympathy and understanding. If O. Henry's story of the devoted couple at Christmas (she cut off her hair to buy his present, while he bought her beautiful combs for the hair) were being told in the suburbs today, I am sure she would cut her hair short and trade in the old station wagon so she could give him a new "family car" for Christmas; while he, in turn, would do without razor blades for a month in order to give her a Mustang convertible, ideal for her new hair-do. It is not that the suburbs do not know suffering. Rather they regard it as either fate or failure, not as a part of living to be accepted and dealt with.

3.

Third, and finally, I believe the "anonymous conformism" of every suburb (even though the content varies from place to place) is more powerful, more restricted in content, more rigid in tone, and more effectively concealed, than are the pressures of the small town with its range in age groups and class structure. The wildness of some week-end social life in many suburbs, and not solely the country-club suburbs, can hardly be accounted for except at least in part

as reaction. Many analysts like David Riesman and Gibson Winter have made far shrewder observations about these conformities than I could possibly do on my own. But my present concern is with what these peculiar pressures do to and about suffering, and the understanding and confrontation of suffering.

Suppose that a man loses the good job he has held competently for years. To be sure, friends and neighbors will at once express sympathy quickly followed by good wishes about getting a better job. But if the better job does not come, and quickly, they will hesitate to speak, "I don't want to embarrass poor Bill." Before long they may hesitate to speak to him at all, about job or anything else. If Bill then takes to drinking more than he should, the friends will be sorry, "Poor Bill," but they will become more and more distant. Suburbanites are not so bad for acute crises. But apparent complicity in failure cannot be dealt with. It is too close to suffering.

Although the mimeographed "letter to our friends at Christmas" is not a bad idea in proper doses, which should be homeopathic, I suspect that the tone of proud confidence of many such letters is a pretty fair test of what is happening in suburbia, mostly a commentary on the cardinal sin being failure (i.e., psychic suffering) in any form. Surely you too have received what I have received. "Sue took thirteenth(!) place in the tri-county baton-twirling contest, and surprised us all by very nearly getting a B in physical education. Joe came within an ace of being elected Janitor of his Home Room (regarded as quite an honor hereabouts), and he can al-

most play 'Joy to the World' on his trumpet. Sally is our artist, her best compositions so far appearing in crayon on our living room walls." And so on. Actually, if you got in to see these folks as old friends, and were sure not to live there, you would probably find that they have had the devil of a year, are out of their minds about all three children, do not know what an "abyss" is, but have been living very close to one; and, withal, are quite courageous and admirable people who need all the help they can get in terms of genuine understanding and moral support. Their Christmas bit has its laudable aspects. But what a shameful culture that will not even let them come just a wee bit clear with their friends. They are conforming faithfully to the suburban tradition, in public. But I hope some one, friend or minister, is helping them in secret.

Before I close out this section on suffering in the suburbs, it may be that some of you are waiting for me to come to the "afflict the comfortable" part of my speech, in which I shall lash out at exploiters and coupon-clippers and restricted covenanters and Saturday-night wife-swappers and rich physicians and conscienceless brokers, and perhaps even ministers who have cultivated suburban paunches, pocketbooks, and pious piffles. Perhaps I ought to do this. But my heart is not in it. When the situation seems to promise some constructive action therefrom, I think I am one of the best "viewers-with-alarm" in the business. I even tried this on the Federation of Theological Schools over a good long period; but then, nobody can win all the time.

The real fact is that I am very

dubious about the chance of a prophetic ministry today to influence the suburbs that does not enter, personally, in a fully pastoral sense with the people who are in the suburbs. The prophetic should grow, I think, from the pastoral. If the people are caught, so are we, as persons and as churches. We are not, thanks to our faith, wholly caught, whether in the suburbs or elsewhere. But neither are we above the battle. As with our people, some of the forces we have to fight are within us, just like the demons of old who started their invasion from outside, but who became demons precisely at the point where the people could not be sure which was outside and which was inside.

The Church and People in the Suburbs

In asking what the Church and the minister may do today with, about, and on behalf of people in the suburbs, the first fact we confront is that no sensitive minister these days is easy about being there. Even though George W. Webber keeps telling us, from his experience with the East Harlem Protestant Parish, that the suburbs are our frontier of ministry, there is pressure upon the suburban pastor to feel at least ashamed, and perhaps also guilty, that he is there at all. The cushier his pews, the greater the shame with, I suspect, the chance that it all becomes repressed. But, repressed or open, the danger is that the minister will have a "failure of nerve" about his job in the suburbs. And if the doctor is afraid either to prescribe or to operate, nothing gets done.

The first problem is, then, not what minister or church can *do* in the sub-

urbs or with their people, but how we can get beyond the failure of nerve without falling into complacent acquiescence. To this end I have no formula, but I do have an analysis and an attitude and even an analogy, as already suggested. I believe the suburbs are out of date because they are clinging to rocks. But I believe that their original rock-clinging was adaptive and strong. If they could really believe in their potential strength, and not waste it by defensive clinging to a non-contemporaneous present, they could do for their people, indeed for all the people, what was promised in their early vision.

Without this paradoxical insight, I suspect that we are sunk. How do you and I, as ministers, feel as we approach a mentally ill person, always granted we are pastor and not psychiatrists? I think I can almost put our reaction into stages. In the first stage as we come to see a bit more of his inner suffering, our sympathy rises; we are truly sorry and we want to help. But then, in a second stage, we see him repeating just that behavior that will increase his suffering, augment his alienation, and prevent his using his resources. We are still sympathetic, but are baffled and even a bit exasperated. In a third stage, we are tempted to pull back the energies and sympathy we have invested in him, and simply hope for better luck with the next person. At that point we may lose him altogether, and our chance to help him. But if we persist and proceed to a fourth stage, then we can see that some of his apparent weakness is actually strength, and some of his apparent strength is actually weakness. With strength and weakness re-

appraised, we may find our own genuine and realistic hope for him rising. We may find ourselves confessing to ourselves that his plight is worse than we had thought, but that his prognosis is better than we had any right to expect. All this is indeed paradox, but it is not contradiction.

It is, by analogy, this kind of attitude that I believe we need to acquire in relation to the suburbs. They, and the churches and people within them, have far greater potential strength than they realize. Both their existence and their development demonstrate this strength. True, they did not plan very well; but then, who does in the face of a great threat? They escaped; they found their rock; and for a time, their clinging to it was adaptive. Clinging is, after all, some kind of enemy of pride; for who will cling if he is wholly autonomous?

But the clinging went on. Defensive attitudes became routine. Vision of the emerging situation was blinded by cryptic attachment to the threat that had been conquered. Restrictive covenants, selfish zoning, a narrowing of identifications, all of it often justified under moral and religious rubrics, all these and similar factors developed. Out of this apparent smugness there was awakening only with newly emergent and insistent problems, like school integration, or juvenile delinquency, or the water supply. But that awakening has been only partial and piecemeal, at least in most places. It has left the basic dynamics unanalyzed and still partly concealed.

If you and I approach our suburb with condemnation, even with the Bible and sociology supporting us, we

shall not get far. But we can not, on the other hand, ignore the people in the suburbs and what suburban structures and culture are doing, and failing to do, for them. My suggestion is the move from precisely the paradoxical attitude that is realistic about the

evils, and immensely hopeful about the potential strengths. If we, and our churches, serve the people who are there, I think we may conceivably be listened to about the more general nature of the plight and the possibility. But I do not guarantee it.

II

PEOPLE IN CITIES

As I attempted to do in the previous lecture about the suburb, I shall begin these remarks by trying to locate the "intentionality" of the city. To be sure, this is a kind of anthropomorphic notion, for the people who have created cities have not done so with clear and conscious intention. And yet there is a kind of semi-conscious purposiveness in the process, for which the item "intentionality" seems appropriate.

Whether we begin with the city in the modern sense of metropolis, or with little Jericho, I believe the intentionality of the city has been to provide a common identity to a group of people in their dealings with everything beyond their group and their boundaries. The specific factors needed to create and implement and maintain the common identity have of course varied widely. The walls of Jericho were primarily to ward off invaders. The bridges around New York City are primarily to bring in buyers and sellers and workers. But in both instances, the intentionality is to create some kind of common or collective identity in relation to the outside.

When we look back, from a modern perspective, at the cities like Jericho, they seem at first to have nothing but a defensive stance against the outside.

Their walls appear to us as massively antagonistic against the alien. We forget that the control of sewage and water, for instance, in a modern city is no less antagonistic to the outsider or the alien even though it is less obtrusive. And we may also forget that the walls of Jericho served a positive purpose of structuring life within them, as well as the defensive purpose against the outside. If we see the central intentionality of the city as the creation and maintenance of common identity in relation to the outside, then it becomes possible to see that all cities in all ages have implemented this intentionality in both negative and positive ways.

As in relation to the suburb, the city too, in its emergence, may be seen by analogy to a coping device. No doubt the coping was first against threat from outside. Had there been no coming together, no doubt weather, wild animals, and marauders could have picked people off one by one. Hence the original coping was effective, averting worse possibilities. And in some respects, the bigger the city, the more effective the coping in the original defensive sense. And, once the city had in some sense begun its course, there were also some positive values at once apparent: structuring

of the in-group for increasingly diversified but mutually helpful purposes, as well as positively patterned ways for dealing with that beyond the city.

But right from the sewage system of Jericho on down, the growth of the city has also brought unintended and negative consequences. And people in cities, collectively speaking, have continued to hang on to their particular rocks, even when they should have dropped the few inches to earth and begun to clean up the water supply. I believe I am not being fanciful in drawing this analogy. And yet cities, as we know them, are so massive, so complex, and so diversified that it requires a studied effort on my part to try to set aside all details and look for the fundamental process beneath. It is easier to talk about the difference between day and night than about the factors present both day and night.

The intentionality of a city is to create and maintain common identity in whatever forms it may be needed, and this necessitates both defensive and constructive measures. But the attempts to cope, while successful in that, without them, things would have been far worse, have also been treated, thereafter, as rocks to cling to. A very great many of the measures taken, or not taken, by any city have been mal-adaptive in meeting its problems or realizing its potentialities. It required a connubial ultimatum in a Mellon family to get Pittsburgh's Golden Triangle cleaned up. It took stark fear to impel some start at cleaning up the area in which we are now meeting in Chicago. And in both instances, if an alien may say so, the cleaning up is only relative.

It is perhaps necessary to look at

cities of which the structures are unfamiliar in order to appreciate the depth of the rock-clinging forces. I can recall, for instance, my attempt to locate a residence in Tokyo. Whether or not any particular street could let a taxicab through was strictly a matter of trial and error, unless the driver had happened to be over that precise street before. And I found that the numerical aids to finding were not attached, as here, to streets and houses, but only to districts or areas. In the city of Seoul, Korea, the residences of the well-to-do have not only the walls and the numerical anonymity of Tokyo, but also spikes and broken glass and other devices on top of the walls. Without denying that both kinds of devices may be partly adaptive to some aspects of the present situation, just as is the doorman on Michigan Avenue, the sense of clinging to the rock is obtrusive to the Western visitor.

In Seoul I was at first amazed to find the shacks of refugees from North Korea high on the hills, commanding beautiful views. But then I discovered that the water supply did not extend above a certain point and that only the refugees, in their desperation, would tolerate the absence of even an impure water supply. I found the refugees making alleged concrete blocks out of the most unlikely materials; and yet wondered why, despite the magnificence of their view, they elected to stay in Seoul with its compounding of the problems of water, sewage, disease, and sanitation. There is perhaps no answer except the basic intentionality of the city, finding a common identity—which, in Seoul, meant at least the hope of finding work and

income and something beyond carrying pails of water up hundreds of hilly feet. As I saw it, both the Korean well-to-do with their spikes on walls, and the poverty-stricken refugees with their brace sand-block coping, were demonstrating the clinging as well as the adaptive aspects of the city.

As I was looking at these contrasts in Seoul, it suddenly occurred to me that I had seen the same thing in New York City without quite being able to place it. I had once dined at the home of a New York millionaire, located less than a hundred feet from an avenue of cold-water flats. I had also been in some of those flats. In New York, the "controls," so to speak, were less visible. The cold-water flats did not threaten the water supply or the sewage disposal of the millionaire. All he had to worry about was the air, and getting home, unless he wanted to regret the lack of a view or the impossibility of an unobserved garden.

Change in the City

When the first modern planners took an over-all look at the city, they felt appalled by the general problem, and were initially inclined to work for the City Beautiful—like Chicago's downtown lake front. Their next pitch was toward the City Efficient, with fast roads, more or less clean streets, and everything moving fast. Of more recent years they have almost, but not quite, come to be working for the City Human—the trouble being that no one quite knows what that should mean. And yet this progression from beauty to efficiency to humanity is, I think, a move in the

direction of justified hopefulness. Part of the grounds of hope is supplied by increasing technological resources. But a part of it also is in vision and imagination.

Some of the physical aspects of our cities are changing at a more rapid rate than at any time since I have been alive, as right here in Hyde Park. But it is no secret that most of the people displaced by new housing, as right here, have had to be shoved elsewhere. How rapidly good housing will be provided for these persons, no one knows. But the nation can afford it if the people elect to do it. And, despite all the tangles about schools, roads, rapid transit systems, parking, and integration, both the wealth and the technology are available to solve all these and related problems if we decide to do it and organize the doing.

I do not believe that living in the city, or working in the city, has to be fatedly and forever dirty, overcrowded in a pejorative sense, inhumane, or devoid of playspace, clean air, roads, or the protection of privacy. And yet, despite their planning commissions, cities are still in actual fact, mostly acting only on the basis of "crash" programs, critical responses to plain emergencies. Almost any city administrator these days has one of the most difficult jobs in the country.

As to the changing shape of cities, in their external aspects, none of this is a part of any expertness I may have. But even I, with the help of some sociologically-tinted spectacles supplied years ago by Sam Kincheloe and others, can see some plain facts; for instance, that cities are becoming both more urban and more exurban at the same time; that segregation by income

and class is perhaps becoming greater even if we are finally making some small headway against segregation by race and national origin; that educational opportunities in urban areas show enormous disparities; that rapid transportation seems to move back two steps for every step ahead; and much else.

When we come to changes in the peoples of the city, I know a bit more. Take medical care, for instance. Blue Cross and Shield, and tax-supported hospitals, and eventually Medicare, will all help a good deal. But did *you* ever go for treatment to the Cook County Hospital? Places like Cook County, granted the enormity of the job handed them by a city, do yeoman work. But they can not solve the basically human problem of isolation and depersonalization even in relation to simple medical and surgical care. And nobody is allowed to repair anybody's teeth.

The field of care of mental illness is improving, both in hospitals and clinics of the established type and also in relation to the new drive toward community mental health centers. Perhaps, in this State and elsewhere, a program moving in the direction of competence can no longer be upset by an election, as it was when I lived here. But even now, the bases upon which progress rests are far too tenuous. And there is a real question as to whether they are designed to reach effectively the most disadvantaged section of the urban population, which perhaps needs them most.

As to crime, delinquency, and related types of anti-social behavior (perhaps including addictions), there seems general agreement that most of

these are increasing in most cities. For this fact the reasons are immensely complex. But I do not see how we can avoid seeing one of these important reasons as a discrepancy phenomenon. Precisely at the time when more people, especially younger people, are adopting the dominant ambition motif of the culture, most especially through higher education, the discrepancy between their cultural conformity and the non-conformity of others, especially disadvantaged groups, becomes greater. Do we have, as Edgar Z. Friedenberg put it, a "vanishing adolescent" these days, in the sense that the more structured and less violent modes of young people's rebelling against the adult culture have worn down; and that our expectation of more conformity from teen-agers (especially about education) leads, proximately, to more violent rebellion by others, and further along to more violent episodic rebellion even by the conformists? So far, our urban efforts at jobs for disadvantaged young people look pretty feeble, because the persons in charge have been given few resources to work with.

There is an even newer fact about city life, perhaps so far most evident in unprecedented New York City, but also appearing elsewhere. That is perhaps best demonstrated in the reported instances of murders and rapes taking place in view of other persons who made no attempt to interfere or even to sound an alarm. In some instances the immediate deterrent has been the presence of a gang of some kind; and perhaps the increase in gangs of various kinds is linked with the discrepancy phenomenon already noted. But some of the reported in-

stances have not involved gangs of any kind.

Rollo May and I were recently trying to explore together possible reasons for this, both of us feeling baffled. I believe he is right that the ultimate cause of this kind of fearful apathy is increasing depersonalization. But that, in itself, does not give the intermediate range of dynamic explanations that might enable us to attack the problem. This new factor, whatever its proximate causes, it not just increasing size. I rode the New York subways for fifteen years and managed to survive the impersonality, the pushing, and the pickpockets. But it never occurred to me, even at two o'clock in the morning, that I might be attacked while others simply looked on. Whatever the reasons, the fact is most alarming of all. It is as if the last small trace of civilization had disappeared. Even in Freud's grim mythological picture of the brothers, in prehistory, rising up to kill their father, there were no mere on-lookers. Every brother was involved.

There is one other characteristic of people in cities that deserves mention, and that is immigration and emigration. When people move from town and rural areas either because they must, or to try to better their condition, they move first to cities. If successful there, perhaps eventually they may become suburbanites. But their first move is into cities. Such moves have been made in recent years not only by individual persons and families, but also by something like great bloc groups of minority and disadvantaged people. As an extreme illustration, I think of the groups of American Indians who were brought directly from

life on the reservation to the near-downtown areas of Chicago, supposedly in order to better their condition. What ghastly interior feelings there must be in persons who, like the American Indians, think at first they will find "freedom" and "equality," and then quickly reach the point of disillusionment. It seems to me altogether likely that the sheer quantity of disillusionment and hopelessness we now have in our cities is enormously greater than during the entrance into our cities of large numbers of immigrants from overseas. Although the living conditions found by such immigrants in their early days were often worse than the present, they had both hope and some kind of solidarity, even if they sometimes cut themselves off temporarily from some aspects of the new culture. The hopeless and disillusioned person in our cities today cannot cut himself off, in a kind of regression in service of the ego, as the immigrant might have done fifty or a hundred years ago. He has to stand and take it, without a defense or an outlet. Psychodynamically speaking, perhaps apathy and Black Muslim kinds of movements are brothers under the skin of any color.

Suffering in Cities

The discussion has already moved into a consideration of the special forms and kinds of suffering that tend to be characteristic of the city. We have mentioned the isolation or depersonalization, and also the apathy and hopelessness as related to some groups. I want also to note the enormous varieties of suffering in the city. Each point will be discussed in turn.

As to isolation, depersonalization,

or detachment, let me begin at the other end, with death and cemeteries. In a city, hardly anybody sees the cemetery, or other contrivance, where he will eventually be buried. There is something healthy, I think, in walking or driving past old Oak Lawn occasionally. The very fact that, in these passings by, one is seldom competing with the existentialists in the prospective confrontation of death, does not decrease the value of at least a passing acquaintance with one's final resting place. Even the suburbanite, who probably exceeds the speed limit as he drives past Shady Acres, nevertheless has *some* kind of contact. The city man very likely has none.

I heard a story recently of the Roman Catholic priest who appeared in the physician's office with a broken wrist. "How did you break it?" asked the doctor. "I fell off a commode," replied the priest. When consulting a colleague about the treatment, and reporting that the accident was caused through the fall off a commode, the physician answered his colleague's question about what a commode is with the words, "How should I know? *I'm* not a Catholic." This is the kind of relationship a city man has to his cemetery.

The detachment of a city—which may appear as protection to some and as isolation to others—is illustrated by an experience I once had in the elevator of a large apartment building. A white-uniformed man was traveling with me. "Is something special going on?" I asked him. "Not really," he replied, "Just a guy who killed himself in 3-B." Even though I was only making a brief call in the building, I shivered. It might just as well have

happened in my apartment building. Proximately, there is some kind of protection. Beyond, isolation.

Privacy, in the city, is almost directly proportional to income, although not quite entirely. You pay extra if you want thick walls, quiet toilets, bedrooms for every child, and freedom from peering. It is true that even the rich may have to confront an elevator man (at Christmas, anyhow) or a doorman, concede and pay for a cleaning woman or a cook, or occasionally tolerate bores at the club's round table for lunch. In these days, they may also have to contend with the glass-eyed architects who want no visual impediment between them and the City Beautiful at any hour of day or night, even though, being rich, they can always drape out the architect's intention. Certainly it is true that, in the city, money can bring most of the privacy any one would want, if he really knows the difference between privacy and isolation.

But the less money, the less the chances of regulating the difference between privacy and isolation. The poorer one is, the more he must pay the price of aloneness in order to achieve any privacy at all. What this does is to break down the discriminating relationship between privacy and aloneness, and make any achievement of privacy a move toward isolation. Take, for instance, the "dumb-waiter" of the old city apartment, which takes down garbage and sometimes brings up groceries. If the city man is so inclined, and is fortunate in his vertical neighbors, he can make it, on occasion, a kind of "party line." "Where *did* you get that broccoli at this time of year, Mrs. Schmidt?" may come

from the third or fourth floor. Mrs. Schmidt, in a pride that is not *hybris*, tells the address of the little anti-super-market man, and has a sense of relatedness not limited by the verticality of her instrument. But, unhappily, few vertical neighbors take this broccoli line. Hostility is the rule, with dumb-waiters. "I couldn't put my garbage on because she hadn't got her groceries off," is the usual complaint to the building superintendent. 4-B is mad at 6-A, all sight unseen, to be sure. Isolation and impersonalization tend very quickly to become hostile. Not a little of the suffering in cities is, I think, a sense of isolation that is subjectively experienced as anger, but which is, in actual fact, a re-active kind of hostility against persons who are involved in, but who have not produced, the events that bring about re-action.

If you live in a suburb and don't like your next-door neighbor, it is true that things may, from time to time, get hot over hedges, fences, dogs, or parking. And yet, no matter how tiny your plot or how large your mortgage, you always have some kind of "residential ego." In the city, especially in disadvantaged areas, and even if the Urban Housing Commission has awarded you an apartment in the new Thinwall Apartments, your next-door neighbor is not so easily dealt with. If he simply violated the clean-cut rules against letting pet boa constrictors loose at night, of course you could nail him. But of course he lives up to the rules. He lets them loose only during the day. If *you* happened to leave your windows open so they could get in and scare you out of a cleaning

woman for years to come, that is not *his* responsibility but yours.

Of course I have been talking, in these last remarks, about my middle-class experience. But how very much more imprisoning if one's city dwelling is without either the personal or the technological buttresses of bourgeois living. Where and how do you dry your laundry, without those protections? Suppose you have two children to a room, and one is sick? Normally, he could sleep through the Crimean War; but now, ill, is restive. That puts a new light on the toe-dancers upstairs, or on the Hi-Fi people below. Besides, the garbage men are always late, whether with cans or dumb-waiters.

In these comments about isolation, detachment, and even depersonalization, I have tried hard not to intrude the pathological. For even the usual is tough enough. But I have not quite succeeded. Perhaps, as an old urbanite, I can no longer make the distinction. Perhaps I am just maladapted. But there is something about dumb-waiters, crowded streets, peering neighbors, and other aspects of urban life which, quite existentially for me, always arouse critique and re-action.

Let me turn to the second special dimension of suffering in the city, which, in relation to special populations, I referred to previously as hopelessness, disillusionment, and even despair. I mentioned the well-intentioned but obviously catastrophic experience of the American Indian settlement in Chicago as a paradigm of disillusionment.

Perhaps as much has been said as time permits about apathy and disillusionment, or the possibly violent re-

action against them, on the part of manifestly disadvantaged peoples. The larger question is whether there is something inherent in urban life itself, as we now know it, that makes for the same qualities in people generally even though in a much less obvious way. Do cities discourage hope in people in however subtle a fashion? Or perhaps we could ask: Is there more "numbness" in cities than is clearly apparent on the surface? I am inclined to believe the answer is yes.

So far as I can tell from what the experts say, both the technological resources and the wealth would permit our cities to have adequate supplies of pure water, to handle snow removal as they do in Vermont, to treat sewage so as to protect all water supplies, to control smoke and smog, and many similar things. But the fact is that hardly any one gets worked up about such things, except the professional planners, unless a crisis or emergency arises. I do not believe this is accounted for in just "not caring." The apathy seems to come, instead, from a feeling that the problems, all rolled together, are so gigantic that not very much is likely to be done about them; so why get worked up? Deal with emergencies, but don't expect more than that.

In some respects I am reminded of the attitude that existed on pre-modern farms, where no one hoped for any diminution of the long hours and hard physical labor, nor much increase in production. All that has changed. And perhaps one of the main reasons for the change is that even the biggest farm, and even when run by a corporation, is still "conceivable." A person, or a group of persons, see

that something can be done in the area for which they are accountable. It is extremely difficult to get any such conviction in the city.

Finally, it seems to me that the very varieties of suffering in the city give urban suffering a different quality. The varieties are of many kinds. Many people who have special forms of suffering, of which drug addictions would be an illustration, concentrate in cities. But the varieties extend also to relative visibilities. A poverty area, for instance, makes many kinds of suffering highly visible. But the agony in pent-houses is far less visible even than that in the suburban mansion. High visibility in one sector tends to make for insensitivity in the other. After travelling through a miserable ghetto, one finds it hard to get excited about the anomie of the pent-houser. And if one has anomie in a pent-house, his upper-lip is likely to be so stiff as to impede his vision if he ever drives through a miserable ghetto. In other words, the forms of suffering in the city, with their great variety, tend to de-sensitize persons to forms other than their own. This gives to suffering in the city a kind of isolated "cluster" effect. From the point of view of the intentionality of the city, as previously defined, it subverts. If the intentionality of the city is to give a sense of identity, by both positive and negative means, against that which is outside or beyond, then this mutually insensitive variety of suffering in the city works precisely against the city's intentionality. Whatever the problems were at one time, they now become worse because there is a decline in empathetic sharing, or sense of common identity. Cities get worked up

positively only over sports teams or concert halls, and negatively only about emergencies and crises. These are tenuous bases for fulfilling the intentionality of the city.

Shepherding the People in Cities

Almost from the beginning of the city of Chicago, there have been bold experiments in trying to alleviate the suffering and foster the welfare of the people through the churches and church agencies and functions. New ways are still being explored, without precipitate discarding of the old ones like neighborhood houses, for helping the disadvantaged peoples. Church planning, thanks to persons like Sam

Kincheloe and Arthur E. Holt and Graham Taylor, is becoming more careful and more clearly relevant.

But I wonder if we too, in the churches, do not have our own kind of hopelessness, settling for too little too quickly, hiding behind our own particular tasks, responding to emergency calls but not hoping for much else, doing what we can for the disadvantaged but not in fact considering their basic problems as like our own only a bit more so? Heaven forbid that we not do what we can for the disadvantaged. But trying to help them is not a sign or proof that we and our kind are above the battle and the sufferings. Help the inner city? Yes. But help the rest of the city too!

III

PEOPLE AT WORK AND PLAY

When Calvin and Luther declared that every Christian and not just the priest or the monk is called by God to his work, as well as to his life at home, in the Church, and in the community, they did not suspect that, by our own century, the notion of "vocation" would have become synonymous with "gainful occupation," and be entirely divorced in common speech from the speaking by God and the hearing by man.

It is important to remember that, to the Reformers, a man's work did not exhaust his vocation from God, important as it was held to be. Calvin wrote, for instance:

"The magistrates will do their work more willingly; a father will conduct his household with greater courage; in short, every one will feel more at home in his state of

life and will conquer the troubles, the anxieties, the disappointments, and the cares which he has, when all are convinced that no one should carry a burden other than that which God has placed on his shoulders." (*Inst.* III: X, 6).

A Christian is called by God to the totality of his relationships, duties, and privileges in life, according to Reformation doctrine. To hear and heed God's vocation, he need not work up any peculiar form of churchiness, or try to manage any special good deeds. The polemics were against the notion that a priestly work is better than other kinds of work, and that the man without a family is better in God's eyes than the husband and father. Calvin did have to make a few qualifications. If a man is a thief, is he fol-

lowing a call better if he is a good thief than if he is a bad thief?

This is certainly not the place to review the complex arguments by Max Weber, R. H. Tawney, and others, associating Protestantism, and especially Calvinism, with the rise of capitalism—especially, as Weber put it, through development of a “this-worldly asceticism” that eventually lost its religious roots. Many criticisms of the detailed argument have been made, and no doubt some aspects of the original argument are vulnerable. But the contribution of Protestantism to a new kind of attitude toward work and production seems undeniable, even if the later secularization of the matter—shown most easily in what has happened to the word “vocation”—distorted and subverted the context essential to what they were declaring. But Protestantism unquestionably altered the meaning of work. All work (except things like thievery) may become a part of the Christian’s total vocation. Wrote Calvin, “There is no work so despised, so sordid, which does not shine and appear very precious in the eyes of God, by means of which we serve in our calling.” (*Ibid.*)

While keeping in the back of our minds the fact that work by no means exhausts a man’s “vocation” in the Christian sense, I want to turn next to an over-all look at the present work situation in our own country. It goes without saying that work is still a very different reality in underdeveloped parts of the world. It is also true that many aspects of the work situation are changing rapidly. But I shall attempt to look at the immediate situation before getting out my crystal ball.

Work Today

I believe that the most important fact about the work situation today, although it is not the most obvious fact, is the growing discrepancy in responsibility among workers. The fact itself is partly concealed because more people are getting more education or training for their jobs, more jobs require more knowledge or skill, and it is more difficult to get most jobs without some kind of special training. But the discrepancy in responsibility continues to increase.

On one occasion I was in a large government office in Washington at five minutes of five. The rapidity with which the large office was cleared was astounding. Stenographers, typists, file clerks, receptionists, and related kinds of personnel who worked in the large office, were through not only physically but also mentally at five P.M. Not one of them carried an ounce of either worry or responsibility about his work beyond the door-sill. Come working hour the next morning and he would worry and be responsible for his bit. But in the interim, work would be set wholly aside.

But the offices and cubicles adjacent to the large office were still full. It took no great imagination to see that the egress from them would be inversely proportional to the size of the particular office, the biggest shots being the last to leave. By the same token, the size of the brief cases that would accompany the inhabitants of private offices would be directly proportional to the size of the private office. Only VIP’s fight the battle of the bulging attaché case.

This phenomenon of discrepancy is

more easily observable in the situation I have described, but I believe it is true virtually everywhere. An equivalent can easily be seen in manufacturing, in merchandising, in most transportation, in communications, and even in institutions like hospitals. The fact I am pointing to is not that some workers have no responsibility while on the job; the bus driver or the trucker or the laboratory technician must be very alert indeed and, within the limits of their assignment, their accuracy and responsibility may well be a matter of life or death. The point is, rather, twofold: the limits of their responsibility are quite clear-cut, both as to time and function. Beyond those limits, they are relieved of responsibility. Some one else does the worrying. Some one else struggles with the responsibility that cannot be clearly defined. Most workers are the beneficiaries of substitutionary responsibility.

On the other side, there is the increasing responsibility of some workers. This responsibility may be partly seen in longer hours, and in the sheer gravity of responsibility carried. But it is seen much more in the relative absence of limits. Whether considered in terms of schedule or function, there is nowhere such persons can say, "Now I can stop worrying and thinking." In some respects, this may be called the "professional revolution."

Contrary to the debased ordinary meanings, to be "professional" is not a matter of being paid instead of unpaid, and is not a matter of treating everybody impersonally. It is, instead, a matter of treating every individual in his full concrete novelty, but on the basis of fundamental principles and not of mere trial and error. And it is

also, as a profession develops, dealing with the person on the basis of ethical (i.e., responsibility) conceptions established by oneself and one's colleagues.

This is not the place to detail the rise in the number of professions, or the development of the many sub-professions within professions, nor the even more fantastic growth of what are, at present, sub-professions which hopefully will move toward becoming, in due course, full exercisers of professional responsibility. But even the most rudimentary account shows this trend to be astonishing. I would wager that the number of persons who are both motivated in proper ways, and also limited in proper ways, by a sense of professional responsibility has increased nearly a hundredfold since the turn of the century. In all of human history, there is nothing to compare with this increase in responsibility.

Some of the most important aspects of the increase in professional responsibility are to be found in management and administration of many kinds: public service, business and manufacturing, education at all levels, and even in the churches. Hardly any of these occupations is wholly professional in the sense, for instance, in which medicine is. But every one of them, almost daily, moves in this direction. In the Washington office which I cited earlier, the men in the larger private offices were very close to thinking of themselves, and acting, as professional men. Their responsibility was, of course, ultimately to the particular field assigned to them, and the people all across the nation served by it if their service was competent and faithful. But it was also to the persons in the large outer office work-

ing under their direction. Barring real emergencies, it was their obligation so to organize the work that people did not have to stay on until midnight—double time or not—to get the necessary functions performed. If this number of people, with these skills, in these offices, could not do all that was needed, then it was the administrators' responsibility to make the representations that could get the additional funds that could acquire the additional space and the extra workers. The people who went home at five o'clock had no worry about such things.

Industrial managers may not yet have caught up with the fact that their jobs make them exercise professional orders of responsibility; but even now, more of them do so in fact than recognize the fact in theory. A manufacturing executive knows that his production workers go home and stop worrying when their shift is over. He knows that even his junior executives and vice-presidents must, at some spot or other, be given a bit of freedom from responsibility. But if he is both astute and professionally-minded, a good deal of his own worrying is directed toward increasing, in his close associates, the readiness to carry responsibility precisely at the points where no law and no limits are available to define everything clearly. A manager who recognizes that the responsibility he carries is professional in nature no longer simply gives orders. He consults. And consultation is a two-way process. When necessary, he does not hesitate, after consultation, to make a decision. And even if it is disguised under the nomenclature of "directive," he still may give an "order." But he is no longer a "boss,"

in the one-way communication sense. The exercise of his own responsibility (which I have suggested is becoming, and must become much more, professional in character) is principally directed toward evoking appropriate responsibility at various levels in all the people who work with him. Not only can he not personally check up on every nut and bolt. He can not check up either on every relationship, sale, or model. Hence he becomes, as Chester Barnard has so cogently suggested, the fosterer of communication. But this function, if I may revert to religious language, is very close to being a form of "servanthood." The servanthood is shown, above all, in that the executive worries about what is not structured, not time-limited, and not defined. By accepting this lack of structure as his own responsibility, he enables others to have graded and relatively structured areas of responsibility. As a result, he has a kind of power; but increasingly his attention is not upon whom he can bop but rather upon whom he must support, protect, warn, or otherwise try to help. "The king was in his countinghouse counting out his money." The modern executive would not only be bored by this low mathematical exercise, which he can hire somebody with an adding machine to do for him much more accurately; he would also be derelict to his managerial responsibility to the people of his organization, and the people served by it, if he wasted his time in such inferior parlor games. Besides, his wife has probably already done all the adding that is necessary for family purposes.

With the memory before me of those courses in the medieval period that

I took with John T. McNeill, I have sometimes done comparisons and contrasts between modern managers (including Seminary Presidents) and the lords of medieval communities. The differences are plain. Modern statuses are not fixed but are flexible. Modern wealth especially through technology makes enormous differences. Education of many kinds is widespread. And successful social climbers are no longer limited to the clergy as in medieval days—when only the clergy were “persons,” i.e., insisting that they belonged with the VIP’s even though they did not start there.

Yet there are also some similarities. With all of their status-remoteness, their reluctance to share the wealth, and their sheer arbitrariness, feudal lords generally had a lively sense of responsibility for the people within their territory, if only or mainly for prudential reasons. Later English literature shows the country squire as possessing an even more lively sense of responsibility toward his people, paternalistic and snobbish as it might be in attitude. While the modern executive may not be without the modern version of snobbery, he has discarded paternalism. A great many modern administrators—in business, government, or education—would be embarrassed to be told that they are more servants than they realize, except at testimonial dinners where everybody is talking and eating with gold-plated shovels. But I believe this is a fact nonetheless.

The modern use of the phrase, “public servant,” is illuminating in this connection. As often as not, the term is used cynically, derisively, or with tongue in cheek. But when the

phrase is used genuinely, then the usual connotation is, “He gave up money to do it.” Our culture, I think, is not so much confused about the relation between servanthood and slavery, as some religious proclamations seem to assume. Its confusion is, rather, about the difference between servanthood and “suckerhood.” For, above all, the greatest possible error in American culture is to “be a sucker.” Thus, our very best business and government and even educational administrators must carefully conceal their servanthood behind various devices such as good salaries, stock options, plenty of perks, and other devices.

Although I do not believe I have digressed, I have spent more words on the “professional revolution” than I had intended, in order to show the meaning of what seems to me the increasing discrepancy in responsibility among different groups of people. I have declared this discrepancy as the most important fact about the present over-all work situation. Perhaps some of the reasons for my assertion are now clear.

If the discrepancy should grow to caricatured limits, we should have the picture drawn in that greatest of modern social satires, Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World*, where the majority of the people (if they are still people) do something called “work,” drink something more effective and less damaging than alcohol, amuse themselves not only with pregnancy-free sexual activities, but also get vicarious kicks through movies turned into “feelies,” and in many other respects demonstrate life without responsibility. The rulers drawn by Huxley are, however, at the furthest

remove from the "proles." They still have the will power of the old world of the past (completely dead in the "proles"). They are still, with all their cynicism, a bit romantic under the skin, and perhaps a bit guilty for what they have wrought. In a back-handed and cynical way, Huxley shows them as almost but not quite acquiring a sense of responsibility.

I do not really, as to the future, fear either the dehumanization of *Brave New World*, or 1984. I do fear many lesser but still important outcomes. Who will want to endure the long and hard and by-no-means-furlined course to becoming a physician, when the rewards of physicianhood—in terms of dollars, peace of mind, or right to get married whenever you have a mind to—become quite inferior to working for General Talcum, with its policy of high starting salaries, rapid promotion, the twelve-hour week, the two-month vacation with fully-furnished cottage at Idle Lake, and the provision of dishwasher, lawnmower, radiant range, TV sets in every room, free new drapes every year, and free educations for all children through the Ph.D.? What sucker, under those conditions, will dare, like Lyndon B. Johnson, to start life as a school teacher, or, to coin a phrase, like Bill D. Moyers, to begin the heavenly ascent as a preacher?

A second aspect of the contemporary work situation is of course the much-discussed effects of automation, computers and all. The recent report of the President suggests that, despite dislocations, we shall not run out of work in the near future. But even for this period of ten to thirty years or so, those dislocations will mean, and

even now mean, great suffering to many people, especially in a society where (unless one owns capital) his self-respect tends to be tied up almost entirely with his gainful employment.

But as to the longer pull, it seems clear that we shall eventually run out of work for many people if jobs, and the payment for doing them, should continue to be defined exactly as at present. On the other hand, it is equally clear that a great deal of the work that needs most to be done, for the sake of uniquely human values, currently remains undone, and is unlikely to be done in the future unless there is redefinition of work and the rewards for it. I think, for instance, of what could happen if all the appropriate and useful work that can be done actually were done with mentally deficient children. A great many such children could be changed radically in the direction of normal living and intelligence. Many more could live their lives, within their limits, fully and happily. Family agonies could be eased; many kinds of human values could be enhanced. Simply to utilize the knowledge and insight we have now, to say nothing of research into both care and prevention, would require hundreds even thousands of professional persons, plus many thousands of sub-professional people. Only reluctantly is our society providing the means for the education and training of a very small number of such people, and the further means for supporting them at this kind of work. If society, which will increasingly have the means, chooses to re-define this kind of function as work in all appropriate senses, it will be centuries

before we can run out of that kind of work.

Proper care of the mentally deficient is but one illustration of the enormously needed potential for work that cannot be approached unless there is a redefinition of work and of the appropriate conditions needed to support it. Care and guidance and healing and rehabilitative and educational services are almost unlimitedly expandable. But so, we might note, are serious investments in the arts of all kinds. I am constantly astonished to see how many of the paintings done by the old WPA art project are really pretty good if not necessarily severe competition with Leonardo or Titian.

As the wealth of our society increases, will we make this shift in the meaning and significance of work, with all the new conditions necessary to make it operate? I have no notion what *will* happen, but it does seem clear that all the past shibboleths about such matters are fast becoming irrelevant. But let us suppose, for the moment, that our society does move in this direction, along with larger quantities and more intelligent aid to underdeveloped countries at the same time.

We shall then, I think, be back at the problem of discrepancy in responsibility. If the economic rewards after a long and gruelling course of study are not much greater than after a quickie training course, and if everybody is far above the subsistence line anyhow, what will motivate the persons needed at the higher levels of responsibility. Will it be only the will to power, as Huxley apparently thought? Or will diakonia, in some

reasonable facsimile of the Christian gospel, have a chance?

It is this challenge of motivation which, above all, I believe, constitutes our unprecedented opportunity in the churches. I see this not as competing with the real basic understanding of vocation initiated by Calvin and Luther, but as moving toward its completion. The Reformers saw work, any honest and productive work, as a part of God's calling. Such work should be done as well as one could do, with no ancient equivalents of featherbedding. The priest's work was no more valuable in God's eyes than any other form of honest and productive work. Yet in the churches we are still enormously concerned with the supply of ministers, and still do very little to influence able young people to consider the health occupations, the welfare occupations, and the like.

The so-called vocational guidance movement in this country began in the early years of this century in the Boston Y.M.C.A. Its first thrust was in the direction of service occupations. Then there came, during and after the first World War, devices for testing individual abilities, which for a time threatened virtually to mechanize guidance about occupations. Good leadership in this guidance movement has now happily restored individuality and sensitivity to all such guidance services, if they are competent to begin with. But in the shuffle, the old service occupation idea has become lost. We have another chance with it, if we choose to get busy.

Finally, a comment is needed about work by women. Every study with which I am familiar shows that the

overwhelming majority of women who are gainfully employed outside the home do that work from necessity or near-necessity. Even most professional women who work by preference and not just necessity tend to think of giving up their career when they get married. Society does not think of their early child-rearing days as a normal interruption of their service but as becoming home-makers.

As wealth increases, fewer women will have to work outside the home for economic reasons. And yet, at the same time, the work needed in the future and not now being done simply must have more women involved as well as men; women have unique feminine capacities for just the kinds of care-taking, healing, and rehabilitating that the future will make possible. But what about motivation? Have we become so completely romantic and slap-happy about the family and rearing children that we actually discourage women from exercising responsibilities beyond the walls of the home? In some respects, what is now called, unhappily, "volunteer service" could prove to be a transition to a new and more desirable situation. But why does so-called "volunteer service" have to be untrained and short on responsibility? I believe we have not even begun to quit joking about women's work, and to give new consideration to the larger problem and potentialities that follow through the combination of Reformation insights into vocation and the emerging cultural and economic situation.

People at Play

The text for this very brief discussion of people at play is, "Unless

you become as little children. . . ." The "work" of little children—the investment of energy and interest and concern—is called "play" by grown-ups. They have not yet learned to avoid investing energies until it is demonstrated that there is something in it for them. Their investment is spontaneous. It requires no other justification than the process itself. And not only do children learn many things in their so-called play. They also, as Freud noted, work out intrapsychic and interpersonal problems through their play. Their play, we might say, is justified by faith rather than by works.

For the investment of energy by adults that does not require earning money, we have no other general term than "leisure," which is simply a commentary on what is not involved. I have more and more been trying to redefine the term hobby to mean "any serious interest pursued not for profit." This is quite different from just *not* doing something. And what we now see increasingly is that one man's job may be another man's hobby, and that cultivated "amateurism" may be no less skilled or responsible than gainful employment. When I told my dentist that my hobby was carpentry, he said he could not stand that after using his hands all day, and that his hobby was reading.

So long as gainful employment, inside or outside the home so to speak, meant long and back-breaking hours of labor for almost everybody except small children, then leisure in its purely negative, stop-a-minute, connotations was understandable. But this situation has become far less true for far more people. And even the

persons who carried the largest and most unstructured kinds of responsibility also need some surcease that is not a mere arrest of the usual activity.

If my crystal ball is operating properly, then the line of distinction in the future between job and hobby will become less and less in the two most important respects: seriousness of energy investment, and responsibility in performance. And everybody should have both a job and one or more hobbies. His sense of identity, his conception of his servanthood, and even his understanding of his creaturehood under God, should be related to his total serious energy investments and not alone to his gainful occupation. This way of looking at the matter preserves what seems to me central in the insight of the Reformers—not idleness or dilletantism or non-seriousness about the use of one's energies, but viewing all responsible energy investments as appropriate ways to serve God and thus God's intent for our selfhood.

If we are to make gains in this direction, of course wealth will have to

increase and be better distributed. On these points I am not, for the long pull, unduly pessimistic. But will people, psychologically and motivationally, be ready when externals confront them with the new situation? Here I am, currently, very pessimistic. Higher education, which should be the great ally of the arts and the churches in this motivational matter, seems almost to have lost its vision of the "liberal arts" tradition which, despite its aristocratic confinement to a few of the favored, nevertheless had a vision about the investment of energies that transcended gainful occupation. Perhaps, in higher education, there may come a Robert N. Hutchins for the new day; or perhaps the Ford Foundation will head the band-wagon. But I still think the churches have the best chance of preparing people motivationally for this new situation.

Why work if you don't have to? The real answer is that work, as serious and responsible investment of energies is absolutely essential to our humanity. The proper exercise of energies in this way is *diakonia*.

BOOK REVIEWS

Theology

Situational Ethics: The New Morality, by Joseph Fletcher. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, Pa., 1966. Pp. 176. \$1.95 (Paper).

A New Introduction to Moral Theology, by Herbert Waddams. Seabury Press, New York, N.Y., 1965. Pp. 240. \$2.25 (Paper).

Theological Ethics, by James Sellers. Macmillan Company, New York, N.Y., 1966. Pp. 210. \$5.95.

The publication of Paul Lehmann's *Ethics in a Christian Context* has aroused a storm of controversy but it has also brought forth a rash of new efforts to lay the foundations of Christian decision making. It would be hard to imagine a more diverse collection than those here under consideration. Joseph Fletcher and Herbert Waddams, both Anglican priests and professors, clash vigorously on the role of law in moral action though they agree in defending casuistry. James Sellers bravely takes on the whole Reformation tradition of *sola gratia* which he finds uncongenial to the modern American man of action, and lays down an ethic of God's promise and fulfillment completing human work, as an alternative. Let us take them in turn.

Herbert Waddams rests his argument on the distinction between Christian ethics and moral theology, and a defense of the latter. Christian ethics in his understanding deals with the general principles, attitudes and spirit of morality in a theological context. Moral theology gets down to particular cases. Having defined the opposition between contextual ethicists in the Protestant tradition, and Catholic moralists in this way, he then refutes the attacks on moral theology by demonstrating that Protestant ethicists also deal with case studies and that Catholic moral theologians traditionally have taken account of the fact that natural law cannot be determined by the human reason alone, but also needs inspiration from the grace

of God revealed in Christ. Waddams, however, objects to the setting of alternatives. Nature *and* grace, love *and* law, situational freedom *and* the structure of moral principle should work together to illuminate the particular choices Christians must make.

All of this is conventionally reasonable. The advice which the author gives in problems of marriage and sex, the use of force, the taking of life and the handling of wealth is a good statement of the enlightened liberal consensus of modern Christianity in these areas. At times this advice is purely situational, as with relation to contraceptives. At others principles fairly well circumscribe the alternatives foreseen. The problem with the book is precisely this conventionality. It is a good example of the kind of wisdom against which Joseph Fletcher directs his polemic, not because he would disagree with Waddams' conclusions in most cases, but because in a treatment like this the adventure and the crisis of moral action are not adequately revealed.

Fletcher is an outspoken foe of ethics based on norms and principles. Of the three here reviewed his book is the clearest and most trenchant. Situational ethics, says Fletcher, is also based upon cases, but it does not prejudge them by any set of laws whatever save the command to love. Love he defines as *agape*, or the Latin *dilectio*, an attitude of the will to seek the neighbors' good on the widest possible scale. It has nothing to do with subjective feelings or impulsive actions. There is a reason which informs love but it is the reason which calculates proper means to achieve the ends which alone can justify these means, not the application of rules to human conduct. Good results are the only good. Every ethical decision is a risk taken in responsible freedom since it must calculate and may be mistaken about what these results will be. For Fletcher life is a series of such ethical adventures where there are conflicting goods to be realized or preserved, but never a rule which settles the issue. The difference between this approach and that of Waddams is most clearly illustrated in their conflicting attitudes toward abortion, especially the case of the Arizona mother who

feared a deformed child because she had taken thalidomide. For Waddams this mother's action was an unjustified taking of life and a lack of faith. For Fletcher it was a creative risk which proved justified because the child would in fact have been deformed.

There is a fundamental insight, and a profound self-deception, in this book's point of view. Fletcher stands in the tradition of Bonhoeffer, Lehmann and Barth in asserting the ethics of freedom, the freedom of the new man in Christ. In the final analysis for him also the form of love and therefore the criterion of the good is God's action there revealed. Here lies the deception, however. Bonhoeffer on whom Fletcher much depends was profoundly aware that God's love is not identical with human love even at its most rational and sensitive. Christian ethical reflection therefore is the effort to discern the reality of Christ taking form in human life often against human ideas of what is good and loving. This form appears to man, because he is not God, as law. There is a structure to the relation of man and woman, there is a limit on the taking of life, there is a quality of integrity in human relations which does not appear to men in every situation as loving. It is this correction of man's self-deception in the ethical situation, this form of God's love over against human love, which Fletcher forgets, though in practice it operates in his decision-making. The result is that he tries to abolish the very creative tension which God has placed in human life, between the good which love itself requires of us and the evil that we needs must do in pursuing the good we see. *Situational Ethics* becomes a human success story despite the dilemmas it propounds. Too little is said about the need and reality of forgiveness and the victory of divine grace. A practical illustration of this is the way in which the quality of human relations in themselves tend to be brushed aside in favor of rational calculation. What it does to a woman and a marriage to go through an abortion for instance if conception is in any sense more than human handiwork, what happens to the trust and friendship of persons with each other when resistance to injustice becomes conspiratorial—these and other human considerations are overridden in the search for rationally calculated results. All three of Calvin's uses of the law are helpful and

necessary in explicating love. Fletcher would have done well to make more use of them, and he could have done so as Bonhoeffer did without the slightest injury to his basic message of situational freedom.

James Sellers' book is more ambitious and at the same time more confused. He seeks to lay the basis for an ethic of action in a society which is action-oriented. He finds the basis of this rightly in the active movement of Biblical history moving from God's promise in the Covenant to its fulfillment in the Kingdom of God. As a good Methodist he emphasizes the role of sanctification in this process and includes elements of justification—the puncturing of our pretenses, and correction of our inhumanities—in it. All of this is very much in line with Harvey Cox and is certainly Biblical in its dynamic. Sellers has also learned a great deal from the later Karl Barth about the Christ-filled substance of ethical action.

It is in what he criticizes and in his interpretation of other points of view, particularly that of the Reformation, that the author falls into all manner of misinterpretations. Unfortunately this critical material forms the first part of the book. He interprets the Reformation principle of *sola fide* as if it rendered human behavior utterly passive. He interprets Calvin and Luther as if their idea of sin related to human misery and rather than to the misuse of human life and strength. He roundly espouses synergism because he cannot make a distinction between man's inability to save himself by his works and man's inability to do any good works at all. A similar polemic, based on similar misunderstandings, he directs against the Reformation principle of *sola scriptura*, as if it were in some way a denial of those insights into the human situation and its needs which come from other sources. In short his understanding of the entire Protestant tradition is borrowed more from a reaction against 19th century Revivalism than from the great theologians of Protestantism themselves.

Underlying this is the failure which Sellers shares with Fletcher, and to a certain extent even with Waddams, to face a simple problem which is basic to ethics today. Man is not weak and inadequate, but strong and creative. He is not sick, but healthy. His center is action, rather than contemplation, as Sellers rightly sees. But it is within his

strength and his activity that his dilemma arises. It is the distortion and misdirection of his goodness, his moral sense, his creativity and his love; it is the misuse of his self-sufficient power, which threatens his humanity. To become weak and a servant, to take sacrifice upon himself may be his calling, and the way back to becoming human. All of this is expressed in the confrontation of the world by a crucified and risen Christ, and in the Reformers' understanding of man's justification by God's grace alone, which these three writers find it so difficult to grasp.

CHARLES C. WEST

Religious Philosophies of the West, by George F. Thomas. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, N.Y., 1965. Pp. xx + 454. \$7.95.

A volume on this subject of this quality has long been needed in the field of the philosophy of religion. Thanks to Professor Thomas' careful exposition we now have for the first time an introduction to the religious philosophies of a selection of the greatest philosophers of Western history, from Plato to the present. Thanks to his critical comments on each we have an interpretive thread running through the book which gives us a key to the history of the philosophy of religion as a whole. Heretofore we have had as introductory material to this field a number of histories of philosophy, each of which has given some attention to religion, and at least one good typological introduction to the field in E. A. Burtt, *Types of Religious Philosophy*. But the present work is unique in being primarily historical and primarily concerned with the interpretation of religion which is found in the works of great thinkers of the Western past. It is basically, one should add, a study of philosophy. A few borderline philosophical theologians such as Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart, and Søren Kierkegaard, and Paul Tillich are included, but it is the philosophical aspect of their thinking which concerns the author rather than their place in the history of doctrine.

This immediately raises the question both for the author and his readers of the definition of religion which underlies this philosophical discipline, and its relation to Christian belief. It seems clear that for Thomas

this definition is basically determined by certain themes of the Christian faith—God as the creator or origin of the world and man, the source of goodness and truth, and man with his personal destiny. He suggests in his Introduction three ways in which philosophy can help religious beliefs: first by purging them of internal inconsistencies and naive ideas; second by providing them with concepts and principles for expressing themselves rationally; and third by examining critically their claims to truth. This critical and systematizing function does not replace the initiative of religion itself as a living experience and way of life but examines its coherence and cogency with relation to other spheres of thought. Thomas has definite preferences in this regard. The theism of Plato with its emphasis on creative activity he prefers to the unmoved mover of Aristotle. He denies that interpretation of Plato which gained ascendancy in neo-Platonic mysticism whereby the Forms have priority over the Creator. Throughout the book he rejects the problem raised in different ways by Augustine, Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard and the modern Existentialists of the inevitable subjectivity and distortion of human understanding. He prefers Aquinas' synergism to Augustine's absolute priority of grace. He finds Hegel's use of reason despite its pantheistic tendencies more constructive than that of Hume or Kant. He roundly defends against both optimistic naturalism and pessimistic existentialism, a continuity between the finite and imperfect but creative striving of man toward truth and goodness, and the infinite and perfect God who transcends and inspires man's quest.

This is a point of view which strengthens some insights and weakens others. Chapters on Aquinas, Tillich, and Whitehead are among the finest in the book. The discussion of Augustine's freedom and dependence on Greek philosophy is especially helpful. The vigorous refutation within the context of a profound fellow feeling for John Dewey is a special treat to read. The weaknesses this reviewer sees are two:

First, the author refuses to take with final seriousness not only the relativity but the distortion of the human philosophical enterprise because of its roots in the minds of sinful human beings. Therefore the moral pathos of philosophical existence in Plato,

which led to its neo-Platonic development escapes him somewhat, and he practically ignores the Stoic-Epicurean controversy. Therefore also he cannot give full value to Augustine's anti-Pelagian stance. It is no accident that there is no dialogue whatever with the Protestant Reformation in this book.

Second, Professor Thomas misses the point of those secular restatements of this basic Biblical insight in the skeptical philosophies of Hume and Kant, and in the later Existentialists. Hume's contribution, he says, to the philosophy of religion is largely negative. But this forgets that Hume was the philosopher who understood first in modern times the utter relativity and therefore unreliability of human reason as a guide to truth and goodness. Hume's faith lay far more in what he called convention or opinion regulated by the practice of mankind than in rational structures themselves. Similarly in Kant the pure reason and the practical reason should not be separated into compartments for analysis. Truth for Kant lay in the act of moral response and the reason which attended it. His dualism which Thomas finds unfortunate is the source of our freedom today from the total systems of idealists and naturalists alike.

In short, this classic history of great philosophers needs now a volume by another author which will start with the state of modern philosophy between existentialism and linguistic analysis over against the discovery by theology of its own object and forms of thought—over against, and yet profoundly analogous in its reference to historical action and response, rather than to the total coherence of systems of thought. This volume then might look back toward history and interpret the philosophical enterprise of the past in a new light, which would dispute and at the same time complement Professor Thomas' point of view.

CHARLES C. WEST

On the Boundary: An Autobiographical Sketch, by Paul Tillich. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, N.Y., 1966. Pp. 104. \$3.95.

In thirteen brief sketches, the author first composed in 1936, then revised in 1964, this fascinating analysis of his life work and

thought. Embedded in these concise yet revealing offerings are insights of Tillich's theology which could otherwise yield to discovery only through long hours of reading and reflection. Each little chapter deals with a different "boundary": for instance, that between city and country, reality and imagination, theory and practice, and so forth.

"I am a Lutheran by birth, education, religious experience, and theological reflection," wrote Tillich. "I have never stood on the boundary between Lutheranism and Calvinism, not even after I experienced the disastrous consequences of Lutheran social ethics and came to recognize the inestimable value of the Calvinist idea of the Kingdom of God in the solution of social problems."

In the essay on the "boundary" "Between Native and Alien Land," we read: "I have always felt so thoroughly German by nature that I could not dwell on the fact at length." Later on, he explained that "the increasing realization of a united mankind represents and anticipates, so to speak, the truth implicit in a belief in the Kingdom of God to which all nations and all races belong. Denying the unity of mankind as aim includes, therefore denying the Christian doctrine that the Kingdom of God is at hand."

Tillich stated categorically that he was happy to discover the United States of America "where now I live thanks to American hospitality." He found here "the image of one mankind," an ideal more consistently explicit than in Europe with her tragic self-dismemberment. It is the image of one nation in whom representatives of all nations and races live as citizens. The image is often shadowed. Nonetheless, it is a kind of symbol of "that highest possibility of history which is called mankind." In that possibility, the boundary between native and alien land ceases to exist, wrote Tillich.

There are many such nuggets in this literally priceless volume. On truth we read: A new definition of truth follows the repudiation of the closed system of essentialism. Truth is bound to the situation of the knower—said the author. For Kierkegaard it was the situation of the individual. For Marx, it was a bond with society. From the Christian standpoint, the highest possibility of achieving non-ideological truth is given at the point of profoundest meaninglessness, through the

deepest despair, in man's greatest estrangement from his own nature.

Tillich carried such relativism to the apologists of the ancient church. When they were vindicating themselves before an aggressive paganism, he stated, the commonly acknowledged criterion was the Logos—theoretical and practical reason. Because the apologists equated Christ with the Logos, and the divine commands with the rational law of nature, they could plead the cause of Christian doctrine and practice before their pagan opponents.

In our day, apologetics, he wrote, does not mean erecting a new principle in opposition to existing intellectual and moral standpoints. Its task is to defend the Christian principle against emerging rival positions. The decisive question for both ancient and modern apologetics is that of the common criterion, the court of judgment where the dispute can be settled.

Tillich brilliantly conceded that when he read Ernst Troeltsch he finally shed the last remnant of his interest in the theology of mediation and its apologetics. He turned to church history and the problem of historical criticism. The foundation of Christian belief was for him the Biblical picture of Christ, not the historical Jesus. The criterion of human thought and action was for him the picture of Christ as it was rooted in ecclesiastical belief and human experience, not in the shifting and artificial construct of historical research.

Here, as in his other writings, Tillich lives in the relevance of his thought—a thought always exciting even where it is hard to share fully.

EDWARD J. JURJI

Toward a Theology of Involvement, The Thought of Ernst Troeltsch, by Benjamin A. Reist. The Westminster Press, Philadelphia, 1966. Pp. 264. \$6.00.

The book under review grew out of a doctoral dissertation at Princeton Theological Seminary supervised by Professor Paul L. Lehmann. True to the precept of a distinguished teacher, Reist, now an accomplished theologian in his own right, manages to say "Yes" and "No" almost simultaneous-

ly. It is a "No" to Troeltsch's relativism and historicism, a "Yes" to the theology of involvement and its fulfillment in contextual ethics.

In this work one is not surprised, therefore, to see Troeltsch emerge as the first real *contextual* theologian. By this Professor Reist implies that Troeltsch deliberately attempted to combine theological knowledge with sociological understanding seeking to sharpen the former by means of the latter. One would have to be terribly insensitive, writes the author, not to have noted the rising *surgé* in our own present day of discussion that fits this motif and that has seized a great hearing in the works of such figures as Harvey Cox, Martin Marty, and Peter Berger.

The constant factor in Troeltsch's understanding of the modern world was that it had its beginnings in the Enlightenment and not in the Protestant Reformation. He saw the profound parallel between naturalism and historicism. Both were intrinsically modern—the two great scientific creations of the modern world. His *Der Historismus* conveyed a refinement of the delineation of historical relativism with which it culminated. To live in the modern world and to think as a modern man is to know the fundamental historicizing of all one's thought concerning the shape and meaning of life. His thought regarding the history of Christianity and its involvement in the modern world was—as Dr. Reist says—disastrous in the sense that his theology dissipated itself in historicizing all thought about man, his culture and values.

In Troeltsch's view, Protestantism represented but a new answer to an old question. Luther's reform of the church was first of all only a reconstruction of Catholicism, a continuation of the Catholic formulation to which there was given a new answer. And this-wordly asceticism was thus seen as the main force of Protestantism. Next to medieval Catholicism, Protestantism arose as the second great type of Christian social doctrine. Even though Reist applies the term "collapse" to the outcome of Troeltsch's theology, he feels impelled to concede that it was also a theology of involvement toward which Troeltsch pointed. It is a theology now appearing as the only road ahead. The church's mission and theology's task in the

post-Christendom world, says the author, must unfold in the context of secularization and pluralism. The task, nevertheless, is to keep pluralism plural.

The life of Troeltsch—depicted in Friedrich von Hügel's biographical sketches—revolved around three concerns: Probing the past, particularly of Protestantism; an attempt to grasp the profiles of the contemporary world; and an attempt to articulate a theology of involvement. In Professor Reist's judgment, the most interesting thing about Troeltsch was the fact that he was the first to give serious theological attention to the question of the come-of-age world which Dietrich Bonhoeffer later tried to clarify. Significantly, too, Troeltsch's own theological position was shattered as he wrestled with the problems now referred to as that of the post-Christian era. But his impressive thought did yield a perspective for understanding both the past and the present efforts of the church to make its gospel clear in and to its time.

EDWARD J. JURJI

Theology in Reconstruction, by T. F. Torrance. Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1966. Pp. 288. \$5.00.

President McCord recently proclaimed that "theology is now a shambles," and then he proceeded with sorting the wreckage. Now Professor Thomas Torrance of Edinburgh speaks of reconstruction, which implies that theology needs badly rebuilding, and, optimistically, that the work has perhaps already begun. Hence the title of his book: *Theology in Reconstruction*, which is a collection of papers which he had published at different times and on various occasions. These essays are grouped under three headlines: (a) Knowledge of God; (b) through Jesus Christ; and (c) in the Holy Spirit. Let not this impressive Trinitarian scheme induce us into thinking that the author meant to write a new *Summa*. This is simply a convenient device for distributing separate articles according to the author's perspective and method, which provide the necessary principle of unity.

The theology of Thomas Torrance might be described as analytical and ideological. It begins with a re-visitation of Nicene and

Chalcedonian themes disengaged, for better or for worse, from Platonic speculation; of course it takes some doing to achieve this separation. The Patristic doctrine is brought under analytical scrutiny, with a view to ascertaining that it is meaningful, and what its meaning actually is. The evaluation of medieval developments is less thorough and less original, but the author comes back into his own when dealing with Reformed theology. His sympathy is evidently toward Barth, but not for Pseudo-Barthianism, of which Karl Barth humorously declares himself innocent. The author's theological method may prove invaluable for the task of reconstruction, in that it makes the most of the positive acquisitions of a developing theological tradition. However, two dimensions seem to be somewhat lacking. Scriptural sources were not submitted to the same rigorous treatment as subsequent doctrinal developments, and few references are made to the context in which these developments took place. Builders engaged in the reconstruction will have to look elsewhere for Biblical hermeneutics and the "reading" of historical events and personalities.

GEORGES A. BARROIS

A Theology Reader, edited by Robert W. Gleason, S.J. The Macmillan Co., New York, N.Y., 1966. Pp. xii+333. \$6.95.

Often it takes decades for textbooks and manuals to catch up with the late developments of almost any science. Theology is no exception, even though its subject matter would seem to partake, if not of the eternity of God, at least of the agelessness of Christian revelation. Yet the theological formulation of dogma is being renewed under our own eyes with a disconcerting rapidity, and few of us today would think of writing a *Summa*, antiquated on publication date! As a matter of fact, manuals of dogmatics and of moral theology survive only as vestigial products of the Pre-Vatican II era. They are obsolete and irrelevant. We welcome all the more a book like Father Gleason's *Theology Reader*, which offers us a series of theological essays on crucial issues. There is here no attempt at an artificial synthesis, no pretense of answering conclusively ques-

tions which had better be left open, but a live record of contemporary theological research in Roman Catholic circles.

Frankly, the essays are somewhat unequal. The opening one, on "Literary Genres in the Bible," reproduces an article published in 1955 in *l'Ami du Clergé*, a French periodical much read by parish priests. It indicates a caution which was in order in the by-gone days of theological McCarthyism, but which appears somewhat ludicrous today. The second essay, on "The Conception of the Gospels as Salvation History," reflects the discussions of the so-called "Synoptic question" much debated during the first two decades of the century. But the third essay, on "The Historicity of the Gospels," launches into actuality, by illustrating the bearing of the techniques of *Form-* and *Redaktionsgeschichte* on the exegesis of characteristic pericopes. It all looks as if the editor, who incidentally is responsible for the essay on "Miracles in Contemporary Theology," had made it a point of ushering the integrators, the conservatives, and generally the timid souls, into the latest ways of thinking, step by step. We are decidedly moving away from the Pre-Vatican II era with such articles as "How Do We Prove that God exists,"—a re-evaluation of the "proofs" (quotation-marks the editor's, not mine!), a re-interpretation of what is meant by the expression "Preambles of the Faith," and Congar's "Scripture and Tradition." The new trends of Catholic theology are most perceptible in several essays tending to a de-objectivation of the notion of grace and the resulting conception of redemption, stressing our personal encounter with God, or re-interpreting the Sacraments, no longer as the Tridentine machinery for salvation, but as the mysterious realization of the vital presence of Christ in his members—Father Schillebeeckx's *Ursakrament*.

GEORGES A. BARROIS

St. Anselm's Proslogion (Trans. with an introduction and philosophical commentary by M. J. Charlesworth). The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965. Pp. viii+196. 35s.

We are presented with a new translation of Saint Anselm's *Proslogion* and of the sub-

sequent debate between Anselm and Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, viz.: *Reply on behalf of the fool*, and *The author's reply to Gaunilo*, on the basis of the critical text edited recently by Dom F. S. Schmidt, O. S. B. For this excellent translation we should be grateful to M. J. Charlesworth, but above all for his introduction and philosophical commentary—more than one half of the volume. Every theological student, sooner or later, has come across Saint Anselm's so-called ontological argument for the existence of God, namely: the mere fact that we can think meaningfully of "that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought," entails necessarily the actual existence of such a being. The original argument was reproduced with various modifications by the Augustinian theologians of the thirteenth century, in particular by those of the Franciscan school, and, after the waning of Scholasticism, by philosophers like Descartes and Leibniz. It had been bluntly rejected by Aquinas as implying an unwarranted jump from the conceptual to the factual order, and discarded by Kant and post-Kantian philosophers as violating the axiom that "existence is not a predicate." The argument somehow outlived the onslaught, and few modern theologians or philosophers would be ready to dismiss it as a useless conundrum. As early as 1931, Karl Barth reconsidered it, interpreting Anselmian theology as a systematic *fideism* making no allowance for a merely rational approach to motives of credibility. Within such a *fideism*, the argument had full force indeed, but the "fool" was left out in the cold. From the thirties onward, a score of articles and monographs have been written on the subject, and the present study constitutes an invaluable guide into that kind of literature.

The author is first and foremost anxious to "re-present Anselm's ideas as he has intended them," and to distinguish Anselm's position from the arbitrary interpretations that were foisted upon it, either because such interpretations involved a different theory of religious knowledge, or because they stemmed from a different conception of the relationship of faith to reason. As a whole, the author would not favor Barth's fideistic re-interpretation of the Anselmian argument, nor any categorical rejection of the same, nor, for that matter, any attempt at revali-

dating it wholesale at the expense of the historical perspective. The commentary of the *Prosligion* and appendices follows step by step the thought of Anselm, in all its fluidity, and through its bewildering stylistic patterns. This is no antiquarian undertaking, but a live concern. The author claims the privilege of arguing with Anselm, "philosopher to philosopher, much as we might argue with a contemporary," and this claim he makes good. It would be little useful, and it would be perhaps deceiving, to try to summarize the argumentation of the commentator within the limited format of a review for the *P. S. Bulletin*. The problem ought to be left open, and a final verdict is definitely inadvisable.

GEORGES A. BARROIS

Biblical

Symbolism in the Dura Synagogue, being vols. 9, 10, and 11 of *Jewish Symbols in the Greco-Roman Period*, by Erwin R. Goodenough. Pantheon Books, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1964. Pp. 237; 251; XXI Plates and 354 illustrations. \$25.00.

The monumental work of the late E. R. Goodenough, in the Bollingen Series, has now reached eleven volumes (the earlier volumes were reviewed in previous numbers of the *P. S. Bulletin*). A twelfth volume, containing an interpretative summary of the entire series, is still to be published.

The three volumes now under review comprise a detailed analysis of the mural paintings in the Jewish synagogue unearthed in the 1930's at Dura Europos. Dura, which was the easternmost outpost of the Roman Empire, was overcome in A.D. 256 by the Persian armies of King Shapur I. The preservation of a large portion of the synagogue is due to the military strategy of the Romans, who, during the siege of the city, covered up a number of buildings, including the synagogue, that were close to the city wall with a mud brick embankment to fortify it. Unearthed now by the archaeologist's spade, the synagogue is seen to have consisted of a prayer hall, a forecourt in front of it, and a precinct surrounded by chambers facing the street through which it was approached. Dated by an inscription A.D. 245, the synagogue was the

third building on the site, replacing not only a synagogue of the second or third century, but a much earlier private dwelling.

Since much of the historical background and many of the archaeological artifacts have already been discussed, notably by Carl H. Kraeling in his definitive publication *The Synagogue* (1956), Goodenough restricts his attention to the interpretation of the artistic remains. Fresh photographs made by Mr. F. Anderegg are reproduced in magnificent color plates in vol. XI, and reproductions in black and white of copies made *in situ* by Mr. H. Gute provide what is probably the most reliable report attainable of the now fading originals, which can be seen in the Yale University Art Gallery.

The discovery of the Dura synagogue aroused much interest not only among art historians but also among historians of ancient Judaism. The latter were quite unprepared by literary evidence for the existence of ancient Jewish painting, much less for the manifest approval of such art used in decorating a house of worship. Here are depicted such biblical scenes as the dream of Jacob, the discovery of the infant Moses in the river, the Israelites' march through the Red Sea, the procession of the ark of the covenant, Elijah's revival of the widow's son, the failure of the sacrifice to Baal, the anointing of David by Samuel, David and Saul in the wilderness, Ezekiel and the valley of dry bones, and several other scenes. In addition there are depicted certain pagan artistic motifs, including signs of the zodiac. Above the benches which line the walls of the hall ran an ornamental dado, almost two feet broad, painted to produce the effect of marble or porphyry slabs. Some of the slabs are plain, and others are decorated with panthers, tigers, lions, lionesses, and masks inscribed in circles. There is thus a plethora of material for the art historian to evaluate, and it is not surprising that many scholars have attempted to interpret the religious and artistic significance of these finds.

In order to understand the religious ideas expressed in the decoration of the Dura synagogue Goodenough turns to Philo and his allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament. Going beyond the historical interpretation of Hellenistic Judaism, Goodenough also evaluates the motifs in the light of the psycho-

analytical theories of Freud and Jung. In accord with modern depth psychology, Goodenough sees in the image of harnessed lionesses not only a Dionysiac motif, but interprets it as a symbol of tamed wildness, that is, an expression of what is held to be one of the deepest conceptions of religious mentality, the taming of the ferocity of the Divinity (vol. IX, p. 60). The anointing of David by Samuel is taken to represent "the initiation of a neophyte into a mystery cult" (vol. IX, p. 188), and the Ark of the covenant was an expression of the nature of ultimate reality (vol. X, p. 87). The infant Moses is taken from the river by Anahita-Aphrodite and given to the Nymphs (vol. X, p. 210).

Goodenough's work is of great value for the art historian, as well as for the historian of ancient Judaism. The reader has brought together for him in these three volumes an impressive amount of literary and archaeological data, for which he can only be grateful. How far, however, Goodenough's interpretation of the religious significance of the Dura material will commend itself is open to question. While acknowledging the author's erudition and acumen, many will doubtless conclude that more than once his interest in psychoanalysis has resulted in foisting upon "the extremely intelligent mind which planned the paintings in the synagogue" (vol. X, p. 123) meanings and intentions that are highly problematical.

BRUCE M. METZGER

A Patristic Greek Lexicon, ed. by G. W. H. Lampe, Fascicle 4 (μετεώρισμα—προκαταίθρημι). The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965. Pp. 865-1152. \$13.45.

The monumental *Patristic Greek Lexicon*, begun earlier this century by Darrell Stone, Principal of Pusey House, Oxford, has been brought one step closer to its completion by the publication of the fourth fascicle. It is expected that one more fascicle will complete the lexicon.

In view of the lack of a good Greek lexicon that covers the Patristic period, the present volume is greatly to be welcomed. The chronological span of writings surveyed by the collaborators in this project extends from Clement of Rome (A.D. 96) to Theodore the Studite (died 826). Within these limits all

words illustrating the development of Christian thought and institutions have been treated as fully as possible, with extensive citations from the more important relevant passages. In order to make more space available for articles of major interest, the common meanings of any word, already noted by Liddell and Scott in their classical Greek Lexicon, are not repeated here unless they are of significance for patristic study. Furthermore, the more important longer articles are arranged according to the logic of the subject matter rather than strictly lexicographically. The work, therefore, leans in the direction of being a theological dictionary without ceasing to be a philological lexicon within the limits mentioned above.

The longest article contained in the fourth fascicle is the one that sets forth the usage of πνεῦμα in fourteen columns. Other noteworthy articles that fall within the section of the alphabet covered by the fascicle are those that deal with μορογενής (which properly is defined first as "only" and secondly as "only begotten"), μορφή, Μωϋσῆς (whom the Fathers found to be a type of God, of Christ, and of the Christian), νηστεία (referring to Christ's fasting, Lenten fasting, and other fasts, both Christian, Jewish, and heretical), νοῦς, οὐσία, πίστις, and many others.

By working through the patristic usage of words such as these, the theologian and historian of doctrine will find much light cast upon the development of Christian thought and practice during the first eight centuries of the growth of the Church. Scholars in many disciplines will await with eagerness the final fascicle of this monumental lexicographical project.

BRUCE M. METZGER

Calvin's Commentaries: The Acts of the Apostles, vol. II (ch. 14-28), trans. by John W. Fraser. Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1966. Pp. 329. \$6.00.

The general design and the quality of Eerdmans' series of Calvin's scriptural commentaries, edited by David W. and Thomas F. Torrance, are well-known and need no introduction. It will suffice to note here that the second part of the commentary on Acts, ch. 14-28, is now available. The translator is

John Fraser, who is also scheduled for the commentary on I Corinthians. We are referred to the introduction to the first volume on Acts, translated by W. J. G. McDonald, for details on the history of both parts of Calvin's commentary on Acts and their successive editions. Fraser's translation is smooth, smoother than Calvin's Latin style, to say nothing of his nervous French. Scanty footnotes point to minor variants in Calvin's free quotations from Scripture, the Vulgate, and modern English versions, or to additional clauses inserted by Calvin—hurriedly, says Fraser—in the second edition of the commentary. The letter of dedication of the second part of the commentary to Frederick, son of the King of Denmark, had already been given by McDonald at the beginning of volume I.

GEORGES A. BARROIS

History

The Reformation Crisis, ed. by Joel Hurstfield. Harper & Row, Publishers, N.Y., 1966. Pp. 118. \$1.25.

In 1962 a series of talks was given on the British radio on the subject of the 16th century religious revolution in Western Europe. These addresses were subsequently revised by their authors, and, along with two additional articles, have now been published under the title *The Reformation Crisis*.

The viewpoint of this symposium is that the Protestant Reformation was basically a religious movement, which it undoubtedly was. But—as this volume makes clear—its course and outcome were to a considerable degree determined by such political factors as nationalism—a yeasty ferment in 16th century Europe—the dynastic rivalries of the houses of Hapsburg and Valois, and even the forays of the infidel Turks in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the age was one of social upheaval, and even revolution; and this factor also played a part in the shaping and development of the Protestant movement.

Any collection of essays such as this runs the risks of unevenness of treatment and incomplete coverage. But such defects are not obvious in this symposium. For all the articles are of first-rate quality; and—within the obvious limits of space—virtually every significant aspect of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation is mentioned, even if

it is not dealt with in detail. And the story is even carried beyond the 16th century into the 17th, when, as Miss Veronica Wedgwood's essay puts it, "the divisions harden." A well selected bibliography greatly adds to the value of this volume.

Small as the book is, it offers an admirable introduction to the profoundly significant and epoch-making events which it describes.

NORMAN V. HOPE

The Ecumenical Vanguard, by Leonard J. Swidler, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pa., 1966. Pp. 287. \$7.75.

For many Protestants, the recent and sudden explosion of ecumenical concern and activity in the Roman Catholic Church has been both surprising and incomprehensible. We may suspect that it has been the result of a ferment quietly at work for a long time but, if that is the case, most of us know very little about it.

In this book, Professor Swidler, of Duquesne University, provides an interesting and illuminating account of one of the most important sources of this new ecumenicity: the Una Sancta Movement and related developments in Germany from the end of World War I to the convocation of Vatican II. What he has written offers an excellent introduction to the "ecumenical vanguard" in the Roman Catholic Church; it could also help to prepare us for a more creative relationship to it.

In his survey, the author shows how certain important developments in Protestantism in recent decades—neo-orthodox theology, the new biblical scholarship, and new interest in liturgy—created a situation in which Roman Catholics were led to take Protestantism more seriously, re-examine their traditional attitudes toward the reformation and toward Protestant life and thought, and eventually to expose themselves to these forces. As these things occurred at the same time that many Protestants were taking a new look at Roman Catholicism, the stage was set for a new era in ecumenical relations.

Swidler explores a number of areas in which these contacts occurred, especially at those points where both communities were concerned about renewal: the Ecumenical

Movement, the Liturgical Movement, Biblical Studies, the re-discovery of the laity, and so forth. Primary attention is given to the *Una Sancta* Movement and to the work of its founder, Father Max Metzger. The book closes with the story of the rapid expansion of this movement after the end of World War II, the serious crisis which arose as the result of decisions taken by Pope Pius XII and the proclamation of the dogma of the Assumption, and the gradual change which became evident in the late 1950's and culminated in the Vatican Council.

While accomplishing his main objective of presenting an historical account of one particular movement, the author offers us interesting insights at a number of specific points. The book itself is an admirable witness to the new ecumenical mood, and its freedom and openness in dealing with Protestantism. The author stresses the importance of Karl Barth's theological work for modern Catholicism. He also shows how the *Una Sancta* was an ecumenical movement limited to Catholics and Lutherans, which had practically no relationship to The Ecumenical Movement during that same period.

Important as this study is, it has certain limitations. Professor Swidler's observations about Protestantism are careful and usually correct, but do not penetrate very deeply. In fact, whether he is dealing with neo-orthodox theology, Protestant biblical scholarship or the new emphasis on the laity, he seldom goes beyond a superficial analysis. In his discussion of the crisis which arose in Catholic Ecumenical circles in the 1950's, he interprets it faithfully, but his account does not reveal much of the deep anguish and suffering of those who lived the intense conflict between their loyalty to the faith as they understood it and the official decisions of the Church. We have here an excellent account of the development of those ecumenical concerns which have come to the fore in recent years. But it is just possible that we are about to enter a new era in ecumenical relationships in which quite new issues will be raised, in a very different context. There is no hint in this book that any such seeds have begun to sprout underground. This may mean that these new forces were not at work in the movements here described. Or, it may indi-

cate that the new stirrings, even where present, have not been perceived.

RICHARD SHAULL

The Register of the Company of Pastors of Geneva in the time of Calvin, ed. and trans. by Philip Edgcumbe Hughes. Wm. B. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Mich., 1966. Pp. xvi+380. \$12.50.

There is no "reviewing" this book, but rather bringing it as a *must* to the attention of all those who are interested in the life and times of Calvin. Theological students often had to be content with biographical studies or historical surveys of questionable objectivity. Primary sources were either unavailable or of difficult reading, since most of the material is written in sixteenth century French or sixteenth century Latin, two idioms with which the majority of American students is not readily conversant. Now we have here a live piece of first-hand documentation, namely the integral Register of the Company of Pastors of Geneva—we would say: the Journal of the Presbytery—covering the years 1541 to 1564. It includes miscellaneous deliberations, decisions, ordinances, and the correspondence of the Company during those crucial years. The entries range from the trivial: appointment of ministers or teachers, memorial notices, admonitions to minister so-and-so for misbehavior, answers to various requests from private persons,—to affairs of momentous consequence: problems of policy and ecclesiastical discipline, communication with the City government, diplomatic relations with the Bernese and the Swiss cantons, the sending of delegates or ministers to reformed churches of other countries, and judicial proceedings against undesirable persons, as a result of which the culprits were censured, or deposed of their charges, or delivered to civil authorities for imprisonment, banishment, or . . . execution. As far as I have been able to judge from a summary reading, the translation makes reasonable justice to the original text, recently published in Geneva (Librairie Droz), under the title: *Registres de la Compagnie des Pasteurs de Genève au Temps de Calvin*, tome I, 1546-1553, edited by Professor Jean François

Bergier (1964); tome II, 1553-1564, edited by Robert M. Kingdon, in collaboration with J. F. Bergier and Alain Dufour (1962).

GEORGES A. BARROIS

Presbyterian Authority and Discipline, by John Kennedy. John Knox Press, Richmond, Virginia, 1965. Pp. 118. \$1.50 (Paper).

John Kennedy is a minister of the Church of Scotland, which is, as he warns us, the tradition out of and to which he speaks. Yet no one should feel that his work is therefore only of parochial interest, any more than that the slenderness of the volume indicates slimness of content or slightness of thought. Accepting the present Scottish Presbyterian system of Church government as his standpoint, he inquires as to the nature, source, and proper scope of the Church's authority.

He begins by saying that the authority of the Church rests upon the authority of the Bible, so much so that "there will be no recovery of allegiance to and in the Protestant Church till there is a recovery of allegiance to the Bible" (p. 5). But since, for Luther and Calvin as for modern man, the Bible has authority only as it speaks convincingly to the believing conscience, it is the awakening of this conscience in its members which becomes the primary task of a Church concerned about the recovery of its authority.

Dr. Kennedy then spends an interesting chapter discussing the nature and exercise of authority in the early Church, which he sees, whatever its locus, as "that which expressed the mind of Christ" (p. 25). The next chapter sketches the development of his own tradition, from "the Reformers [who] re-established in their day the religious authority of the Word of God and removed its seat from the Church to the religious consciousness" (p. 40) to the formulation and establishment of the Scottish tradition.

He next moves to a consideration of the problem of "discipline and Christian fellowship," which lies at the heart of his thesis. He has an extremely interesting discussion of earlier Scottish ecclesiastical discipline, including the fact that the kirk session was

in many ways the precursor of the modern police force, which goes a long way toward explaining the Scot's distaste for Church authority. Nevertheless, he bemoans the modern lack of any spirit of "obedience to constituted Church authority properly administered" (p. 68), which he blames on self-sufficient individualism on the one hand, and ecclesiastical *laissez-aller* on the other. And here lies not only his dilemma, but his problem: "The freedom of the individual's approach to God does not abrogate the fact that he is a member of Christ's body, the Church, and owes a reasonable obedience to its properly constituted authorities" (pp. 68f). But just what is "reasonable obedience," when even the Bible is submitted for validation to the individual conscience? This has been the *vexata quaestio* in every discussion of Church authority since the Reformation, and especially since the loss of the state as the coercive arm of the Church. Voluntarism is still voluntarism, no matter how you slice it.

It is within this context that one must view his attempted solution of the problem. The Church member's obligation to accept that authority to which he has submitted himself, the need for small groups (both to revive the spirit of concern and sharing and to de-emphasize government by impersonal rule), the training of elders to assume responsibility for these groups, and family spirit as normative for the Church, all these are given fine, thoughtful discussion. No one could disagree that intimate, loving concern reflects the love of Christ. But it is not the only way the mind of Christ is expressed. Despite a kind of romanticism which denigrates government by rule, the Church has got to be ruled. The book misses its chance in bypassing (as Dr. Kennedy's forebears did not) the problem of expressing the mind of Christ in the framing and exercise of ecclesiastical law. The Reformers and their heirs built their polity on their theology, and the one was intended to express the other. We have a vastly changed theology, but have hardly begun to build a polity to express it.

This book is, nevertheless, interesting and informative within its limits, and would slip easily into the hands of a session concerned with the exercise of its authority.

DONALD F. CHATFIELD

Preaching

Whose God is Dead? by David H. C. Read. Forward Movement Publications, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1966. Pp. 87. 25¢.

In this small paperback, one of the really great preachers of the English speaking world takes on the challenge of the new atheism and gives some sensible evangelical answers to the inevitable questions people have raised. Albert Outler referred to the current theological spasm (or is it merely sociological?) as "the death of God hulla-baloo" and, as far as its tenure is concerned, his characterization may have a point. Nevertheless, well-meaning Christian individuals are asking questions that arise from those mental and emotional complexities the omniscience of the secular crowd has not answered yet.

In the course of eight concise chapters, Dr. Read, who is senior minister at Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church in New York City, pursues his theme "with a steady eye on the Christian faith and an equally steady eye on the theological rumblings of the times" and gives "coherent answers for a confounded world." The topics of his chapters indicate the thrust of his discussions: Is God an Abstraction? Is God Three or Two or One? Is Holiness Outdated? Was God Ever Born? and so forth. He avoids delivering merely a polemic against the Hamiltons and Altizers of the new theological school; rather he maintains a consistent orientation towards personal religion and shows us how many of our images and doctrines are necessary descriptions of living experiences. There is much common sense in these pages. The author writes from no ivory tower; he comprehends the Bible completely, but he understands people also, both as a man in the world and as a Christian who knows how to respond to the foibles and faddisms of human nature. Some may criticize the firmness with which he states his own case and the traditional orthodoxy that forms the context out of which he speaks, but Dr. Read has an alert mind and a solid deposit of basic theological certainties which fit him admirably for a major part in the necessary dialogue between the Church and those who feel the

churches have gone into "the limbo of nostalgic irrelevance" (p. 5).

This little book should be read by all contemporary clergymen and Church School teachers. Many will use it profitably as a guide for study groups and retreats.

DONALD MACLEOD

What is Sin? What is Virtue? by Robert J. McCracken. Harper & Row, New York, 1966. Pp. 94. \$2.95.

This is a thoughtful, well written series of sermon essays by the minister of the Riverside Church in New York City, a preacher with strong convictions and of unusual competence. He has taken two ancient structures, "the seven deadly sins" and "the seven cardinal virtues" and used them as a framework by which to study our human nature and direct us in fashioning our moral judgments.

The first half of these studies is necessarily analytical; the second prescribes the road to "mental, moral, and spiritual health." The usefulness of this book is primarily in its content, but we cannot overlook how well it demonstrates the way to make a series of "teaching sermons" really effective. The key to this latter quality lies largely in the author's perceptive knowledge of human nature and his sensitive awareness of the religious and cultural movements of our day. It is not easy to preach engaging sermons on such well worn concepts as pride, envy, anger, justice, temperance, *et cetera*, in an age that blurs such moral distinctions and regards the advocates of spiritual priorities as being "stuffy." Dr. McCracken, however, makes a firm case for Christian morality with a measure of freshness and in a superior English style somewhat rare in a day of literary mediocrity in the Protestant pulpit.

DONALD MACLEOD

The Magnificent Defeat, by Frederick Buechner. The Seabury Press, New York, 1966. Pp. 144. \$3.50.

One of America's veteran preachers, Ralph W. Sockman, said about this book: "Here is a book that is down to earth and up to God." Of the writer's style, another contemporary preacher, Theodore P. Ferris, remarked: "He can let the Bible speak.

Through him it speaks naturally, strongly, and with great beauty." What is the secret of the power and effectiveness of this volume? Maybe Dr. Ferris named it when he added: "The author believes in God and in Christ and is not embarrassed by the word *religion*."

As a novelist, Frederick Buechner has written four works, the first, *A Long Day's Dying*, receiving wide popular acclaim and enthusiastic reviews. A Presbyterian minister, he serves as School Minister at Phillips Exeter Academy and is gaining generally an admirable reputation as an interpreter of ancient religious concepts in vigorous and vital terms. This volume is a series of sermons that can be grouped under three heads: the challenge to surrender; the triumph of love; and the mystery and miracle of grace. In form and sentiment Buechner is a disciple of Buttrick, Knox, and Scherer—as superb a trio of mentors none can find anywhere. His type of reading is revealed in the echoes of Shakespeare, Shelley, and Keats. But his homiletical art is his own and its quality and strength lie in his ability to cast Biblical events in contemporary form and to deal with the great issues of faith and life simply and with telling impact. Such a book as this makes traditional homiletical textbooks appear somewhat truncated because rarely do they include these exciting models that exemplify the creations of the highly competent.

DONALD MACLEOD

A Listener's Guide to Preaching, by William D. Thompson. Abingdon Press, Nashville, Tennessee, 1966. Pp. 110. \$1.25 (Paper).

Here is a book for laymen that would be well worth a pastor's while putting into their hands. However, he had better be prepared for some excitement if he does so, for it is bound to get a response.

The book has a dual thrust: "Every preacher who fulfills his calling has a word from the Lord for you" (p. 14), and, "By your response to the preaching, you ultimately determine its effectiveness" (p. 8). It is the task of the book to convince the reader of the second theme and show him its

implications, which it does in part by using the first as a kind of leitmotif throughout.

Dr. Thompson, who is associate professor of homiletics and speech at Eastern Baptist Theological Seminary, has obviously given this problem a good deal of thought and research; yet his style is, for the most part, racy, contemporary, and effective ("Without consistent, biblical preaching to give it meaning, the Christian hand outstretched in love falls limp into a humanitarian gesture"; "Don't let a habit of sitting in a certain place keep you from hearing God's Word to you"); the occasional note of condescension ("Do you remember the process of communication we talked about in chapter 4?") does not mar the effect of the whole.

He begins by defining preaching (in a chapter which is a bit slow in getting to the point), and then speaks convincingly on the listener's responsibility for preaching, basing his case on the nature of the Church. The third chapter lets the church member in on how a sermon is prepared, dealing with the choice and arrangement of ideas and the composition and delivery of the sermon. The weaknesses here are the confusing of the sermon's main idea with its function (kerygmatic, didactic, therapeutic), and the sketchiness of the section on delivery. Nevertheless, the layman should find it interesting, and the clergyman may even find it illuminating.

The fourth chapter deals with preparation for listening, and the eight ideas presented (rather too briefly, in some cases) could not help being beneficial if put into practice. The next chapter, on listening to the sermon, is the one I found most interesting, especially for its fine brief analysis of barriers to concentration. Finally he talks about responding to the sermon; it is a helpful section, in spite of laying disproportionate emphasis on change of behavior. There is a valuable discussion of the possibilities of sermon feedback groups, and closing recommendations which will gladden the pastor's heart (e.g., "express your honest appreciation frequently . . . provide ample time and sufficient funds for him to study").

The book is not without its defects: the occasional condescension and sketchiness already noted; the illustrations, which look as if they were done for a mimeographed youth fellowship news letter; the several lists of

recommendations, which tend to get confusing and sometimes are not specific enough. But the singleness of purpose with its theological rationale, the popular and lively style, the insistent challenge to the listener to take his proper part in the task of proclamation, these should gain the book a wide readership, and will cause it to have seminal effectiveness wherever it is read.

DONALD F. CHATFIELD

General

The Prophetic Voice in Modern Fiction, by William R. Mueller. Anchor Books (Doubleday & Company, Inc.), Garden City, New York, 1966. Pp. 186. 95¢ (Paper).

William R. Mueller's provocative and challenging book, first published by the Association Press in 1959, is now out in paperback. Currently professor of English at Goucher College, Mueller combines critical competence in his own field with an impressive theological and biblical awareness, and he builds a highly interesting dialogue between the two areas.

He analyzes six novels by authors in "the prophetic tradition," who "analyze and chronicle the sickness of their own civilization" (p. 12), and, having in each case examined the Biblical teaching on the novel's major motif, concludes each chapter with a discussion of the relationship between the Biblical and fictional view of the same theme. Thus the Biblical themes of vocation, the fall, judgment, suffering, love, and remnant provide the matrix, respectively, for discussions of Joyce's *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Camus' *The Fall*, Kafka's *The Trial*, Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*, Greene's *The Heart of the Matter*, and Silone's *A Handful of Blackberries*.

These dialogues (as the author calls them) are handled with skill and imagination, and are often not only thought-provoking but sometimes even verge on the definitive. Just one example of the vistas opened to the reader of this book is the final sentence on Joyce's Stephen Dedalus: "Stephen, cut off from the Church Visible and the nation vis-

ible, yet serves Christian and Irishman alike as he stands in the anteroom to salvation, fashioning those words which will call men to a knowledge of themselves and of their place in a mysterious and beautiful creation" (p. 45).

There are, however, two problems which should be mentioned. The first is that of method. Why were these particular books chosen? And why are they placed in this order? The reason for the progression of the book remains obscure to the reader. More than this, is the method of allotting one theme to a book really satisfactory (Camus and Kafka are both, as he admits, dealing with conviction of sin, Faulkner and Greene with suffering, Greene and Silone with love)? And is it helpful to divide each chapter into three discreet sections? The whole effect is, inevitably, one of artificiality, and, more seriously, of slighting the full reach and integrity of each novel for a constricted dogmatic purpose. The content of the sections on the Bible, especially, is often illuminating and informative, but the effect of sectional treatment is somewhat distracting and didactic.

The second problem is that of aim. For whom is he writing? What is his object? To inform educated Christians, or to convert uncommitted students of literature? From his discussions of the books, one would say that he wants to bring us to a conviction of sin and start us on the "search for a just Redeemer" (p. 81). His major concern at the end of each chapter seems to be to figure out whether the novel's major character(s) will end up in heaven or in hell. This dilemma is, to say the least, ancillary to the major emphasis of each novelist (except, perhaps, Graham Greene), and its being raised as the ultimate question is only explicable if Professor Mueller's aim is to induce the same question in the reader.

A few matters of style. The author would do well to eschew attempts at humor, for his is heavy-handed (see pp. 13, 30, 80f). A few words are infelicitous: "depreciation" for "deprecation" (p. 6); "Reform" for "Reformed" (p. 38); "but" for "as" (p. 124, first sentence); "giving" for "give" (p. 154); "devolves" for "evolves" or "develops" (p.

180). The hyphen in "some-tenderness" (p. 133) is a typographical error.

On the whole, however, this is an interesting, thoughtful, and stimulating book, well-suited to a Christian adult study group. But it is not one to be put in the hands of

the non-Christian seeker, who takes literature and the human heart with sophistication and seriousness; and it seems that this is just the person the author is after.

DONALD F. CHATFIELD

ADDRESSES OF PUBLISHERS

- Abingdon Press, 201 Eighth Avenue South, Nashville, Tenn. 37203
Doubleday & Company, Garden City, Long Island, N.Y. 11530
Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15219
William B. Eerdmans, 255 Jefferson Avenue S.E., Grand Rapids, Mich. 49502
Forward Movement Publications, 412 Sycamore Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Harper & Row, Publishers, 49 East 33rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10016
John Knox Press, 8 North Sixth Street, Richmond, Va. 23219
Macmillan Company, 60 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011
Oxford University Press (The Clarendon Press), Amen House, London, E.C.4
Pantheon Books Inc., 22 East 51st Street, New York, N.Y. 10022
The Seabury Press, 815 Second Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017
Charles Scribner's Sons, 597 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017
The Westminster Press, Witherspoon Building, Philadelphia, Pa. 19107

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First priority will go to those who have attended sessions at the Center of Continuing Education, and to overseas alumni of the Seminary. A waiting list will be carefully maintained for all who request the service. The program is open to ministers of all denominations. It is recommended that a first, second and third choice be given. Applications can be made by writing a note on the Church letterhead.

CREDIT

There are no papers or reports required, and there is no credit awarded toward an academic degree.

GUIDES IN PRINT

There are seven guides available at the present time. Others will be produced in the next year:

1. "Biblical Theology" by J. Christaan Beker
2. "Christian Education for the Parish" by D. Campbell Wyckoff
3. "Church Administration" by Arthur Merrihew Adams
4. "Church Unity" by Paul A. Crowe, Jr.
5. "The New Hermeneutics" by Daniel L. Migliore
6. "World Religions" by Edward J. Jurji
7. "Pastoral Care and Counseling" by Seward Hiltner
8. "Evangelism" by Elmer G. Homrighausen
9. "The Ministry of Preaching" by Donald Macleod
10. "The Church at Worship" by Donald Macleod

